Opinion
No. 1230 C.D. 2013
11-08-2013
Hector Huertas, Appellant v. Paul A. Ennis; Debra K. Sauers
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COVEY
Hector Huertas (Huertas), an inmate at State Correctional Institution - Forest (SCI-Forest), appeals pro se from the Court of Common Pleas of the 37th Judicial District, Forest County Branch's (trial court) July 18, 2012 order sustaining the preliminary objections filed by SCI-Forest Superintendent Debra K. Sauers (Sauers), and SCI-Forest Major Paul A. Ennis (Ennis) (collectively, Appellees) to Huertas' Amended Writ of Mandamus (Amended Writ). Huertas raises two issues for this Court's review: (1) whether the trial court erred by concluding that because the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' (Department) internal policies did not grant Huertas a clearly-established legal right to psychological treatment, Huertas could not prove that he had such a right or that Appellees had a corresponding duty to provide psychological treatment; and, (2) whether the trial court erred by concluding that Huertas had another remedy in habeas corpus and, therefore, mandamus could not be granted.
On September 1, 2011, Huertas filed a writ of mandamus. In response, Appellees filed preliminary objections. On May 30, 2012, after oral argument, the trial court issued an order sustaining the preliminary objections, but permitting Huertas to file an Amended Writ. On June 8, 2012, Huertas filed an Amended Writ, alleging that Appellees' failure to perform certain mandatory duties, including providing him with psychological treatment, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States (U.S.) Constitution, and Article I, Section 12 of the Pennsylvania Constitution., On June 15, 2012, Appellees filed preliminary objections to the Amended Writ, asserting that the Department's policies cited in the Amended Writ did not confer any right on Huertas, or impose any duty on the Appellees. The preliminary objections further noted that the administrative regulations cited in the Amended Writ applied only to county jails and not state correctional institutions. Appellees argued that because no rights or corresponding duties were implicated, mandamus could not be granted. Further, Appellees contended that because Huertas had an alternate remedy in habeas corpus, mandamus could not be granted.
Pa. Const. art. I, § 12.
During oral argument on the preliminary objections, Huertas withdrew all claims other than Appellees' failure to provide him psychological services.
Argument on Appellees' preliminary objections to Huertas' Amended Writ was held on July 17, 2012. By July 18, 2012 order, the trial court sustained Appellees' preliminary objections and dismissed Huertas' Amended Writ with prejudice. In dismissing the action, the trial court held that the Department's internal policies referenced by Huertas did not confer upon him a clearly-established legal right or impose a corresponding duty upon the Appellees that could be enforced by mandamus. Further, the trial court concluded that Huertas had an adequate alternate legal remedy available to him by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Huertas timely appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The Superior Court transferred the case to this Court.
This Court has stated:
A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits every well-pleaded fact in the complaint and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. It tests the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleadings and will be sustained only in cases where the pleader has clearly failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When determining whether a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer was properly granted, an appellate court must accept as true all properly pleaded material facts. We must confine our analysis to the complaint and decide whether sufficient facts have been pleaded to permit recovery if the facts are ultimately proven. The demurrer may be granted only in cases which are so free from doubt that a trial would certainly be a fruitless exercise.
Huertas first argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that because the Department's internal policies did not afford him a clearly-established legal right, Huertas could not prove that he had such a right and that Appellees had a duty to provide psychological treatment.
It is well-established that "mandamus is an extraordinary writ which lies to compel the performance of a ministerial act or a mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and a want of any other appropriate and adequate remedy." Valley Forge Racing Ass'n v. State Horse Racing Comm'n, 449 Pa. 292, 295, 297 A.2d 823, 824-25 (1972) (emphasis added). The trial court properly noted that "[a]dministrative regulations or policies do not create rights in inmates." Bullock v. Horn, 720 A.2d 1079, 1082 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). Thus, if regulations and/or policies do not create rights in inmates, there can be no corresponding duties thereto. For this reason, the trial court concluded that the Department's internal policies referenced in Huertas' Amended Writ did "not afford [Huertas] with a legal basis for his assertion that he has a clearly established legal right that must be enforced with the issuance of a writ of mandamus." Trial Ct. Op. at 3.
The trial court also concluded that the Pennsylvania Administrative Code provisions cited in the Amended Writ (37 Pa. Code §§ 95.226, 95.229, 95.230) applied to county jails and prisons rather than state correctional institutions, so they did not provide Huertas "with any basis to claim a clearly established right to enforce any mandatory duties of Defendants." Trial Ct. Op. at 2.
In addition to referencing violations of various Department policies and procedures, Huertas' Amended Writ sets forth, although inartfully, claims for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution and his rights under Article 1, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, alleging cruel and unusual punishment through the deprivation of necessary medical treatment. The United States Supreme Court has held that "[d]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
"We do not hold pro se complainants to the stringent standards expected of pleadings drafted by lawyers, and will examine the substance of their complaint to determine if plaintiffs would be entitled to relief if they proved the facts averred." Madden v. Jeffes, 482 A.2d 1162, 1165 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984).
"The guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Pennsylvania Constitution provides no greater protections than that afforded under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Jochen v. Horn, 727 A.2d 645, 649 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).
