Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4520-11T3
05-02-2013
HUDSON COUNTY IMPROVEMENT AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SAMUEL L. MICHAELS, Defendant-Appellant.
Samuel L. Michaels, appellant pro se. Kathleen A. Walrod, attorney for respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Waugh and St. John.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Hudson County, Docket No. DC-22403-11.
Samuel L. Michaels, appellant pro se.
Kathleen A. Walrod, attorney for respondent. PER CURIAM
Defendant Samuel L. Michaels appeals the March 26, 2012 order of the Special Civil Part adjudicating him in violation of N.J.A.C. 7:26-3.4(b), which requires that certain solid waste be disposed of at an approved facility. We reverse.
I.
We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record on appeal.
On April 5, 2011, Craig Jordan, an enforcement officer for plaintiff Hudson County Improvement Authority (HCIA), went to a site on Monmouth Street in Jersey City at which illegal dumping of solid waste was known to occur. He went to the site to retrieve the memory card from a camera used by HCIA to monitor the site.
While at the site, Jordan noticed a U-Haul pickup truck with a trailer attached. He observed the driver of the truck, subsequently identified as Michaels, get out of the vehicle, remove material from the pickup, and "just throw it" on the site. According to Jordan, when he went to investigate, Michaels told him that he had been told he could "dispose" of his "stuff" there.
According to Michaels, he had gotten lost looking for a place to sell or dispose of some motorcycle and automobile parts he had removed from a storage facility in Cranford earlier that day. He stopped to rearrange the items in the trailer because he heard them shifting around as he was driving. As he took two convertible seats out of the pickup truck, intending to put them back in a more secure manner, Jordan arrived on the scene.
Jordan issued Michaels a summons for illegal dumping. In October 2011, the HCIA filed a complaint in the Special Civil Part charging Michaels with failure to dispose of solid waste at an approved facility in violation of N.J.A.C. 7:26-3.4. The matter was tried on March 23, 2012. The judge delivered an oral decision on March 26. The trial judge did not credit Michaels' testimony that he was merely rearranging the items in the pickup and found that he had engaged in illegal disposal of solid waste. Although the HCIA originally sought a penalty of $15,000, it modified its request to $5000 at trial. The judge imposed a fine of $2500, plus court costs of $57. This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, Michaels contends that the trial judge erred as a matter of law in finding that he violated regulations that he argues do not apply to the disposal of personal waste transported in small vehicles. He also contends that the HCIA failed to prove the items originated in Hudson County and that he was denied discovery.
When reviewing a decision resulting from a bench trial, "[t]he general rule is that [factual] findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). We do not disturb the factual findings of the trial judge unless we are "convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Id. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms, supra, 65 N.J. at 484) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981). It is also well-established that our review of a judge's conclusions of law is plenary. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) ("A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.").
Based upon our standard of review and the record before us, there is no question that Michaels was dumping solid waste at the Monmouth Street site in Jersey City. The issue is whether he did so in violation of N.J.A.C. 7:26-3.4. We conclude, as a matter of law, that he did not.
The regulations at issue were "promulgated by the [Department of Environmental Protection] in order to carry out the [legislative] policies regarding solid waste management." Middlesex Cnty. Health Dep't v. Roehsler, 235 N.J. Super. 262, 268 (Law Div. 1989).
In 1970, the Legislature enacted the Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA), N.J.S.A. 13:1E-1 to -207, and the Solid Waste Utility Control Act (SWUCA), N.J.S.A. 48:13A-1 to -13, in an effort to establish a comprehensive regulatory framework for the disposal of solid waste in New Jersey. In accordance with those statutes, the State was divided into twenty-two solid waste management districts, including all twenty-one counties and a "Hackensack Meadowlands" district. N.J.S.A. 13:1E-20. Each district was assigned the responsibility for developing and implementing a long-term solid waste management plan, subject to approval by the State Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). N.J.S.A. 13:1D-19; 13:1E-20, -24.Pursuant to the regulations, the HCIA, which is vested with the authority to regulate solid waste flow in Hudson County, submitted its District Solid Waste Management Plan (Plan) to the DEP, which in turn approved the Plan. According to the HCIA, the Plan applies to "waste generated within" Hudson County and requires that such waste be delivered to one of three designated facilities.
[Borough of Princeton v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Mercer, 169 N.J. 135, 141 (2001) (citation omitted).]
The Plan itself is not included in the record.
N.J.A.C. 7:26-1.6(a) defines "solid waste" as "any garbage, refuse, sludge, or any other waste material" not specifically exempted. N.J.A.C. 7:26-3.4(b), the regulation Michaels was charged with violating, states that "[a]ll collected solid waste shall be properly deposited at an approved facility in accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:26-1 and 2." However, N.J.A.C. 7:26-3.3(a) specifies the following exemptions from the subchapter's provisions:
1. Persons transporting only their own household solid waste in passenger automobiles bearing general registration plates; andMichaels was transporting his own solid waste using a pickup truck and trailer that he testified were below the specified weights. The HCIA offered no contrary evidence. Consequently, the evidence in the record supports Michaels' argument that he was exempt from the prohibition contained in N.J.A.C. 7:26- 3.4(b).
2. Persons transporting only their own solid waste in vehicles registered with a State motor vehicles agency as having a maximum gross vehicle weight of 9,000 pounds for a single vehicle or 16,000 pounds combined maximum gross vehicle weight for a vehicle pulling a trailer.
In addition, the HCIA approved Plan, which specifies the "approved facility[ies]" for disposal of "collected solid waste," regulates waste generated in Hudson County. The evidence in the record is that Michaels had emptied a storage unit in Union County.
We do not suggest that Michaels' conduct was not otherwise illegal. See Jersey City, N.J., Code of Ordinances §§ 287-13, -29 (1995) (illegal dumping punishable by fines and incarceration); N.J.S.A. 13:1E-9.3 (prohibiting illegal dumping); N.J.S.A. 13:1E-9.4 (violation of N.J.S.A. 13:1E-9.3 is a disorderly persons offense). We hold only that Michaels cannot be penalized for violating a regulation that did not apply to him. For that reason, we reverse the order on appeal.
Because we reverse, we need not reach the discovery issue raised by Michaels.
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Reversed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATEM DIVISON