Opinion
No. 105701.
June 7, 2011.
Laurence L. Pinkerton, Judith A. Finn, Pinkerton Finn, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Keith F. Sellers, Sellers Law Firm, and Frederic G. Dorwart, Erica A. Dorwart, Paul DeMuro, Michael J. Medina, Frederic Dorwart Lawyers, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees.
ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION 4
¶ 0 Vick Allen Hubbard, Plaintiff, appeals from a postjudgment order of the district court granting litigation costs and attorney fees to Kaiser-Francis Oil Company, Texas Southwest Gas, L.L.C., and GBK Corporation, Defendants. The district court relied on offers of judgment made pursuant to 12 O.S. Supp. 2002, § 1101.1[ 12-1101.1](B) as authorization for the award of fees and costs. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division IV, affirmed and this Court granted certiorari to decide issues of first impression.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.
¶ 1 I concur in part and dissent in part to the majority opinion. I must dissent to that portion of the opinion which injects a new standard of reasonableness into the offer of judgment statute, 12 O.S. Supp. 2002, § 1101.1[ 12-1101.1](B).
¶ 2 The majority acknowledges that the Legislature did not statutorily impose a reasonableness test on the proposed offer. Nevertheless, the majority asserts that such a requirement must have been intended because the Legislature set forth in the statute that any fees and costs to be awarded pursuant to the offer must be reasonable. However, reference to the statute's assessment of "reasonable litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees" to the prevailing party fails to support the proposition that the Legislature intended the trial court to evaluate all offers of judgment for reasonableness. Requiring the trial court to determine the soundness of an offer of judgment unwittingly places the court in the subjective position of evaluating the evidence, credibility of the witnesses and trial strategy from the position of advocate for one of the parties.
Reliance on the Court of Civil Appeals case of Fuller v. Pacheco, 2001 OK CIV APP 39, 21 P.3d 74, is misplaced. That case dealt with the reasonableness of an award of attorney fees and not whether the offer of judgment supporting the award of fees was reasonable.
¶ 3 To inject the trial court into the determination of what is a fair offer of judgment defeats the clear intent of the statute which is to place the responsibility clearly on the lawyers shoulders. Failure to impose an express reasonableness standard here does not conversely mean that the Legislature intended to permit unreasonable offers. This Court is duty-bound to give effect to legislative acts, not to amend, repeal or circumvent them. Mehdipour v. State Dept. of Corrections, 2004 OK 19, ¶ 22, 90 P.3d 546, 555. The Legislature could have imposed a duty on the courts to assess and weigh each offer for reasonableness but it elected not to do so. We must honor this decision and have confidence counsel can fully evaluate their own position without court interference.