After the enactment of OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) in 2001, despite the change in language from previous statutes, the Court of Appeals has continued to follow the common-law rule as to motions filed within the term of court or before the statutory deadline. See Jones v. State , 348 Ga. App. 653, 654 (1), 824 S.E.2d 575 (2019) ; Patterson v. State , 347 Ga. App. 105, 107 (1), 817 S.E.2d 557 (2018) ; Pendleton v. State , 335 Ga. App. 455, 455-56, 781 S.E.2d 570 (2016) ; Richardson v. State , 334 Ga. App. 344, 346, 779 S.E.2d 406 (2015) ; Hudson v. State , 334 Ga. App. 166, 167 (1), 778 S.E.2d 406 (2015) ; Myrick v. State , 325 Ga. App. 607, 607 n.1, 754 S.E.2d 395 (2014) ; Valldeparas v. State , 319 Ga. App. 491, 493 (1), 735 S.E.2d 816 (2012) ; Bradberry v. State , 315 Ga. App. 434, 435, 727 S.E.2d 208 (2012) ; Grady v. State , 311 Ga. App. 620, 620-21, 716 S.E.2d 747 (2011) ; State v. Fredericks , 256 Ga. App. 401, 403, 568 S.E.2d 489 (2002). The key question, then, is whether the addition of the word "jurisdiction" to the statute's grant of "power and authority" to the trial court clearly overrides the common-law rule, and we conclude that it does not.
See Hudson v. State , 334 Ga. App. 166, 169 (2), 778 S.E.2d 406 (2015) (holding that OCGA § 16-8-41 (b), which provides that one convicted of armed robbery shall be punished by life in prison or imprisonment of ten to twenty years, was not ambiguous and therefore the rule of lenity did not apply). Although Waller argues that the trial court improperly relied upon two of the convictions offered by the State at sentencing, the State also provided three other of Waller's prior convictions for the sale of cocaine.
We admit that the parties’ interpretation of the statutory rule may have been reasonable given that one could read prior cases from this Court as suggesting that the only factor relevant to the time limitations set forth in OCGA § 17-10-1 (f) is whether the defendant filed a timely motion. See Jones v. State , 348 Ga. App. 653, 654 (1), 824 S.E.2d 575 (2019) ; Patterson v. State , 347 Ga. App. 105, 107 (1), 817 S.E.2d 557 (2018) ; Pendleton v. State , 335 Ga. App. 455, 455-456 (1), 781 S.E.2d 570 (2016) ; Richardson v. State , 334 Ga. App. 344, 346, 779 S.E.2d 406 (2015) ; Hudson v. State , 334 Ga. App. 166, 167 (1), 778 S.E.2d 406 (2015) ; Myrick v. State , 325 Ga. App. 607, n. 1, 754 S.E.2d 395 (2014) ; Valldeparas v. State , 319 Ga. App. 491, 493 (1), 735 S.E.2d 816 (2012) ; Bradberry v. State , 315 Ga. App. 434, 435, 727 S.E.2d 208 (2012) ; Grady v. State , 311 Ga. App. 620, 620-621, 716 S.E.2d 747 (2011). These cases are distinguishable, however, because none address the specific issue resolved in this opinion.
Because OCGA § 16–5–23.1 (f) (2) (B) is unambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply. Hudson v. State, 334 Ga.App. 166, 168 (2) n. 3, 778 S.E.2d 406 (2015). ("The rule of lenity is a rule of construction that is applied only when an ambiguity still exists after having applied the traditional canons of statutory construction.") (citation and punctuation omitted).
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Hudson v. State , 334 Ga.App. 166, 168 (2), 778 S.E.2d 406 (2015), quoting Corey v. State , 216 Ga.App. 180, 180–181, 454 S.E.2d 154 (1995).Therefore, Brown's arguments based on the vagueness of OCGA § 16–8–41 (b) are without merit.