Opinion
10-27-2016
Gregory Sage, Kerhonkson, appellant pro se. