Opinion
5:05-CV-699 (NAM/GHL).
September 23, 2008
Jaya A. Shurtliff, Esq., Olinsky DiMartino, LLP, Oswego, New York, Attorney for Plaintiff.
William H. Pease, Esq., Glenn T. Suddaby, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, New York and Barbara L. Spivak, Esq., Jennifer S. Rosa, Esq., Office of General Counsel, Social Security Administration, New York, New York, Attorneys for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Linda Huber brings the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Act, seeking review of the Commissioner of Social Security's decision to deny her application for supplemental security income ("SSI"). Presently before the Court are the parties' motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was 50 years old at the time of the administrative hearing on May 11, 2004. (Administrative Transcript at p. 69). She completed tenth grade and has past work experience as a laborer in the laundry business, housekeeper, and desk clerk. (T. 80, 97). Plaintiff alleges disability due to depression and anxiety, migraines, status post arthroscopic acromioplasty on the right shoulder, low back pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"), osteopenia of the low back and hips, and emphysema. (T. 121, 138, 237, 249, 263).
Portions of the administrative transcript, Dkt. No. 9, filed by the Commissioner, will be cited herein as "(T ___)."
A. Plaintiff's Medical Treatment
1. Treating Physicians
Plaintiff treated with Dr. Karl Hafner from approximately May 20, 2000 through April 29, 2004. (T. 125-31, 222-28). X-rays of Plaintiff's sternum, taken December 12, 2002, were negative for any abnormalities. Id. at 131. On March 13, 2003, Dr. Hafner noted that Plaintiff was tender in the sacroiliac joints, more on the left than right, but otherwise her examination was normal. Id. at 127. She was given samples of Imitrex to try for headaches. Id. Dr. Hafner noted on April 25, 2003 that Plaintiff likely suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. at 126. On September 12, 2003, Plaintiff had gained weight but was "still very much within normal limits." Id. at 225. She had an unremarkable physical examination. Id. On April 29, 2004, Plaintiff had a normal gait and heel-toe walk, full range of motion in the arms, and a normal brochovascular examination. Id. at 222. Dr. Hafner opined that she was disabled for the time being, but that she had a good to fair prognosis with long-term psychiatric care. Id.
Plaintiff saw Dr. Thomas Smallman for follow-up of an arthroscopic acromioplasty of the right shoulder in 2000. Id. at 234-36. Plaintiff reported pain in the right shoulder after spending nine and a half hours grouting; Dr. Smallman opined that the pain resulted from overuse of the shoulder. Id. at 236. Three months later, on August 21, 2000, Dr. Smallman injected two painful sites in the shoulder and reported a "modest success in the sense that virtually all of her pain from both sites [was] now gone." Id. at 235. On November 1, 2000, Dr. Smallman opined that no active care was required. Id. at 234.
2. Examining Sources
Dr. Jonathan Braiman, a neurologist, performed a consultative examination of Plaintiff on May 12, 2003. (T. 121-24). Dr. Braiman found normal bulk, tone and strength of all muscle groups with some give way or inconsistent contraction with the long finger flexors of the fourth and fifth finger on the right; bilaterally symmetrical and intact reflexes; normal sensory examination; and normal motor nerve conduction studies. Id. at 229-30. Dr. Braiman opined that Plaintiff's symptoms were consistent with carpal tunnel syndrome ("CTS"), and recommended conservative measures for treatment. Id. at 230.
Dr. Myra Shayevitz performed a consultative examination on August 25, 2003. Id. at 136-44. Dr. Shayevitz noted that Plaintiff did some cooking daily, did limited laundry and cleaning with help from her boyfriend and daughter, bathed and dressed herself, watched television, listened to the radio, read, and socialized. Id. at 137. Plaintiff was in no acute distress with a normal gait, heel-toe walk, normal stance. Id. at 138. Plaintiff required no assistive device and needed no help getting undressed and onto the examination table. Id. Flexion of the cervical spine was thirty degrees, extension was to twenty degrees, rotation was sixty degrees bilaterally, and lateral flexion was thirty degrees bilaterally. Id. There was no scoliosis or kyphosis, or abnormality of the thoracic spine. Id. Plaintiff's lumbar spine showed tenderness and some limited flexion due to discomfort. Id. A straight leg raising test was negative. Id. at 139. Plaintiff exhibited full ranges of motion in the shoulders, elbows, forearms, wrists, hips, knees, and ankles, with 5/5 strength of the upper and lower extremities and stable and nontender joints. Id. Her neurologic examination was normal and hand and finger dexterity were intact with 5/5 grip strength. Id. Dr. Shayevitz opined that there was "some limitation to prolonged sitting, prolonged standing, walking, stair climbing, any heavy lifting, or carrying," but did not specify the parameters of these limitations. Id.
