Opinion
7:02-CV-078-R
April 24, 2002
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Petitioner, an inmate confined in the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Iowa Park, Texas, brings this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Huddleston claims that he was denied due process in a disciplinary action brought against him when he was confined in the Eastham Unit. The disciplinary case resulted in a reduction in Huddleston's prison classification from S3 to Line 1, 45-days of restrictions on privileges, a reduction from minimum to medium custody and the forfeiture of 365 days of good-time credits. Petition ¶¶ 3 18. He now seeks habeas relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of the right to appeal and insufficient evidence. Petition ¶ 20.A-C. Because Petitioner is currently incarcerated within the Northern District of Texas, this has jurisdiction to entertain this action. See Story v. Collins, 920 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 (5th Cir. 1991).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") there is a one-year limitation period during which an inmate must file any federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he seeks relief under § 2254. The AEDPA provides in pertinent part
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —
(A) the date on which the judgment became final byte conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).
Because "[TDCJ] is not a state court, and the application of good conduct time is not a judgment . . . [Huddleston's] good conduct time claim attacks the conditions of his restraint under his judgment of conviction" rather tan attacking the conviction itself. Story, 920 F.2d at 1251 Therefore, the Court does not look to the date of the criminal conviction for purposes of the statute of limitations. Rather, the Court must look to the factual predicate upon which Huddleston's petition is based. This factual predicate is the disciplinary action that was heard and decided on November 16, 2000. Petition ¶ 18. Thus, the statute of limitations began to run on that date and expired on November 16, 2001.
The instant action was originally filed in the Eastern District of Texas on February 7, 2002, more than one year after the date Huddleston lost his good-time credits. While the pendency of a prison grievance (i.e. an appeal of the disciplinary decision) would toll the limitation period, Huddleston's prison grievances ware unprocessed because they were filed too late. Petition ¶ 19.
Although the Fifth Circuit has recognized that under appropriate circumstances the limitation period may be equitably tolled, see e.g. Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000), a review of the papers and pleadings filed in this action reflects that Huddleston can make no showing sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. See Davis v. Johnson., 158 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that equitable tolling may apply in "rare and exceptional circumstances."), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1074, 119 S.Ct. 1474 (1999).
Assuming arguendo that the instant action is not time-barred, the petition still fails. Huddleston has no constitutionally protected interest in his custodial classification. See Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that "[t]he loss of the opportunity to earn good-time credits, which might lead to earlier parole, is a collateral consequence of [an inmate's] custodial status" and, thus, does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1196, 116 S.Ct. 1690 (1996). Similarly, the temporary loss of privileges presents no issue of constitutional magnitude. Inmates generally do not have protected liberty interests in their privileges. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995) (holding that a prisoner's liberty interest is "generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."). The 45-day privilege restriction imposed against Huddleston does not represent an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Huddleston concedes that he is not eligible for mandatory supervised release. Petitton ¶ 16. Therefore, his good-time credits do not represent a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the state may create a constitutionally protected liberty interest requiring a higher level of due process where good-time credits are forfeited in a disciplinary action against an inmate eligible for mandatory supervised release). Absent some constitutionally protected liberty interest, due process does not attach to a prison disciplinary proceeding.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED as time barred. Alternatively, the petition is DENIED.
A copy of this order shall be transmitted to Petitioner.