Hudson v. Miller

4 Citing cases

  1. State v. Hudson

    121 N.H. 6 (N.H. 1981)   Cited 19 times
    Holding an involuntary commitment proceeding to be a civil proceeding even though it utilized the standard of proof required in criminal trials

    We reject the defendant's arguments and affirm the order of commitment. The defendant has been before this court twice in the recent past, see State v. Hudson, 119 N.H. 963, 409 A.2d 1349 (1979); Hudson v. Miller, 119 N.H. 141, 399 A.2d 612 (1979), and much of the factual background of this case is clearly set forth in those cases. Accordingly, we present only an abbreviated version of the facts.

  2. State v. Hudson

    119 N.H. 963 (N.H. 1979)   Cited 23 times
    Stressing that "it is the judge who makes the decision and not the psychiatrist" and observing that the prior version of this statute "empower[ed] the court to overrule the recommendation of psychiatrist against involuntary commitment"

    On May 22, 1973, his parole was revoked and, after a finding that he was a dangerous sexual offender, he was ordered incarcerated. That order remained in effect until our decision in Hudson v. Miller, 119 N.H. 141, 399 A.2d 612 (1979). On February 5, 1977, while in confinement at the New Hampshire State Hospital pursuant to the May 22, 1973 order, the defendant walked off the hospital grounds.

  3. Grindle v. Miller

    119 N.H. 214 (N.H. 1979)   Cited 7 times
    In Grindle, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of RSA chapter 173–A, the Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act, a prior version of the statute before us here.

    See RSA ch. 173 (Laws 1949, ch. 314), repealed Laws 1969 ch. 443:2. See also Hudson v. Miller, 119 N.H. 141, 399 A.2d 612 (1979). Thus the statute may be construed as permitting sentence to an institution as an alternative to prison sentence.

  4. Tedder v. Fairman

    93 Ill. App. 3d 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 11 times
    In Tedder v. Fairman, 93 Ill. App.3d 948, 49 Ill.Dec. 447, 418 N.E.2d 91 (4th Dist. 1981), the Illinois Appellate Court considered consolidated appeals of two inmates who sought to compel various officials of the Department of Corrections to act affirmatively to aid them in support of their rights and to protect them from oppressive conditions.

    Yet the distinction is artificial; denominating a proceeding as "civil" rather than "criminal" does not mean that due process and equal protection are inapplicable. ( Hudson v. Miller (1979), 119 N.H. 141, 399 A.2d 612.) As Powell made clear in discussing civil litigants' right to appear with counsel, due process is not confined to criminal cases.