Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 207-208 (1848).Hudson v. Abercrombie, 258 Ga. 729, 730 (2) (a) ( 374 SE2d 83) (1988). OCGA ยง 5-6-5, the statute at issue in this appeal, was enacted in 1845.
Regarding "common-law jurisdiction in civil cases," an expression "intended to embrace only cases which were the subject of real, personal, or mixed actions, according to the practice of the English common-law courts," and not those proceedings only authorized under Georgia statutes, this Court "found no court in existence prior to the Constitution of 1777, which had such jurisdiction "in which trial by jury was not provided for."). See also Swails v. State , 263 Ga. 276, 278 (3), 431 S.E.2d 101 (1993) (following Foster in identifying 1798 as the key date for an analysis of the right to trial by jury); Hudson v. Abercrombie , 258 Ga. 729, 730 (2) (a), 374 S.E.2d 83 (1988) (following Foster and Williams in identifying 1798 as the key date for an analysis of the right to trial by jury); Cawthon v. Douglas County , 248 Ga. 760, 762 (1), 286 S.E.2d 30 (1982) (following Williams in identifying 1798 as the key date for an analysis of the right to trial by jury); Williams v. Overstreet , 230 Ga. 112, 116, 195 S.E.2d 906 (1973) (following Foster in identifying 1798 as the key date for an analysis of the right to trial by jury); Foster , 5 Ga. at 207-208 (identifying, without citation or analysis, 1798 as the key date for an analysis of the right to trial by jury). I do not agree that correcting our identification of Georgia's first constitution requires consideration of the doctrine of stare decisis.
(4) Order either or all parties to receive appropriate psychiatric or psychological services as a further measure to prevent the recurrence of stalking. This statutory authorization for attorney fees is in derogation of common law, see Hudson v. Abercrombie, 258 Ga. 729 (2) (a), 374 S.E.2d 83 (1988) ; Bowers v. Fulton County, 227 Ga. 814 (1), 183 S.E.2d 347 (1971), and, thus, must be strictly construed, see Workman v. RL BB ACQ I-GA CVL, LLC, 303 Ga. 693 (1), 814 S.E.2d 696 (2018) ; VSI Enterprises, Inc. v. Edwards, 238 Ga. App. 369 (2), 518 S.E.2d 765 (1999). OCGA ยง 16-5-94 (d) is composed of two sentences.
See OCGA ยง 53-7-6 (4). See also Hudson v. Abercrombie , 258 Ga. 729, 732 (2) (b), 374 S.E.2d 83 (1988) (portion of administrator's attorney fee claim related to personal lawsuits not connected with administration of the estate so as to authorize payment of fees from estate's assets); Haring , 314 Ga. App. at 774 (2), 726 S.E.2d 86. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
(Citations omitted.) Hudson v. Abercrombie, 258 Ga. 729, 730 (2) (a) ( 374 SE2d 83) (1988). And since OCGA ยง 15-19-14 does not provide the statutory right to a jury trial in actions to enforce an attorney's lien, the award was a matter for the trial court to decide.
See Chester v. Bouchillon, 253 Ga. 175, 177 (4) ( 317 SE2d 525) (1984); Ray v. Nat. Health Investors, 280 Ga. App. 44, 52 (6) ( 633 SE2d 388) (2006); In re Estate of Arnsdorff, 273 Ga. App. 612, 616 (3) (b) ( 615 SE2d 758) (2005); In re Estate of Garmon, 254 Ga. App. 84, 87 (2) ( 561 SE2d 216) (2002). See Hudson v. Abercrombie, 258 Ga. 729, 732 (2) (b) ( 374 SE2d 83) (1988). RUFFIN, Presiding Judge.
This Code section states that an executer is authorized to provide competent legal counsel for the estate according to the needs of the estate he represents. But, an executor or administrator may not bind the estate for attorney's fees for the costs of litigation brought on by his own fault or misconduct. Hudson v. Abercrombie, 258 Ga. 729, 731 ( 374 S.E.2d 83) (1988). In Armstrong v. Boyd, 140 Ga. 710 ( 79 S.E. 780) (1913), a suit to remove an administrator, the court said that whether or not the estate could be charged with the administrator's legal fees depended on the outcome of the litigation.
It is not governed by ยง 45-19-38 (d) but instead by its own terms. Furthermore, the term "actual damages" in Georgia has traditionally meant compensatory damages and does not include punitive damages and attorney fees. See, e.g., Money v. Thompson Green Machinery Co., 155 Ga. App. 566, 567 ( 271 S.E.2d 699) (1980); Hudson v. Abercrombie, 258 Ga. 729, 730 (2a) ( 374 S.E.2d 83) (1988). They are allowed by contract or statute.
Our courts have not found it necessary to limit parties to one remedy, as a principle. Recently, an action for conversion of certificates of deposit by an executor was "condoned" by the Georgia Supreme Court, in Hudson v. Abercrombie, 258 Ga. 729 ( 374 S.E.2d 83); a certificate of deposit is a physical piece of paper, but what those plaintiffs sought to recover for was conversion of the money which the pieces of paper represented. As to conversion generally, as a distinct act of dominion wrongly asserted over one's property, see Maryland Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welchel, 257 Ga. 259 ( 356 S.E.2d 877) and cits. It would seem the gist of the tort is an act of hostile dominion or appropriation, and is not merely a matter of whether the property appropriated was tangible or intangible.
However, Georgia courts have recognized that in certain circumstances a trustee is entitled to charge the trust estate for attorney expenses incurred in defending against a lawsuit brought by beneficiaries alleging that the trustee has mismanaged or misappropriated the trust estate. See Citizens S. Nat'l Bank v. Haskins, 254 Ga. 131, 327 S.E.2d 192, 203-04 (1985); Melson v. Travis, 133 Ga. 710, 712, 712, 66 S.E. 936, 937 (1910); cf. Hudson v. Abercrombie, 258 Ga. 729, 374 S.E.2d 83, 85-87 (1988) (temporary administratrix of will seeking reimbursement for fees incurred during litigation with caveator of will); Armstrong v. Boyd, 140 Ga. 710, 79 S.E. 780, 781 (1913) (administrator of will seeking fees from trust funds after lawsuit with legatees); Ross v. Battle, 113 Ga. 742, 39 S.E. 287, 288-89 (1901) (same). For cases in other jurisdictions, see, for example, DuPont v. Southern Nat'l Bank of Houston, Tex., 771 F.2d 874, 886 (5th Cir. 1985) (Texas law), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085, 106 S.Ct. 1467, 89 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986); Grey v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 393 F.2d 371, 387-88 (5th Cir.) (Texas law), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961, 89 S.Ct. 398, 21 L.Ed.2d 374 (1968); Weidlich v. Comley, 267 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1959) (New York law).