This Court has previously addressed the interrelationship between alleged constitutional violations and the clear legal rights and corresponding duties required to maintain a mandamus action, stating:
It is true that prison officials have wide latitude in administering prison affairs, but it is not so wide as to permit them to ignore rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Such rights include, inter alia,
religious freedom, due process before significant disciplinary action is taken, and access to the courts in pursuit of post conviction relief.Commonwealth ex rel. Lindsley v. Robinson, 372 A.2d 1258, 1261-62 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977) (citations omitted, emphasis added); see also Madden v. Jeffes, 482 A.2d 1162 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). Thus, if Huertas sufficiently alleged a violation of the Eighth Amendment by Appellees' "[d]eliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs," mandamus would be appropriate.
As the duty not to interfere with the exercise of such rights is one which a public officer must perform in a prescribed manner in accordance with the mandates of law, when confronted with a given factual matrix, such duty is clear and ministerial in the context of mandamus. If at this point in time such duties in the context of this case are not perfectly clear, the action will lie to compel their performance even if their very existence and scope must be established and defined by the action itself, but any decree ultimately issued by this Court will exclude indefinite future duties on the part of respondents which would impose upon this Court supervisory responsibility.
"The eighth amendment, which embodies the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, was applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause." Commonwealth v. Strunk, 582 A.2d 1326, 1331 n.10 (Pa. Super. 1990).
"The eighth amendment, which embodies the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, was applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment's due process clause." Commonwealth v. Strunk, 582 A.2d 1326, 1331 n.10 (Pa. Super. 1990).
Contrary to the trial court's conclusion that mandamus could not be granted since there was another "appropriate and adequate remedy" by way of habeas corpus, Valley Forge Racing Ass'n, 449 Pa. at 295, 297 A.2d at 825, this Court has rejected this same reasoning when it held that "habeas corpus is not available until all other remedies, including mandamus, have been exhausted." Commonwealth ex rel. Lindsley, 372 A.2d at 1261 (emphasis added); see also Moore v. Roth, 331 A.2d 509 (Pa. Super. 1974); Commonwealth v. Bookbinder, 247 A.2d 644 (Pa. Super. 1968). Because habeas corpus was not available to Huertas since mandamus had not yet been exhausted, we hold that the trial court erred when it concluded that the remedy of mandamus could not be granted on the ground that an alternate remedy in habeas corpus was available.
Our Superior Court has recognized:
The availability of habeas corpus in Pennsylvania is both prescribed and limited by statute. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6502 (Power to issue writ); 6503 (Right to apply for writ). Subject to these provisions, the writ may issue only when no other remedy is available for the condition the petitioner alleges or available remedies are exhausted or ineffectual. Thus, habeas corpus should not be entertained . . . merely to correct prison conditions which can be remedied through an appeal to prison authorities or to an administrative agency.
In order to establish "deliberate indifference," Huertas must have "at a minimum, allege[d] that [the Appellees] knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to [his] health or safety." Jochen v. Horn, 727 A.2d 645, 649 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). Huertas' Amended Writ alleges the following with respect to the alleged deprivation of medical care:
17. Plaintiff has been in segregation in the [Restricted Housing Unit] for nearly ten years. As a result of this segregation Plaintiff has developed numerous psychological problems most of which Plaintiff cannot determine the names of.Amended Writ at ¶¶17, 18. This Court has recognized:
18. Plaintiff has now been at SCI Forest for nearly (3) years, and despite Defendants['] mandatory duties of providing psychiatric treatment . . . Plaintiff has never had a psychiatric evaluation or assessment.
The deliberate indifference test affords considerable latitude to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of inmate patients. Courts will disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . . (which) remains a question of sound professional judgment. Complaints about medical care which merely reflect a disagreement with the doctors over the proper means of
treating the prisoner's medical condition do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Absent a showing that [prison] officials have engaged in constitutionally impermissible conduct, it is not in the public's interest for the court to usurp the Bureau of Prisons' authority and micro-manage the medical needs of a particular inmate.Kretchmar v. Dep't of Corr., 831 A.2d 793, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Huertas' Amended Writ does not reflect a mere disagreement with doctors or prison officials over the "proper means of treating" his alleged psychological problems. Id. Instead, it asserts the complete lack of evaluation and treatment. However, "[n]ot every ache and pain or medically recognized condition involving some discomfort can support an Eighth Amendment claim." Id. Importantly, Huertas does not describe the nature or severity of his alleged psychological ailments. Thus, Huertas did not allege that Appellees "knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to [his] health or safety." Jochen, 727 A.2d at 649 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Huertas' Amended Writ fails to establish a claim of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and we affirm the trial court's dismissal on that basis. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
"It is well settled that this Court may affirm the decision of the trial court on any basis without regard to the basis upon which the trial court relied." Boro Constr., Inc. v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 992 A.2d 208, 214 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). --------
For all of the above reasons, the trial court's July 18, 2012 order is affirmed.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2013, the Court of Common Pleas of the 37th Judicial District, Forest County Branch's July 18, 2012 order is affirmed.
/s/_________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
Clark v. Beard, 918 A.2d 155, 158-59 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (citations omitted).
Commonwealth ex rel. Fortune v. Dragovich, 792 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).