Opinion
2 CA-CV 2023-0204
07-05-2024
Huiqin Du, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Sherry H. McGeary, Defendant/Appellant.
Huiqin Du, Kingman In Propria Persona Sherry H. McGeary, Kingman In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County No. PO202300309 The Honorable Eric E. Gordon, Judge
Huiqin Du, Kingman In Propria Persona
Sherry H. McGeary, Kingman In Propria Persona
Judge Brearcliffe authored the decision of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Eppich and Presiding Judge Sklar concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BREARCLIFFE, JUDGE
¶1 Sherry McGeary appeals from the superior court's issuance of an order of protection granted in favor of Huiqin Du, as confirmed following a contested hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 Du is married to Joseph Jarvis. In August 2023, Du petitioned for an Order of Protection against her sister-in-law, Sherry McGeary. Du alleged multiple acts of domestic violence and harassment by McGeary, occurring on separate occasions. Du describes McGeary "screaming at [her] and [her] husband," making "vulgar gestures," calling them "vulgar names," and causing disturbances. The interactions escalated, requiring police involvement, and culminated with Du alleging that McGeary had "assaulted [her] by pulling [her] right arm and shaking [her] head by [her] hair and then forced [her] to the floor and then slammed the guest room door on [her] head," causing "a concussion the size of [a] half baseball on the right side of [her] head, that also left bruises on [her] arms and legs." Du requested that McGeary be ordered to stay away from her residence.
¶3 The superior court held an ex parte order of protection hearing during which Du and Jarvis testified. The court issued an order of protection, "finding reasonable cause to believe that [McGeary] may commit an act of domestic violence or has committed an act of domestic violence" against Du. The court ordered that McGeary "shall have no contact with" Du and "shall not go to or near" Du's residence.
¶4 McGeary sought a hearing at which to contest the order of protection, denying the conduct alleged in Du's petition and seeking dismissal of the order. McGeary claimed that Du and Jarvis had assaulted her and that the order of protection had been filed in retaliation for criminal charges they faced for that assault. Jarvis also moved to intervene, but there is no indication from the record that the superior court ever formally ruled on that motion.
¶5 The superior court held a contested hearing, where Du, Jarvis, and McGeary testified. The court "affirm[ed] the Injunction Against Harassment that was previously granted," and entered a signed "Hearing Order" pertaining to an "Order of Protection," stating "[t]he protective order listed above remains in effect." McGeary appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(5)(b) and Rule 42(a)(2), Ariz. R. Protective Order P.
Discussion
¶6 We review an order of protection for abuse of discretion. Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, ¶ 10 (App. 2014). "A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion or 'when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's decision, is devoid of competent evidence to support the decision.'" Id. (quoting Mahar v. Acuna, 230 Ariz. 530, ¶ 14 (App. 2012)). We review questions of law de novo. Michaelson v. Garr, 234 Ariz. 542, ¶ 5 (App. 2014).
¶7 On appeal, McGeary first argues that the superior court erred by permitting Jarvis to intervene in the action. In support, she cites to Rule 35(a)(2), Ariz. R. Fam. Law P., which prohibits motions that exceed seventeen pages. Indeed, Jarvis's motion to intervene exceeded seventeen pages. The Rules of Family Law Procedure do not apply to this matter because this action was not "heard in conjunction" with a pending family law case. Ariz. R. Protective Order P. 2. Rather, this matter is governed by the Rules of Protective Order Procedure and, if not inconsistent with those rules, the Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. And, while the page limit for motions under the Rules of Civil Procedure is the same, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2) (page limit for motions), Ariz. R. Civ. P. 24(c) (motions to intervene), McGeary does not articulate why that would be a sufficient basis to reverse a court in such a matter. But, at bottom, McGeary does not point to any order in which Jarvis's motion to intervene was granted in the first instance, and we cannot find one. We cannot conclude, therefore, that the court abused its discretion on this basis.
¶8 McGeary also seems to argue that the petition for order of protection was legally deficient because it put forth an insufficient number of incidents of harassment. She cites our decision in Wood v. Abril, in which we vacated an injunction against harassment on the basis it was unsupported by substantial evidence. 244 Ariz. 436, ¶¶ 6-11 (App. 2018). To obtain such an injunction, a party must show "[a] series" of acts that constitute harassment. A.R.S. § 12-1809(T). In Woods, the party had only demonstrated a single act of harassment, which was insufficient. Woods, 244 Ariz. 436, ¶¶ 6-11.
¶9 But this matter involves an issued order of protection, not an injunction against harassment. Compare § 12-1809, with A.R.S. § 13-3602. Although the unsigned minute entry for the contested hearing is titled "Contested Injunction Against Harassment Hearing" and concludes with the court "affirming the Injunction Against Harassment that was previously granted," the previously granted, and signed, order was an order of protection. An order of protection requires only a single act of domestic violence or threat of the same. See § 13-3602(E); Ariz. R. Protective Orders 23(e)(1). In its review of the petition, the superior court may also consider "any other evidence offered by the plaintiff." Ariz. R. Protective Orders 23(d). Du's petition alleged several acts of harassing conduct and assault, which would serve as adequate grounds for either an order of protection or an injunction against harassment. See A.R.S. §§ 13-3601(A) (domestic violence includes assault under A.R.S. § 13-1203); 13-3602(E); Ariz. R. Protective Orders 23(e)(1); 12-1809(E), (T)(1)(a); Ariz. R. Protective Orders P. 25(e). And to the extent that the court erroneously identified its confirmed order as an injunction against harassment, this was a technical error that does not merit reversal. See Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 27 ("No cause shall be reversed for technical error in pleadings or proceedings when upon the whole case it shall appear that substantial justice has been done."). We see no error.
¶10 McGeary makes several other arguments directed at the superior court's conduct and evidentiary findings, including that the court refused to watch video evidence McGeary made available; "did not stay within the constraints of the petition"; showed "bias toward [Du] and her husband"; "made a sexist statement"; and did not give McGeary "an opportunity . . . to object to any of the false statements being made." However, McGeary fails to develop any of these arguments with legal authority and citations to the record. See Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62 (App. 2009) ("Opening briefs must present and address significant arguments, supported by authority that set forth the appellant's position on the issue in question."); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A) ("'[A]rgument' . . . must contain . . . contentions concerning each issue presented for review, with supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the appellant relies."); Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, ¶ 8 (App. 2022) ("Courts hold unrepresented litigants in Arizona to the same standards as attorneys and do not afford them special leniency."). Accordingly, these arguments are waived. Ritchie, 221 Ariz. 288, ¶ 62. Further, McGeary did not provide a transcript of any proceedings that occurred below. See Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995) ("A party is responsible for making certain the record on appeal contains all transcripts or other documents necessary for us to consider the issues raised on appeal."); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 11(c). Even if her arguments were not waived, we would assume that the transcript supports the superior court's order. Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73 ("When a party fails to include necessary items, we assume they would support the court's findings and conclusions.").
Disposition
¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's affirmance of its order of protection.