We are not required to engage in any of these distinctions in the instant case. The employee also relies upon Hudson v. E.I. DuPont deNemours Company, Del.Super., 245 A.2d 805 (1968) and Collins Ryan v. Hudson, 6 Terry 438, 75 A.2d 261 (1950). The Hudson case is not applicable because there a fall satisfied the "accident" prerequisite.

As such, the case is the same as Belber, and is controlled by it. State Home Impr. Co. v. Davis, Del.Super., 251 A.2d 833, and Hudson v. DuPont Company, Del., 245 A.2d 805, cited and relied on by claimant, may be distinguished along the same lines. Each of them stands for the proposition that a compensable injury occurs when a pre-existing defect is suddenly accelerated by severe and unusual activity in the performance of the claimant's job. The record before us is devoid of any such evidence. We hold that there was no "accident" in this case within the meaning of that word as it is used in our Workmen's Compensation Law. See Reynolds v. Continental Can Company, Del., 240 A.2d 135.

See Hudsonv. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 245 A.2d 805, 809 (Del. Super. 1968) (recognizing that an injury is compensable if it follows as a direct and natural result of the primary injury, while also recognizing that a subsequent injury resulting from an intervening cause is not compensable); see also Barkley v. Johnson Controls, 2003 WL 187278, at *2, 3 (Del. Super. Jan. 27, 2003) (confirming the rule that an employer is liable for subsequent injuries if there is no separate intervening event that breaks the causal chain connecting the first injury).

Wade v. Chrysler Corp., 1986 WL 2830 (Del. Super. Mar. 5, 1980).Hudson v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 245 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Super. 1968). Indeed, this Court has repeatedly held, in numerous decisions, that a claimant was entitled to an award of medical witness fees even where the claimant presented both successful and unsuccessful claims to the Board. For example, the Appellant here relies principally upon Baker v. Allen Family Foods, in which the Board denied a petition for an alleged injury to the claimant's coccyx but granted a petition for permanent impairment for loss of balance.

In Hudson v. E.I. Dupont, this Court stated as follows: Hudson v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 245 A.2d 805, 810 (Del.Super. 1968). A subsequent injury is compensable only if it follows as a direct and natural result of the primary compensable injury . . . If the subsequent injury is attributable to the claimant's own negligence or fault, the chain of causation is broken and the subsequent injury is not compensable.

The relevant standard for determining causation, which the Board applied, is that a "subsequent injury is compensable only if it follows as a direct and natural result of the primary compensable injury. If the subsequent injury is attributable to the claimant's own negligence or fault, the chain of causation is broken and the subsequent injury is not compensable."Hudson v. E.I. duPont de Nemours and Company, 245 A.2d 805, 810 (Del.Super.Ct. 1968). The limited role of this Court is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Board's decision. It is solely the Board's function to resolve conflicts in the evidence and weigh witness credibility.

Similarly, in DuPont Hospital for Children v. Haskins, the Superior Court stated that "an intervening independent cause of incapacity will not remove the employer's liability for benefits as long as the prior injury remains a `cause' of the accident's ongoing conditions . . ." 245 A.2d 805 (Del.Super. 1968).Id. at 810, citing 1 Larson, Worker's Compensation Law, § 13.12; Hartford Fire Insurance Company Group v. Beeler, 244 F.Supp. 188 (E.D.Tenn.

Similarly, in DuPont Hospital for Children v. Haskins, the Superior Court stated that "an intervening independent cause of incapacity will not remove the employer's liability for benefits as long as the prior injury remains a "cause" of the accident's ongoing conditions. . . ." 245 A.2d 805 (Del.Super. 1968). Id. at 810, citing 1 Larson, Worker's Compensation Law, § 13.12; Hartford Fire Insurance Company Group v. Beeler, 244 F.Supp. 188 (E.D.Tenn.

Dr. Fink's opinion, however, provides substantial evidence to support the Board's decision that the claimant's current condition and symptoms are the product of other causes and are not the natural result of her work injury. Hudson v. DuPont, 245 A.2d 805 (Del.Super. 1985); Barkley v. Johnson Controls 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 21 (Del.Super. 2003). 11. The decision of the IAB is affirmed.

The court also observed that if the subsequent injury is attributable to the claimant's own negligence or fault, the chain of causation is broken and the subsequent injury is not compensable. 245 A.2d 805 (Del.Super. 1968). Id. at 810.