Opinion
1:21-cv-01066-CL
12-14-2021
SARAH HULETT Plaintiff, v. TROY BABB, Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
MARK D.CLARKE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Sarah Hulett brings this cause of action against the defendant, Troy Babb. The case comes before the Court on Plaintiffs default judgment (#18). For the reasons below, the motion should be GRANTED, Default Judgment should be entered against the defendant in the amount of $200,000.
LEGAL STANDARD
The decision to grant or deny a motion for default judgment is within the discretion of the court. Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986). In exercising its discretion, the court must consider seven factors, often referred to as the Eitel factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff s substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986).
Upon entry of default, plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations of fact regarding liability, except allegations relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true. Geddes v. United Fin-Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff must establish damages by proof, unless the amount is liquidated or otherwise susceptible of computation. Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir, 1981) (internal citation omitted). Relief for cases of default judgment "must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings." Rule 54(c).
DISCUSSION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because the events underlying Plaintiffs claims took place in Curry County, Oregon, which lies within the Medford Division of the District of Oregon.
On September 16, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiffs motion for alternative service method after it appeared that the defendant was evading service. On October 10, 2021, the Court determined that Plaintiff had complied with the Court's Order for alternative method of service, . and service was deemed completed on Defendant Troy Babb. On November 22, 2021, a Clerk's Entry of Default was entered as to Defendant Troy Babb. Now, Plaintiff moves for a default judgment in the amount of $200,000. For the reasons below, Plaintiffs motion for default judgment should be granted.
I. The Eitel factors weigh in favor of entering default judgment against the defendant.
All of the factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment, or they are neutral, except the policy factor favoring a judgment on the merits. On balance, the factors strongly favor granting the motion.
a. The possibility of prejudice to Plaintiff weighs in favor of default judgment.
First, if default judgment were not granted, Plaintiff would be denied a legal remedy against the defendant for his allegedly unlawful actions and "would be left without a remedy given defendant's failure to appear and defend themselves." J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Frel, No. 4:12-cv-0127-BLW, 2013 WL 3190685, *1 (D. Idaho Jun. 21, 2013). Here, Plaintiff has diligently attempted to serve the defendant in multiple ways. She has presented evidence that the defendant has intentionally evaded service. Thus, without a default judgment, Plaintiff would be left without a remedy for the defendant's actions in this case. This prejudice renders the first factor favorable to Plaintiff.
b. The sufficiency of the complaint and the merits of Plaintiffs substantive claims also weigh in favor of default judgment.
Next, Plaintiffs Complaint sufficiently states a claim for relief, thus meeting the second, and third Eitel factors. See Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating the second and third factors require a plaintiff s allegation "state a claim on which the [plaintiff] may recover"). Because the Clerk of the Court has entered default, the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint are taken as true and are binding against the defaulting party. Garcia v. Pacwest Contracting LLC, 2016 WL 526236, 1 (D, Or. Feb 9, 2016) (citing Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, the question is whether Plaintiff is entitled to recover on the facts set forth in the complaint. The Court concludes that Plaintiff is so entitled.
Plaintiff alleges that in September 2020, Defendant Troy Babb hired her to work for his construction business as a cleaner. This required her to move from Portland, Oregon, to Brookings, Oregon. After she moved to Brookings and began to work for the defendant, she claims that he began to pressure her to give him massages, go on dates with him, and perform sexual acts in exchange for money. He sent her many unwanted, sexually explicit text messages before and after she did work for him. Plaintiff additionally claims that the defendant never paid her for the work she did.
These allegations sufficiently state a claim for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 USC 2000e , which prohibits unwanted, offensive verbal or physical conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment that a reasonable person in plaintiffs circumstances would consider to be abusive or hostile. Plaintiff has satisfied the second and third Eitel factors.
c. The possibility of a dispute concerning material facts is a neutral factor, or it weighs in favor of granting default judgment.
The defendant has been properly served but has not appeared in this case. Without an appearance by the defendant and his version of the facts, or any other countervailing evidence, and because all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint are deemed true after entry of default, "no likelihood that any genuine issue of material fact exists" after default has been entered. Elektra Entm't Grp. Inc v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (CD. Cal. 2005). This factor is neutral or weighs in favor of granting default judgment.
d. The sum of money at stake in the action is neutral or weighs in favor of granting default judgment.
"One of the factors the court is free to consider in exercising its discretion to grant or deny default judgment is the sum of money at stake." J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Rafael, No, CIV S-10-1046 LKK GGH, 2011 WL 445803, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb 8, 2011). Here, Plaintiff is seeking non-economic damages in the amount of $200,000, which aims to compensate Plaintiff for her emotional distress, fear, humiliation, embarrassment, and anxiety stemming from Defendant Babb's sexual harassment of Plaintiff. The Court finds this factor is neutral or weighs in favor of granting the motion.
e. No. evidence suggests default was due to excusable neglect; this factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment.
No evidence exists to suggest the defendant's failure to respond to the Complaint was due to excusable neglect. In fact, there is evidence that the defendant intentionally evaded service. An Order of Default was entered. The defendant has not appeared in this case or otherwise indicated that he will do so. This factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment.
f. Policy favors a decision on the merits of the case; this factor weighs against default judgment.
The one factor that weighs in favor of the defendant, and against default judgment, is the strong policy favoring decisions on the merits. However, this factor, without more, is not sufficient to preclude default judgment. "Although 'cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible,' 'the mere existence of Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b) indicates that this preference, standing alone, is not dispositive."' Garcia v. Pacwest Contracting LLC, 2016 WL 526236, at *4 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2016) (quoting PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d. at 1177). Here, the defendant's "failure to defend against [Plaintiffs] claims makes a decision on the merits impossible. Accordingly, the policy favoring decision on the merits does not preclude the Court from entering default judgment against [the Defendants]." Id.
g. Conclusion
The Eitel factors weigh strongly in favor of granting Plaintiffs motion for default judgment because the only factor that weighs against default judgment is the final, policy factor, and it is not dispositive. Without an appearance by Defendant Troy Babb and his side of the facts or any other countervailing evidence, the factors weigh in Plaintiffs favor, and the Court cannot find a reason to deny the motion for default judgment.
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs' motion for default judgment (#18) should be GRANTED.
Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure provides that "[a] default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings." Here, Plaintiffs complaint seeks relief in the form of economic damages in the form of expenses and lost income, fair and reasonable compensatory damages, relief as determined by the Court, and prevailing party fees and reasonable attorney fees. In filing her motion for default judgment, Plaintiff submits a declaration attesting to the actions the defendant took that caused her mental anguish, emotional distress, and she claims that, while she does not know how to put a dollar value on her experience, she hopes that a judgment for $200,000 will help her move forward with her life and "provide some compensation for the emotional distress, moving expenses, and wage loss I have suffered." The Court finds damages thus sufficiently proven and sufficiently the same in kind to what is demanded in the pleadings. The Court should enter default judgment against defendant Troy Babb in the amount of $200,000.
SCHEDULING
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The Report and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections to this Findings and Recommendation, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from today's date. If objections are filed, any response to the objections is due fourteen (14) days from the date of the objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6.