Opinion
For Margarita Salinas Huerta, Plaintiff: Suzanne C Leidner, LEAD ATTORNEY, Suzanne Leidner Law Offices, Los Angeles, CA.
For Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant: Assistant U.S. Attorney LA-CV, LEAD ATTORNEY, Office of U.S. Attorney, Civil Division, Los Angeles, CA; Assistant U.S. Attorney LA-SSA, LEAD ATTORNEY, Office of the General Counsel for Social Security Adm., San Francisco, CA; Marla K Letellier, LEAD ATTORNEY, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel - Social Security Adm, San Francisco, CA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
PATRICK J. WALSH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff appeals a decision by Defendant Social Security Administration (" the Agency"), denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (" SSI") and Disability Insurance Benefits (" DIB"). She claims that the Administrative Law Judge (" ALJ") erred when she discounted Plaintiff's testimony and the testimony of her daughter, overlooked some of Plaintiff's impairments, and concluded that Plaintiff was still able to work at her former job. For the following reasons, the Court affirms the ALJ's decision.
II. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS
In April 2011, Plaintiff applied for SSI and DIB, alleging that she had been disabled since February 2010, due to depression, panic attacks, arthritis, sleep problems, neck pain, headaches, and weakness in her knees. (Administrative Record (" AR") 93-103, 120, 366-69.) Her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration and she requested and was granted a hearing before an ALJ. In October 2012, she appeared with counsel and testified at the hearing. (AR 364-94.) In November 2012, the ALJ issued a decision denying benefits. (AR 36-45.) Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council, which remanded the case to the ALJ for reconsideration of the SSI claim (based on new evidence) but denied review of Plaintiff's DIB claim. (AR 11-13.) Plaintiff then commenced this action, challenging the denial of her DIB claim.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The ALJ's Credibility Findings
The sum and substance of Plaintiff's hearing testimony--which was consistent with a function report she had filled out and submitted earlier--was that her neck pain and depression precluded her from working. (AR 139-45, 369-86.) The ALJ discounted this testimony because:
1. Plaintiff had stopped working at her last job as an in-home caregiver because the patient that she was caring for had died, not because she was unable to work any longer. 2. Plaintiff's medications controlled her symptoms.
3. Plaintiff's ability to engage in a variety of daily activities suggested that she was not as impaired as she claimed.
4. Plaintiff's treatment was routine and conservative.
5. Plaintiff's subjective claims were not supported by the objective medical evidence.
(AR 41-42.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that she was not credible. For the following reason, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err.
ALJs are tasked with judging a claimant's credibility. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). In doing so, they can rely on ordinary credibility techniques. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996). Where there is no evidence of malingering, however, ALJs can only reject a claimant's testimony for specific, clear, and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2014).
The ALJ's reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony are specific, clear, and convincing and are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ relied on the fact that Plaintiff stopped working when the patient she was being paid to care for died. The record supports this finding (AR 370-71), and it is a legitimate reason for questioning Plaintiff's testimony that she can no longer work because she is disabled. See Hensley v. Colvin, 600 Fed App'x 526, 527 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding ALJ's finding that claimant's testimony that she could not work was undermined by the fact that she stopped working by choice, not because she was unable to continue); and Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming ALJ's adverse credibility finding based in part on fact that claimant left his job because he was laid off, not because he could no longer work).
It stands to reason that Plaintiff's testimony that she can no longer work is inconsistent with the fact that she was able to work until she lost her job. This understanding is bolstered by the fact that, after Plaintiff left her job, she filed for unemployment benefits and continued to look for work. (AR 370-71.) Generally speaking, in order to apply for and receive unemployment benefits in California, a claimant has to represent that she is able, available, and actively looking for work. Cal. Unemp. Ins.Code § 1253. An ALJ can consider this fact in assessing her testimony that she is unable to work. See, e.g., Carmickle v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2008) (" [R]eceipt of unemployment benefits can undermine a claimant's alleged inability to work full[]time . . . .").
Plaintiff did not claim that she was pursuing part-time work (AR 371) and does not argue here that she was. Thus, the Court, as did the ALJ it appears, presumes that the work she was seeking was full time, undermining her claim that she could not work. Cf., Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162 (explaining claimant's ability to perform only part-time work does not necessarily undermine claim of disability).
The ALJ's second reason for questioning Plaintiff's claims of disabling symptoms was that her medications helped reduce them, at least as to her depression, anxiety, and insomnia. (AR 41.) This, too, is a valid reason for discounting a claimant's testimony, see Warre v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding " impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling"), and is supported by the record. Plaintiff testified that Ambien helped her sleep and that her other medications helped control her anxiety and depression. (AR 377-79.) Plaintiff also explained that her medications did not do much to relieve her neck and stomach pain. (AR 377, 379.) Even so, overall, the ALJ's reasoning here is supported by the record.
The ALJ also questioned Plaintiff's claims of disabling pain because she was able to participate in a number of daily activities. (AR 41.) Here, again, the record supports the ALJ's finding. Plaintiff testified that she could drive, clean, cook, do household chores, exercise, care for her children and a bird, dress and bathe herself, iron, shop (11/2-2 hours at a time), watch T.V., handle her finances, and spend time with her children. (AR 375-76, 382-83.) Though these activities are fairly minimal, Plaintiff's ability to perform them contradicts her claims of almost incapacitating pain and impairment. For example, she testified that she was unable to even point her head down to work. (AR 383.) It strains credulity to believe that someone in this much pain could exercise, shop for two hours at a time, and drive a car.