A physical Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") assessment was completed by a state agency physician on September 2, 2003. Id. at 145-50. Plaintiff was found able to lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently; sit, stand, and/or walk for about six hours in an eight-hour workday; occasionally climb ramps, stairs, ropes or scaffolds, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; and was limited in fine manipulation. Id. at 146-47. She had no visual or communicative limitations, and it was found that she should avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation, and the like. Id. at 148.
A mental RFC assessment was completed on September 5, 2003. Id. at 165-68. Plaintiff was found to be moderately limited in the ability to understand and remember detailed instructions; moderately limited in maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods and in performing activities within a schedule, maintaining regular attendance, and being punctual within customary tolerances; moderately limited in completing a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; and moderately limited in setting realistic goals or making plans independently of others. Id. at 165-66. Plaintiff was found to retain the RFC for substantial gainful activity consisting of simple tasks. Id. at 167.
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income ("SSI") on June 27, 2003. (T. 69). The application was denied on September 11, 2003. (T. 56-57). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") which was held on May 11, 2004. (T. 21-55). On August 13, 2004, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Guy B. Arthur issued a decision denying plaintiff's claim for disability benefits. (T. 11-20). The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on March 30, 2005, making the ALJ's decision the final determination of the Commissioner. (T. 3-5). This action followed.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S DECISION
The Social Security Act (the "Act") authorizes payment of disability insurance benefits to individuals with "disabilities." The Act defines "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). There is a five-step analysis for evaluating disability claims:
"In essence, if the Commissioner determines (1) that the claimant is not working, (2) that he has a `severe impairment,' (3) that the impairment is not one [listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations] that conclusively requires a determination of disability, and (4) that the claimant is not capable of continuing in his prior type of work, the Commissioner must find him disabled if (5) there is not another type of work the claimant can do." The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, while the Social Security Administration bears the burden on the last step.Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Draegert v. Barnhart, 311 F.3d 468, 472 (2d Cir. 2002)); Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
In this case, the ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff has not engaged in gainful activity since the filing date of her application. (T. 12). At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff suffered from back disorder and dysthymia, which qualified as "severe" impairments within the meaning of the Social Security Regulations (the "Regulations"). (T. 14). At the third step of the analysis, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal the severity of any impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations. (T. 14). At the fourth step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):
[The claimant retains the RFC] to perform at the light and alternatively sedentary exertional levels. The claimant is unable to climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; no hazardous heights and no hazardous moving machinery; and no exposure to extreme temperature changes. The claimant requires a low stress routine (i.e., work with no more than moderate attention and concentration and persistence and pace for prolonged periods). The claimant must have no concentrated exposure to dusts, fumes, chemicals, poor ventilation or excessive humidity or wetness or excessive vibration. The claimant has the ability to occasionally climb stairs or ramps and to balance and stoop and occasionally kneel and crouch, but is unable to crawl. The claimant experiences moderate pain and moderate limitations as to performing activities within a schedule and maintaining regular attendance for reliability purposes and being punctual within customary tolerances. The claimant also has moderate limitations as to completing a normal work day or work week without interruptions from psychological symptoms and as to performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable length and number of rest periods.
(T. 16).
The ALJ described this RFC assessment as an ability to perform a "significant range of light work." (T. 17). Based upon the vocational expert ("VE") testimony which the ALJ found consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"), the ALJ concluded, at step five, that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a desk clerk and auditor, but not as a housekeeper. (Tr. 17). Alternatively, the ALJ concluded that based on VE testimony and using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines as a framework for decision-making, Plaintiff could perform other work as an information clerk, rental clerk, call out operator, charge account clerk, or order clerk. (Tr. 18). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. (T. 17).
