Opinion
Civil Action 3:23-CV-100 (GROH)
09-18-2024
KEVIN MICHAEL HUFFMAN, Petitioner, v. WARDEN BROWN, Respondent.
ORDER DECLINING TO ADOPT REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND REASSIGNING CASE TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE
GINA M. GROH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Now before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) entered by United States Magistrate Judge Robert W. Trumble on February 9, 2024. ECF No. 9. Pursuant to the Local Rules of Prisoner Litigation Procedure, this action was referred to Magistrate Judge Trumble for submission of an R&R. In his R&R, Magistrate Judge Trumble recommends this Court deny and dismiss without prejudice the instant Petition for Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. at 8. For the below reasons, the Court declines to adopt the R&R and reassigns this case to Magistrate Judge Trumble for further proceedings.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court must conduct a de novo review of the magistrate judge's findings where objection is made. However, the Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge to which no objection is made. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Pro se filings must be liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by licensed attorneys, but courts are not required to create objections where none exist. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1971). Failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of de novo review and of a petitioner's right to appeal this Court's Order. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984).
II. DISCUSSION
The R&R recommends the pending Petition be denied and dismissed without prejudice because the “Petitioner appears to have failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this action,” depriving this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 9 at 8. Upon review, the Court finds the R&R misapplies the exhaustion requirement and therefore declines to adopt the R&R.
“The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) mandates that an inmate exhaust ‘such administrative remedies as are available' before bringing suit to challenge prison conditions.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 635 (2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a)). Although this exhaustion requirement “allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court[,]” the Supreme Court has held “that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under PLRA” and that “inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007); see also Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008). Additionally, the PLRA's exhaustion requirement “does not operate as a bar to [a] district court's exercise of its subject-matter jurisdiction.” Anderson v. XYS Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 678 (4th Cir. 2005).
Notably, “[a] court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint when the alleged facts in the complaint, taken as true, prove that the inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies” in rare cases. Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017).
Here, the Court finds the R&R misapplies the exhaustion requirement for two reasons. First, the R&R is simply incorrect that an inmate's failure to exhaust deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. As noted above, the Fourth Circuit-along with “[e]very court to have considered the question”-has concluded the PLRA's “exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional requirement.” Anderson, 407 F.3d at 677.
Second, the R&R improperly places the burden to demonstrate exhaustion on the Petitioner. Specifically, the R&R concludes that “it appears [the] Petitioner has failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available to address his claims.” ECF No. 9 at 7 (emphasis added). In support, the R&R reasons (1) the Petitioner has not demonstrated cause or prejudice for failure to exhaust; (2) the Petitioner does not allege he was denied access to the relevant forms; and (3) the Petitioner does not contend staff failed or refused to submit the forms once prepared by the Petitioner. Id. at 7-8. However, the Petitioner is not required to demonstrate-or even allege-exhaustion at this stage. See Moore, 517 F.3d at 725 (“inmates need not plead exhaustion, nor do they bear the burden of proving it.”). Thus, it is inapposite whether it “appears” the Petitioner failed to exhaust. Instead, sua sponte dismissal is only appropriate in “the rare, exceptional instance where [a lack of] administrative exhaustion [is] apparent on the complaint's face.” Cf. Custis, 851 F.3d at 362. Upon review and consideration, the Court finds the Petition does not present such a rare or exceptional instance. See Myles v. Edwards, 813 Fed.Appx. 130 (4th Cir. 2020) (finding sua sponte dismissal for failure to exhaust was error, even though the petitioner acknowledged his failure to exhaust).
Accordingly, the Court DECLINES TO ADOPT the R&R [ECF No. 9] and ORDERS that this matter be reassigned to Magistrate Judge Trumble for further proceedings.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to transmit copies of this Order to the Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt request, at his last known address.