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Huftile v. Farmer

United States District Court, E.D. California
Feb 9, 2006
No. Civ. S 03-0585 DFL PAN P (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2006)

Opinion

No. Civ. S 03-0585 DFL PAN P.

February 9, 2006


FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS


Plaintiff, who proceeds without counsel, filed this action as a civil detainee under California's Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) Act. He claims defendant, Val. G. Farmer, Ph.D. (Farmer), a licensed psychologist, violated his civil rights by testifying against him in his involuntary civil commitment trial in 2002. Plaintiff seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.

The court approved service of the June 4, 2004, amended complaint, which is not verified, on Farmer, the sole defendant. Presently before the court are plaintiff's June 8, 2005, motion for preliminary injunctive relief and Farmer's August 19, 2005, motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

The following facts are undisputed.

From 1983 to 1992, Farmer was employed by the West River Mental Health Center in Rapid City, South Dakota. In 1984, plaintiff, represented by counsel, was the defendant in a criminal child molestation trial in South Dakota. Plaintiff's attorney called Farmer as a witness at a mitigation and sentencing hearing. Farmer testified he had become acquainted with plaintiff in 1983 for counseling services, which were terminated by mutual agreement. He testified he examined plaintiff again in 1984 to prepare a report and psychological evaluation ("report") for the court, at the request of plaintiff's attorney. Farmer testified about the report in response to questioning by the trial judge, the prosecutor and defense counsel.

In 2002 plaintiff was the subject of civil commitment proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predators Act in the Sacramento County Superior Court, People of the State of California v. Huftile, Case Number 95F01023. A prerequisite of California commitment proceedings is the decision of two "evaluators" that the person sought to be committed "has a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and custody." Welf. Inst. Code § 6601(d). Plaintiff's evaluators were Dr. Miccio-Fonseca and Dr. Vognsen, both of whom testified for the state. Plaintiff did not permit these doctors to interview him. The district attorney independently obtained Farmer's report and called him as a witness to testify about it. Farmer testified within the scope of the 1984 report, which was submitted into evidence without any objection based on psychotherapist-patient privilege. Farmer appeared voluntarily and received witness fees and travel expenses. Farmer testified without plaintiff's consent. Plaintiff took the stand during proceedings and faced questioning about admissions reflected in Farmer's report.

Governing Legal Standards

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept plaintiff's allegations as true, read the complaint most favorably to plaintiff, give plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference that appears from the pleading and argument of the case and dismiss the complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 658 (1963); Retail Clerks International Association, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 754 n. 6 (1963); Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The court may consider documents attached to the complaint in evaluating a motion to dismiss. Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits, for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)-(c).

An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is "material" if it affects the right to recover under applicable substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that establishes the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any'" that the moving party believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on an issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence to support the opponent's burden. To avoid summary judgment on an issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the opponent must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the "`depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324. The opponent's affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent.Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be presented to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 587.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) provides that "supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) "if reduced to admissible evidence" would it be sufficient to carry the party's burden at trial. Id. at 327. Thus, in Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing party's reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as recorded recollection.

A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004).

Application

Farmer contends plaintiff's suit is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). To recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff necessarily would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated through other means such as a petition for habeas corpus. Id.

Plaintiff filed a separate civil rights action against Dr. Miccio-Fonseca, Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, Civ. S 03-1522 FCD DAD P, seeking damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. This court dismissed the action under Heck. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of claims for damages and declaratory relief, but remanded for consideration of injunctive relief. See Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2005) (favorable termination rule of Heck generally applies to § 1983 suits challenging civil commitments under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act, and Huftile had standing to seek habeas relief because a subsequent petition to recommit him could be traced back, through preceding petitions, to his initial confinement). The court determined a decision for plaintiff in the civil rights action would necessarily imply the invalidity of his commitment because Miccio-Fonseca was one of the requisite evaluators who triggered the commitment proceedings.

The court of appeals reasoning in Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca is equally applicable here. Plaintiff claims Farmer conspired with Miccio-Fonseca and Vognsen to fabricate evidence he suffers a mental disability. Granting relief on that ground would necessarily imply the invalidity of plaintiff's commitment. Farmer is entitled to dismissal of claims for damages and declaratory relief, but his claims for injunctive relief survive the Heck analysis.

