We affirm. Although " Public Officers Law § 17(3)(a) provides that the State shall indemnify its employees for a judgment or settlement provided that the act or omission which was the subject of the judgment or settlement occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his [or her] public employment or duties," that duty does not extend to cases in which "the injury or damage resulted from intentional wrongdoing on the part of the employee" ( Matter of Spitz v. Coughlin, 128 A.D.2d 281, 283, 516 N.Y.S.2d 346 [3d Dept. 1987] [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeHubbard v. New York State Off. of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 192 A.D.3d 1586, 1589, 145 N.Y.S.3d 711 [4th Dept. 2021] ). There is no doubt that "intentional acts of sexual harassment ... [are] not within the scope of [an individual's] employment and [do] not advance the [State's] interests" ( Town of Somers v. Titan Indem. Co., 289 A.D.2d 563, 564, 735 N.Y.S.2d 614 [2d Dept. 2001] ; seeGrasso v. Schenectady County Pub. Lib., 30 A.D.3d 814, 818, 817 N.Y.S.2d 186 [3d Dept. 2006] ).
Here, given that the accident occurred at night, issuing the charge exactly as written in the pattern jury instructions, with the words "in broad daylight," would have had significant potential to confuse the jurors. Moreover, since the court otherwise adhered to PJI 2:176, the charge as given "substantially complied" with the pattern jury instructions ( Spensieri v. Lasky, 94 N.Y.2d 231, 239, 701 N.Y.S.2d 689, 723 N.E.2d 544 ; seeHubbard v. New York State Off. of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 192 A.D.3d 1586, 1590, 145 N.Y.S.3d 711 ). Consequently, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not err in charging the jury on the open run defense without including the phrase "in broad daylight."
In other words, "[w]ithout knowing what is 'too loud'," "there [was] no standard of care by which a jury could determine on the evidence presented that defendant[] had breached a duty owed to plaintiff" (Powell v Metropolitan Entertainment Co., 195 Misc.2d 847, 850 [Sup Ct, NY County 2003]). Because there was no "rational process by which the [jury] could base a finding in favor of [plaintiff]" on the element of breach, we conclude that the court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict (Hubbard v New York State Off. of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 192 A.D.3d 1586, 1588 [4th Dept 2021]; see CPLR 4401).
Ct., N.Y. County 2003] ). Because there was no "rational process by which the [jury] could base a finding in favor of [plaintiff]" on the element of breach, we conclude that the court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict ( Hubbard v. New York State Off. of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr. , 192 A.D.3d 1586, 1588, 145 N.Y.S.3d 711 [4th Dept. 2021] ; see CPLR 4401 ). In light of that conclusion, we do not address defendant's remaining contentions.
Likewise, the DOL defendants seek to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(1), (2), (5), and (7) on the basis that they are entitled to absolute immunity based on their quasi-judicial function and because the complaint fails to plausibly allege constitutional violations, which if existed, would not be barred by the State's sovereign immunity. "The Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over actions for money damages against State agencies, departments, officials, and employees acting in their official capacity in the exercise of governmental functions" (Hubbard v New York State Off. of Mental Health, 192 A.D.3d 1586 [4th Dept 2021]; Court of Claims Act § 8; NY Const., art. VI, § 9). Here, plaintiff's claims brought against individual DOS defendants
Here, given that the accident occurred at night, issuing the charge exactly as written in the pattern jury instructions, with the words "in broad daylight," would have had significant potential to confuse the jurors. Moreover, since the court otherwise adhered to PJI 2:176, the charge as given "substantially complied" with the pattern jury instructions (Spensieri v Lasky, 94 N.Y.2d 231, 239; see Hubbard v New York State Off. of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 192 A.D.3d 1586, 1590). Consequently, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not err in charging the jury on the open run defense without including the phrase "in broad daylight."
In other words, "[w]ithout knowing what is 'too loud'," "there [was] no standard of care by which a jury could determine on the evidence presented that defendant[] had breached a duty owed to plaintiff" (Powell v Metropolitan Entertainment Co., 195 Misc.2d 847, 850 [Sup Ct, NY County 2003]). Because there was no "rational process by which the [jury] could base a finding in favor of [plaintiff]" on the element of breach, we conclude that the court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict (Hubbard v New York State Off. of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 192 A.D.3d 1586, 1588 [4th Dept 2021]; see CPLR 4401). In light of that conclusion, we do not address defendant's remaining contentions.