Central Trust Co. of Illinois v. Owsley, 188 Ill. App. 505 (1914). See also Huffman v. Gould, 327 Ill. App. 428, 435, 64 N.E.2d 773, 777 (1946). The Shipping Act makes it illegal for anyone to transfer any interest in an American ship to a noncitizen without the approval of the Maritime Administration. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 808, 835.
'" Golla, 167 Ill.2d at 369, 657 N.E.2d at 902. Plaintiff's second contention on appeal is defendant Devonshire fraudulently concealed and intentionally misled her as to the wrongful cause of her injury. Plaintiff, relying on Huffman v. Gould, 327 Ill. App. 428, 439, 64 N.E.2d 773, 779 (1945), argues Devonshire's repeated misrepresentations regarding the building's air quality create a question of fact for the jury as to whether the such fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations or, in the alternative, whether defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting a limitations defense. To state a prima facie case of fraudulent concealment, plaintiff must allege acts or misrepresentations affirmatively showing fraudulent concealment of a cause of action that prevented the discovery of the cause of action.
If a cause of action is fraudulently concealed, this can toll the running of the limitations period. Huffman v. Gould, 327 Ill. App. 428, 436, 64 N.E.2d 773, 777 (1945). However, the fact that fraud forms the basis of Golden's causes of action does not show that the causes of action themselves were fraudulently concealed.
Concealment weighs heavily against the trustee, there must be an open disavowal of the trust. Huffman v. Gould, 327 Ill. App. 428, 438. Further, the trustee's continued or subsequent recognition or acknowledgement of the trust is regarded as strongly indicating that he had not repudiated it. ( Huffman v. Gould.) For the purpose of the summary judgment motion defendant admitted that since July 15, 1964, it had collected the sum of $210.12 on the bonds and requested the judgment be entered against defendant for $210.12.
"No lapse of time is a bar to a direct trust, as between trustee and cestui que trust. . . . At least, time begins to run against a trust only from the time when it is openly disavowed by the trustee who insists upon an adverse right or interest which is fully and unequivocally made known to the cestui que trust." To the same effect are Finn v. Wetmore, 212 Ill. App. 550, and Huffman v. Gould, 327 Ill. App. 428. That part of the decree dismissing the complaint for want of equity, relating to the securities listed in the letter of direction, was correct and is affirmed.