V. DISCUSSION
A Commissioner's determination that a claimant is not disabled will be set aside when the factual findings are not supported by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence has been interpreted to mean "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. The Court may also set aside the Commissioner's decision when it is based upon legal error. Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff argues that: (1) the ALJ failed to properly apply the treating physician rule; (2) the ALJ's RFC assessment was improper; (3) the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert ("VE") and relied upon by the ALJ was improper; (4) the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work was improper; and (5) the ALJ's credibility evaluation was erroneous.
A. Treating Physician Rule
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly follow the treating physician rule. (Pl.'s Br. at 8-11). Generally, the opinion of a treating physician is given controlling weight if it is based upon well-supported, medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2); see Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496 (2d Cir. 1998). As already noted, an ALJ may not arbitrarily substitute his own judgment for a competent medical opinion. Rosa, 168 F.3d at 79. Thus, if the treating physician's opinion is not given controlling weight, the ALJ must assess several factors to determine how much weight to afford the opinion: the length of the treatment relationship, the frequency of examination by the treating physician for the condition(s) in question, the medical evidence supporting the opinion, the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, the qualifications of the treating physician, and other factors tending to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2)-(6), 416.927(d)(2)-(6).
Moreover, the "ultimate finding of whether a claimant is disabled and cannot work [is] `reserved to the Commissioner.'" Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(1), 416.927(e)(1). "That means that the Social Security Administration considers the data that physicians provide but draws its own conclusions." Snell, 177 F.3d at 133. Thus, a treating physician's disability assessment is not determinative. Id. Where the evidence of record includes medical source opinions that are inconsistent with other evidence or are internally inconsistent, the ALJ must weigh all of the evidence and make a disability determination based on the totality of that evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2).
Dr. Karl Hafner, Plaintiff's treating physician, offered a medical source statement dated April 29, 2004, which found that Plaintiff could sit, stand, and/or walk for about two hours in an eight-hour workday, required periods of walking in an eight-hour workday, could lift and/or carry ten pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently, would need unscheduled breaks during the day, and would probably have unscheduled absences from work more than three times per month. (Tr. 237-43). Dr. Hafner also opined that Plaintiff would have difficulty dealing with work stress, and would have various problems with mental functioning, including difficulty maintaining attention and concentration, maintaining regular attendance, working with others, and completing a workday or week without experiencing interruptions due to psychologically-based symptoms. (Tr. 241-42).
The ALJ reviewed this statement from Dr. Hafner, and concluded that it was inconsistent with the medical evidence as a whole, as well as Dr. Hafner's own treatment notes. (Tr. 15). The ALJ also noted that Dr. Hafner's expertise was not in psychiatry or psychiatric treatment, and discounted his opinions as to Plaintiff's mental impairments for that additional reason. Id.
The ALJ's decision in this regard is supported by substantial evidence. Dr. Hafner's most recent treatment notes show that Plaintiff had a normal gait, was able to heel/toe walk, and had full range of motion ("ROM") of the arms. (Tr. 222). Dr. Shayevitz, a consultative examiner, also noted that Plaintiff had a normal gait and heel/toe walk, was able to get on and off of the examination table and rise from a chair without difficulty, had a negative straight leg raising ("SLR") test, and full ROM of the arms and legs. (Tr. 138-39). As to Dr. Hafner's psychological conclusions, the decision does indicate that the ALJ's RFC finding incorporated the bulk of Dr. Hafner's psychological findings. (Tr. 16). In any event, the ALJ was entitled to give the psychological findings less weight because Dr. Hafner does not specialize in that area, and did not actively treat Plaintiff for her psychological conditions outside of prescribing some medication and referring her to the Oswego Hospital Mental Health Department. (Tr. 33, 125, 127, 224); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)-(6). For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision to accord less than controlling weight to Dr. Hafner's opinion was both properly explained and supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to clarify Dr. Hafner's opinion and failed to develop the record to obtain "missing" information from Dr. Hafner. (Pl.'s Br. at 9). The Court finds no evidence that this is the case. Dr. Hafner's opinion was not ambiguous, as Plaintiff argues, and Dr. Hafner's treatment notes appear in the record with no obvious gaps or missing information.
