Nothing in the text of Section 171, however, requires a quantifiable percentage of impairment to accompany the prior adjudicated disability as Fund alleges. In construing statutes, "[t]he general rule is that nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the act itself ...." Huffman v. Oklahoma Coca–Cola Bottling Co., 1955 OK 76, ¶ 18, 281 P.2d 436, 440 (quoting 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, § 244 ). At the time of Claimant's subsequent compensable injury on March 22, 2007, Claimant had satisfied the statutory definition of a "physically impaired person" by virtue of the 1992 adjudication.C. Permanent Total Disability Claims Against the Fund

Such a conclusion would require an unauthorized exercise of legislative power by the court and would not be in accord with accepted rules of statutory construction. A similar situation existed in Huffman v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Okla., 281 P.2d 436. There the court refused to enlarge upon Title 40 O.S. 1951 § 72[ 40-72], by including in the term "dangerous machinery" a power driven mechanical conveyor belt not otherwise specifically enumerated therein. There the court held:

¶15 "In construing statutes, ‘[t]he general rule is that nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the act itself ....’ " Multiple Injury Trust Fund v. Garrett , 2017 OK 62, ¶ 20, 408 P.3d 169 (quoting Huffman v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co. , 1955 OK 76, ¶ 18, 281 P.2d 436 ).¶16 We find nothing in the language of the statutes governing MITF awards, 85A O.S. §§ 30 through 34, suggesting the legislature intended § 32(B) to impose a "once in a lifetime" restriction barring a "physically impaired person" who timely files a claim — regardless of the claimant's age or prior awards — from receiving PTD benefits.

Edmondson v. Pearce, 2004 OK 23, ¶ 79 n.48, 91 P.3d 605, 640 n.48 (Okla. 2004) (quoting Huffman v. Okla. Coca–Cola Bottling Co., 1995 OK 76, ¶ 18, 281 P.2d 436, 440 (Okla. 1955)).

This rule is derived from the "ancient and generally accepted rule of construction known as 'Noscitur A Sociis' which . . . means: 'The meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it.'" Application of Central Airlines, Inc., 1947 OK 312, 185 P.2d 919, 923-924(citation omitted); see also Huffman v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1955 OK 76, 281 P.2d 436, 440 (providing that "a statute should not be construed any more broadly or given any greater effect than its terms require. Where the language of the statute is clear in limiting its application . . . and leaves no room for doubt as to the intention of the legislature, there is no authority to transcend or add to the statute, [and the statute] may not be enlarged, stretched, or expanded, or extended. . . .").

¶ 9 We view the Court of Criminal Appeal's interpretation of § 1-142(b) as too broad in that it would make virtually every private parking lot a public parking lot for purposes of Title 47. "The general rule is that nothing may be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the act itself." Huffman v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1955 OK 76, 281 P.2d 436, 440. "Where the language of the statute is clear in limiting its application . . . and leaves no room for doubt as to the intention of the legislature, there is no authority to transcend or add to the statute, [and the statute] may not be enlarged, stretched, or expanded, or extended to cognate or related cases not falling within its provisions." Id.

Plaintiff's employment was not one of those specifically forbidden by such section and therefore was not in violation thereof. 56 C.J.S., Master and Servant, §§ 14 and 419; Huffman v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Okla., 281 P.2d 436. Defendants also contend that the court erred in overruling their motion for new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence.

In construing a statute, courts generally may not read into the statute that which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the act itself, and a statute should not be construed any more broadly or given any greater effect than its terms require. Huffman v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 281 P.2d 436 (Okla. 1955). In section 1101, there is an absence of any language which dictates that offers to allow judgment are irrevocable.