We reject the defendant's arguments and affirm the order of commitment. The defendant has been before this court twice in the recent past, see State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 409 A.2d 1349 (1979); Hudson v. Miller, 119 N.H. 141, 399 A.2d 612 (1979), and much of the factual background of this case is clearly set forth in those cases. Accordingly, we present only an abbreviated version of the facts.
On May 22, 1973, his parole was revoked and, after a finding that he was a dangerous sexual offender, he was ordered incarcerated. That order remained in effect until our decision in Hudson v. Miller, 119 N.H. 141, 399 A.2d 612 (1979). On February 5, 1977, while in confinement at the New Hampshire State Hospital pursuant to the May 22, 1973 order, the defendant walked off the hospital grounds.
See RSA ch. 173 (Laws 1949, ch. 314), repealed Laws 1969 ch. 443:2. See also Hudson v. Miller, 119 N.H. 141, 399 A.2d 612 (1979). Thus the statute may be construed as permitting sentence to an institution as an alternative to prison sentence.
Yet the distinction is artificial; denominating a proceeding as "civil" rather than "criminal" does not mean that due process and equal protection are inapplicable. ( Hudson v. Miller (1979), 119 N.H. 141, 399 A.2d 612.) As Powell made clear in discussing civil litigants' right to appear with counsel, due process is not confined to criminal cases.