Farmer next argues he is not a state actor within the meaning of the civil rights statute.

A civil rights plaintiff must show the defendant, acting "under color of state law," deprived him of a right secured by the constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). On occasion, a civil rights claim can proceed against a private party who is "a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents." Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). In assessing state action, the ultimate question is whether the deprivation of federal rights alleged by plaintiff is "fairly attributable" to the government. Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002). A court can identify state action under any of four standards: (1) the public function test; (2) the joint action test; (3) the governmental compulsion test; or (4) the governmental nexus test. Id. (citing Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 935-36 (9th Cir. 1999)). The state-action inquiry is necessarily fact-bound. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).

An allegation that a private person conspired with a state official satisfies the requirement that a defendant act under color of state authority. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff makes a colorable showing Miccio-Fonseca and Vognsen acted as state agents or officials, and defendant offers nothing to rebut that showing. For purposes of the present motion, plaintiff satisfies the state action test.

Farmer next argues he is entitled to absolute witness immunity and the immunity extends to allegations he conspired to submit false evidence. This argument has merit. Franklin v. Terr, 201 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2000). The court finds civil commitment proceedings under California SVP statute are the type of adversary proceeding that bring witness immunity doctrines into play. Nevertheless, defendant's entitlement to witness immunity does not resolve plaintiff's injunctive relief claims. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (absolute immunity does not bar claims for injunctive relief).

Farmer is entitled to summary judgment on the merits of injunctive relief claims concerning psychotherapist-patient privilege. Construing the pleading in favor of plaintiff and based on a review of South Dakota statutes, plaintiff states a claim that Farmer's testimony revealed material subject to psychotherapist-patient privilege under South Dakota law and any waiver effected in the 1984 criminal trial and sentencing was limited to those proceedings. See South Dakota Evidence Code §§ 19-13-7, 19-2-3.2, 19-2-3. Even so, plaintiff's consent to disclosure of privileged information can be implied by his failure to assert psychotherapist-patient privilege during the 2002 commitment trial. See California Evidence Code § 912;People v. Combs, 34 Cal. 4th 821 (2004). Through his silence in California proceedings, he has waived the right to assert the privilege in the future. Thus, Farmer is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief concerning breach of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in future California proceedings.

The court must next address plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief prohibiting Farmer from conspiring with state agents in the future to fabricate evidence plaintiff has a mental disorder. Plaintiff produced no evidence of a conspiracy, and Farmer declared in moving for summary judgment he never spoke to the evaluators. It is far better the claim be raised in future state commitment proceedings, should events warrant it, rather than for this court to cling to such a weak jurisdictional thread. Abstention is proper.

Defendant urges the court to dismiss supplemental state law claims, to the extent plaintiff alleges any. The pleading broadly invokes the court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, but does not plead any causes of action under state law. Because no such claims are alleged, it is unnecessary for the court to consider whether to dismiss them.

In his June 8, 2005, motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff seeks an order prohibiting Farmer from breaching the psychotherapist-patient privilege in the future. For reasons stated above, Farmer is entitled to summary judgment on claims related to the privilege. Therefore, plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied.

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends that:

1. Defendant's August 19, 2005, motion to dismiss and for summary judgment be granted.

2. Plaintiff's claims for damages and declaratory relief be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Heck v. Humphrey.

3. Summary judgment for Farmer be entered on plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief based on breach of psychotherapist-patient privilege.

4. The court abstain from hearing and dismiss plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief prohibiting Farmer from conspiring with state agents in the future to fabricate evidence plaintiff has a mental disorder.

5. Plaintiff's June 8, 2005, motion for a preliminary injunction be denied.

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be filed within 20 days of service of these findings and recommendations. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." The district judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and recommendations in whole or in part.


Summaries of

Huftile v. Farmer

United States District Court, E.D. California
Feb 9, 2006
No. Civ. S 03-0585 DFL PAN P (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2006)
Case details for

Huftile v. Farmer

Case Details

Full title:Michael Huftile, Plaintiff, v. Val G. Farmer, Defendant

Court:United States District Court, E.D. California

Date published: Feb 9, 2006

Citations

No. Civ. S 03-0585 DFL PAN P (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2006)

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