Opinion
July 15, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Lama, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
It is well established that while a party remains liable for all normal and foreseeable consequences of his acts, an intervening act will constitute a superseding cause and will serve to relieve that party of liability when the act is of such an extraordinary nature or so attenuates that party's conduct from the ultimate injury that responsibility for the injury may not be reasonably attributed to that party (see, Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308; Sheehan v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 496, 503; Mack v. Altmans Stage Light. Co., 98 A.D.2d 468). No duty is imposed on a defendant to prevent a third party from causing harm to another unless the intervening act which caused the plaintiff's injuries was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant's negligence (see, Boltax v. Joy Day Camp, 67 N.Y.2d 617; Detko v McDonalds Rests., 198 A.D.2d 208; Rivera v. Goldstein, 152 A.D.2d 556, 557; Grandy v. Bavaro, 134 A.D.2d 957). Further, it is well settled that "there is no duty to warn against a condition that can be readily observed by a reasonable use of one's senses" (see, Zaffiris v. O'Loughlin, 184 A.D.2d 696; Olsen v. State of New York, 30 A.D.2d 759, affd 25 N.Y.2d 665; see also, Burns v Mastroianni, 173 A.D.2d 754; Lester v. Jolicofur, 120 A.D.2d 574, 575; Cimino v. Town of Hempstead, 110 A.D.2d 805, 806, affd 66 N.Y.2d 709; McAlister v. Schwartz, 105 A.D.2d 731, 733).
Although the appellants herein sought to establish that the codefendant, and third and fourth-party defendants were negligent, it is clear that under the circumstances of this case, the conduct of the appellant William P. Malone effectively broke any causal nexus linking any alleged negligence on the part of any of the other parties with the plaintiff Dain Huber's injuries (see, Farrell v. Lowy, 192 A.D.2d 691; Rivera v. Goldstein, 152 A.D.2d 556; Grandy v. Bavaro, 134 A.D.2d 957, supra; Mannion v Lizza Indus., 127 A.D.2d 567, 568; Cimino v. Town of Hempstead, supra; Herman v. State of New York, 94 A.D.2d 161, 163, affd 63 N.Y.2d 822). Since the appellants failed to establish that any acts of the codefendant, the third-party defendants, or the fourth-party defendant were a proximate cause of this occurrence, the complaints, cross claims, and counterclaims insofar as asserted against each of these parties were properly dismissed (see, Boltax v. Joy Day Camp, 67 N.Y.2d 617; Sheehan v. City of New York, supra).
We have examined the appellants' remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Bracken, J.P., Thompson, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.