B. Residual Functional Capacity
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide a proper assessment of her residual functional capacity ("RFC"). (Pl.'s Br. at 11-12). Residual functional capacity is:
"what an individual can still do despite his or her limitations. . . . Ordinarily, RFC is the individual's maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis, and the RFC assessment must include a discussion of the individual's abilities on that basis. A `regular and continuing basis' means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule."Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (SSA July 2, 1996)). In making a residual functional capacity determination, the ALJ must consider a claimant's physical abilities, mental abilities, symptomology, including pain and other limitations which could interfere with work activities on a regular and continuing basis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).
"The RFC assessment must first identify the individual's functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a function-by-function basis, including the functions in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 20 CFR 404.1545 and 416.945. Only after that may RFC be expressed in terms of the exertional levels of work, sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy." SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *1 (SSA 1996); see also Verginio v. Apfel, 1998 WL 743706, *3 (N.D.N.Y Oct. 23, 1998); LaPorta v. Bowen, 737 F. Supp. 180, 183 (N.D.N.Y 1990).
As noted above, the ALJ made the following RFC finding:
[The claimant retains the RFC] to perform at the light and alternatively sedentary exertional levels. The claimant is unable to climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; no hazardous heights and no hazardous moving machinery; and no exposure to extreme temperature changes. The claimant requires a low stress routine (i.e., work with no more than moderate attention and concentration and persistence and pace for prolonged periods). The claimant must have no concentrated exposure to dusts, fumes, chemicals, poor ventilation or excessive humidity or wetness or excessive vibration. The claimant has the ability to occasionally climb stairs or ramps and to balance and stoop and occasionally kneel and crouch, but is unable to crawl. The claimant experiences moderate pain and moderate limitations as to performing activities within a schedule and maintaining regular attendance for reliability purposes and being punctual within customary tolerances. The claimant also has moderate limitations as to completing a normal work day or work week without interruptions from psychological symptoms and as to performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable length and number of rest periods.
The ALJ described this RFC assessment as consistent with an ability to perform a "significant range of light work." (T. 17). The ALJ did not specify Plaintiff's capacities with regard to sitting, standing, walking, lifting, or carrying. Instead, the ALJ made the conclusory finding that Plaintiff could perform a significant range of light work, without first providing a function-by-function assessment of Plaintiff's capacities. This failure to provide a function-by-function assessment was in contravention of SSR 96-8p as well as the applicable regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945. It is noted that regardless of whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ's determination, where "reasonable basis for doubt exists as to whether correct legal principles were applied, the ALJ's decision may not be affirmed." Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987). Thus, this case is remanded for proper evaluation of Plaintiff's RFC.
C. Vocational Expert Testimony
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ's reliance on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") was inappropriate given the ALJ's inadequate RFC finding. (Pl.'s Br. at 12-13).
The ALJ is entitled to rely on vocational expert evidence in deciding whether a plaintiff retains the capacity to perform other work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(e). It is well-established that elicitation of testimony from a vocational expert is a proper means of fulfilling the agency's burden at step five of the disability test to establish the existence of jobs in sufficient numbers in the national and regional economy that plaintiff is capable of performing. Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 604-05 (2d Cir. 1986); Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1553-54 (2d Cir. 1983); Dwyer v. Apfel, 23 F. Supp.2d 223, 229-30 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (Hurd, M.J.) ( citing Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566, 416.966. Use of hypothetical questions to develop the vocational expert's testimony is also permitted, provided that the question incorporates the full extent of a plaintiff's physical and mental limitations. Dumas, 712 F.2d at 1553-54. If the limitations set forth in the hypothetical are supported by substantial evidence, then the vocational expert's testimony may be relied upon by the ALJ in support of a finding of no disability. Id.
In this case, the Court has already found that the ALJ's RFC finding was inadequate. Because the hypothetical question posed to the VE incorporated this erroneous RFC finding, the VE's response to such hypothetical could not form a proper basis for the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled. On remand, any hypothetical questions posed to a VE should incorporate a full and accurate RFC determination.
D. Past Relevant Work
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work. (Pl.'s Br. at 13-14). At step four of the disability analysis, the ALJ must make the following findings in determining whether an individual may perform his or her past relevant work:
(1) A finding of fact as to the individual's residual functional capacity;
(2) A finding of fact as to the physical and mental demands of the past job/occupation; and
(3) A finding of fact that the individual's residual functional capacity would permit a return to his or her past job or occupation.
S.S.R. 83-62, A Disability Claimant's Ability to Do Past Relevant Work, in General, 1983 WL 31386, *1 (S.S.A. 1983).