The fourth reason the ALJ provided for questioning Plaintiff's testimony was that her care had been routine and conservative. (AR 42.) The record supports this finding and it is a valid reason for discounting a claimant's testimony. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining ALJ may consider fact that claimant was receiving conservative treatment when evaluating claims of disabling pain). As described above, Plaintiff claimed that her pain was almost incapacitating. She testified that moving her arms or head caused swelling. (AR 380.) Yet, the medical records in this case are sparse. She visited the emergency room three times over a two-year span in 2010 and 2011, once for fevers and chills, once because her neck hurt, and once because she felt dizzy. (AR 168-92.) Her treatment outside the emergency room consisted of pain medications, which she testified did little to resolve her debilitating neck pain. (AR 377.) Thus, it was not unreasonable for the ALJ to wonder why Plaintiff was receiving little or no treatment for this and her other symptoms if, as she claimed, they were so severe.
The final reason provided by the ALJ for discounting Plaintiff's testimony was that the objective medical evidence did not support it. (AR 42.) This is a valid reason for questioning a claimant's testimony. See, e.g., Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding ALJ's credibility determination in part because medical evaluations revealed little evidence of disabling abnormality alleged by claimant). And it is supported by the record. The ALJ summarized the medical evidence and explained how the objective medical tests showed at most only mild irregularities. (AR 42-44.) For example, she pointed out that MRIs of the brain and spine showed mild deviations but were generally unremarkable. (AR 269-70.) She also accurately noted that the examining and reviewing doctors found little evidence of impairment and concluded that Plaintiff was capable of medium work. (AR 43-44.)
Because the ALJ's reasons for discounting Plaintiff's testimony are specific, clear, and convincing and are supported by substantial evidence in the record, the credibility finding is affirmed.
B The ALJ's Rejection of Plaintiff's Daughter's Testimony
Plaintiff's daughter's testimony closely tracked Plaintiff's. (AR 147-54, 389-94.) The primary reason the ALJ rejected it was because it was not supported by the medical evidence. (AR 42.) The ALJ also, however, considered the fact that the daughter was not competent to speak with authority on medical issues and was likely biased because she was Plaintiff's daughter. (AR 41-42.) Plaintiff takes exception to this finding, particularly the ALJ's reliance on the fact that her daughter was probably biased because she was related to Plaintiff. Though the Court agrees that the ALJ should not have considered this in evaluating the daughter's testimony, it finds that any error in doing so was harmless.
ALJs are required to assess the credibility of the witnesses and may reject lay witness testimony for reasons that are germane to the witness. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993). In doing so, they can generally rely on things that other factfinders rely on in assessing credibility--except for the witnesses' relationship to the claimant. Regennitter v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 166 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1999) (" [T]he fact that a lay witness is a family member cannot be a ground for rejecting his or her testimony."); c.f. Romero v. Tansy, 46 F.3d 1024, 1030 (10th Cir. 1995) (concluding alibi testimony by a defendant's family members is of significantly less value than that of an objective witnesses); and see Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instruction No. 1.11, Credibility of Witnesses (" In considering the testimony of any witness, you may take into account: . . . (4) the witness's interest in the outcome of the case and any bias or prejudice; . . . (7) any other factors that bear on believability.").
The ALJ should not have focused on the fact that the witness was Plaintiff's daughter and should not have presumed that she was biased as a result. That being said, however, it is clear from the record that the daughter's testimony, like Plaintiff's testimony, was not supported by the objective medical evidence. That is a germane reason for rejecting the daughter's testimony. Further, the Court concludes that, had the ALJ not focused on the familial relationship, she still would still have rejected the daughter's testimony because it was identical in most respects to the claimant's testimony, which the ALJ rejected, and was inconsistent with the medical evidence. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting " general principle that an ALJ's error is harmless where it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination") (citation omitted). For that reason, the ALJ's finding here will be upheld.
C. The ALJ's Assessment of Plaintiff's Medical Conditions
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ overlooked some of her conditions and did not consider the impact that they had on her overall ability to function. She points out, for example, that the ALJ neglected to consider the impact of her sleep problems, knee problems, stomach pain, and fatigue. Here, again, the Court disagrees. The ALJ took into account all of Plaintiff's medically verifiable conditions. Plaintiff's sleep problems were resolved with Ambien. (AR 379.) Her knee problems, to the extent that they existed, were immaterial to her ability to work. (AR 193-95, 208-11, 213-17.) And there is no evidence that her stomach pain ever prevented her from working or was severe enough to prevent her from working in the future. Thus, the ALJ did not err here.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding that she could work in her former job as a sewing machine operator based on the fact that the ALJ erred in assessing her credibility and in analyzing the medical evidence. Because the Court has rejected these other arguments, it rejects this argument, too.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Agency's decision is affirmed and the case is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion and Order filed herewith, IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED that the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration is affirmed and this action is dismissed with prejudice.