Therefore, Cooper v. State is inapposite here. Hughes v. Hinks, 249 Ga. 416, 416-417 ( 291 SE2d 545) (1982). OCGA ยง 42-8-36 (a) (2) provides an additional tolling method which we must also address: "[T]he running of a probated sentence is suspended when the probation supervisor submits an affidavit to the court stating that a probationer is no longer at a residence whose location is known to the supervisor and that the probationer's new residence is not known.
But we find no basis for concluding that Gamble made a knowing and intelligent waiver of this statutory right. See generally Hughes v. Hinks, 249 Ga. 416, 417 ( 291 SE2d 545) (1982). Judgment reversed and case remanded for resentencing. Andrews, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur.
To the extent the state argues that Dave waived her due process rights related to the hearing by, in the state's terms, "absconding" from the mental health court's supervision, we are not persuaded. A criminal defendant must knowingly waive the right to notice, see Hughes v. Hinks , 249 Ga. 416, 291 S.E.2d 545 (1982) (holding that a probation revocation proceeding conducted without notice to the probationer violates due process unless the probationer has knowingly waived the right to notice), and nothing in the record shows that Dave knowingly waived that right. Compare Andrews v. State , 276 Ga. App. 428, 432-433 (3), 623 S.E.2d 247 (2005) (holding that a criminal defendant waived a claim of insufficient notice of a hearing because he was nevertheless present at the hearing, where he failed to object).