Because the Court has found that the ALJ's RFC determination was improper, any finding that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work was based on an erroneous RFC determination. Thus, the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work was not based on proper foundational findings and must be reevaluated on remand.
E. Credibility
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard and erroneously determined that Plaintiff's statements regarding her impairments were not entirely credible. (Pl.'s Br. at 14-16). It is well settled that "a claimant's subjective evidence of pain is entitled to great weight where . . . it is supported by objective medical evidence". Simmons v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 982 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). "Objective medical evidence is evidence obtained from the application of medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, such as evidence of reduced joint motion, muscle spasm, sensory deficit or motor disruption." Casino-Ortiz v. Astrue, 2007 WL 2745704, at *11, n. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)). The ALJ retains discretion to assess the credibility of a claimant's testimony regarding disabling pain and "to arrive at an independent judgment, in light of medical findings and other evidence, regarding the true extent of the pain alleged by the claimant." Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979); Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that an ALJ is in a better position to decide credibility).
If a plaintiff's testimony concerning the intensity, persistence or functional limitations associated with her pain is not fully supported by clinical evidence, the ALJ must consider additional factors in order to assess that testimony, including: 1) daily activities; 2) location, duration, frequency and intensity of any symptoms; 3) precipitating and aggravating factors; 4) type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of any medications taken; 5) other treatment received; and 6) other measures taken to relieve symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vi), 416.929(c)(3)(i)-(vi). The issue is not whether the clinical and objective findings are consistent with an inability to perform all substantial activity, but whether plaintiff's statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of her neck and back pain are consistent with the objective medical and other evidence. See SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2.
After considering plaintiff's subjective testimony, the objective medical evidence, and any other factors deemed relevant, the ALJ may accept or reject claimant's subjective testimony. Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp.2d 145, 151 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(4), 416.929(c)(4). An ALJ rejecting subjective testimony must do so explicitly and with specificity to enable the Court to decide whether there are legitimate reasons for the ALJ's disbelief and whether his decision is supported by substantial evidence. Melchior v. Apfel, 15 F.Supp.2d 215, 220 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Brandon v. Bowen, 666 F.Supp 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)) (citations omitted). It is insufficient for an ALJ to make a conclusory statement that "the individual's allegations have been considered" or that "the allegations are (or are not) credible". SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4 (SSA July 2, 1996). Absent such findings, a remand is required. Miller v. Shalala, 894 F. Supp. 73, 75 (N.D.N.Y. 1995); see also Knapp v. Apfel, 11 F. Supp. 2d 235, 238 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) ("a finding that the Commissioner has failed to specify the basis for his conclusions is [a] compelling cause for remand").
In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain were not fully credible. (Tr. 14-15). In doing so, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's daily activities as well as the consistency of Plaintiff's allegations with the objective medical evidence. Id. The record demonstrates that Plaintiff was able to take care of her own personal needs such as bathing and dressing herself, and that she cooked, cleaned and did laundry with help from family members, watched television, read, and socialized. Id. at 137. The ALJ also noted inconsistencies between Plaintiff's testimony regarding her daily activities at the hearing. Id. at 14-15. The hearing transcript demonstrates that, as the ALJ observed, Plaintiff initially claimed she could not engage in any daily activities, but on further questioning admitted that she was able to participate in a activities including limited vacuuming, mopping, and dusting. Id. at 39-40. Plaintiff testified that she was able to stand for forty-five minutes to an hour at a time and sit for about two hours at a time. Id. at 42. Additionally, clinical findings appeared relatively benign, in that Plaintiff consistently demonstrated a normal gait and heel-toe walk, full strength, and full ranges of motion. See id. at 127, 138, 222, 229-30. Although the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's credibility could have been more detailed, the Court finds that it was not insufficient as a matter of law. The ALJ's reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's subjective complaints are readily apparent from a reading of the decision, and there is substantial evidence of record to support the ALJ's conclusion. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in assessing Plaintiff's credibility.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that the decision denying disability benefits is REVERSED and this matter be REMANDED to the Commissioner, pursuant to 42 § U.S.C. 405(g) to reassess Plaintiff's residual functional capacity; to incorporate a proper RFC determination into the five-step disability analysis; and for further proceedings consistent with this Order.