Opinion
4:21-CV-04167-KES
05-17-2023
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
KAREN E. SCHREIER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff, Kevin Lee Hughbanks, filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dockets 5, 20. Hughbanks alleges that his conditions of confinement at Mike Durfee State Prison (MDSP) violate his constitutional rights. Dockets 5, 20. Hughbanks has filed a motion for temporary restraining order. Docket 140. For the reasons set forth below, Hughbanks's motion for temporary restraining order is denied.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Hughbanks alleges that the South Dakota Department of Corrections and MDSP implemented a policy, which was to become effective on May 15, 2023, limiting the personal property, including legal documents, books, personal mail, personal clothing, stationary items, journals, and grievances, prisoners can maintain. Docket 140 at 1-2. To prevent irreparable harm if excess personal property is disposed of, Hughbanks requests that the court enter an order to “maintain the status quo and either allow [him] personally, or all inmates, to retain [their] items as long as [they] fit[] in assigned space.” Id. at 2. The court requested that the State defendants respond to Hughbanks's motion for temporary restraining order. Docket 141. Hughbanks did not include a copy of the newly implemented policy with his motion, and he did not identify the policy by number or subject. See Docket 140.
According to the State defendants' response, “[t]here is no new policy, or revision to an existing policy, that will be implemented effective May 15th, 2023, that will reduce the amount of space inmates can use to store items[.]” Docket 143 at 2-3; Docket 143-4 ¶¶ 4-5. The relevant policy, the Offender Personal Property policy, 1.3.C.4, became effective on November 15, 2022. Docket 143-1 at 1; Docket 143-4 ¶ 5. A comprehensive list of allowed personal policy, the Universal Property List, is maintained and is an attachment to the Offender Personal Property policy. Docket 143-1 at 1, 7-11. The Universal Property List was revised on April 11, 2023. Docket 143-1 at 7-11; Docket 1434 ¶ 3. There is no revision to the Universal Property List that will take effect on May 15, 2023. Docket 143-4 ¶ 3. The April 11, 2023, revision to the Universal Property List added “soft cover” to all books. Compare Docket 143-1 at 8, with Docket 143-2 at 8.
When policies are created or revised, inmates are provided the new or revised policies on their tablets. Docket 143-4 ¶ 8. Since the revised Offender Personal Property policy was published to inmates' tablets in November 2022, Hughbanks has not filed a grievance regarding the policy. Id. ¶ 9. Inmates in each unit were informed of the date on which they would be required to comply with the November 15, 2022, revisions to the Offender Personal Property policy. Id. ¶ 6. West Crawford was the last unit that was required to comply with the revised policy. Id. Inmates in West Crawford were informed that they needed to comply with the November 15, 2022, revisions to the Offender Personal Property policy by May 15, 2023. Id. ¶ 7. In accordance with the November 15, 2022, Offender Personal Property policy as well as the previous policy, inmates are allowed two storage containers. Id. ¶ 13; Docket 143-1 at 9; Docket 143-3 at 4. In accordance with the November 15, 2022, Offender Personal Property policy as well as the previous policy, inmates are allowed ten books. Docket 143-4 ¶ 14; Docket 143-1 at 8; Docket 143-3 at 3. The current Offender Personal Property policy provides that “[o]ffenders with an active [legal] case may be granted additional storage space while the case is pending.” Docket 143-1 at 2. Hughbanks is permitted to maintain extra legal documents after May 15, 2023, due to his pending litigation. Docket 143-4 ¶ 12.
DISCUSSION
A temporary restraining order is issued only in the extremely rare instance in which court action must be taken without notice to the nonmoving party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b). Because the State defendants were provided notice and filed a response, the court will construe Hughbanks's motion as a request for a preliminary injunction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(1)(“The court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.”).
A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary and drastic remedy[.]” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008) (citation omitted). Hughbanks, the party seeking preliminary relief, bears the burden of establishing the elements necessary for relief. Watkins, Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003). Whether a preliminary injunction should issue is decided by weighing the four Dataphase factors: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on the other parties; (3) the probability that the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981). In a prison setting, a request for a preliminary injunction “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.' ” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)).
The purpose of preliminary relief, such as a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, is to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm until the court has an opportunity to rule on the merits of the complaint. Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113 n.5 (citation omitted). A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief “must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). “It is inappropriate to grant a preliminary injunction for matters ‘lying wholly outside the issues in the suit.' ” Brakeall v. Stanwick-Klemik, 4:17-CV-04101-LLP, 2019 WL 3807272, at *1, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136069, at *2 (D.S.D. Aug. 13, 2019) (quoting DeBeers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)). In Devose, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of a request for a preliminary injunction requesting relief for alleged retaliatory conduct that had nothing to do with the underlying § 1983 claim of inadequate medical treatment. 42 F.3d at 471. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that it was “self-evident that Devose's motion for temporary relief [had] nothing to do with preserving the district court's decision-making power over the merits of Devose's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit.” Id.
Hughbanks's amended complaint alleges deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs (Docket 20 at 11-29), unsanitary conditions (id. at 2947), inadequate nutrition (id. at 73-77), and overcrowding (id. at 86-89) in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. He alleges lack of meaningful access to the courts in violation of his First Amendment rights. See id. at 62-73. He challenges the inmate correspondence policy, contending it violates his First Amendment rights. See id. at 47-51. He also challenges the Sex Offender Management Program policies, contending they violate his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination. See id. at 81-83, 89-95. Finally, Hughbanks challenges the policies of the parole board, arguing that they do not comply with state law. See id. at 83-86. Hughbanks's amended complaint does not challenge the policy governing the control of prisoners' personal property or allege that his constitutional rights have been violated because the volume of personal property he can possess is restricted. See id. at 11-95. Although Hughbanks's claim that he is being forced to reduce the amount of personal property he can possess, including legal documents, religious materials, personal mail, stationary items, and grievances, may support relief in a new case, it is not a basis for preliminary relief in this § 1983 lawsuit. Further, Hughbanks was provided notice approximately six months ago of the policy revision he now sees to enjoin emergently in this action (Docket 143-4 ¶¶ 5, 8-9), and the State defendants have confirmed that Hughbanks will be permitted to maintain additional legal documents due to his pending litigation (Id. ¶ 12). Hughbanks has not met his burden of demonstrating that a preliminary injunction should issue.
Hughbanks alleges that he should be provided a laptop computer to facilitate legal typing and research. Docket 20 at 68-69. This is a claim regarding a restriction on the type of personal property that an inmate can possess rather than the volume of personal property an inmate can possess.
Thus, it is ORDERED that Hughbanks's motion for a temporary restraining order (Docket 140) is denied.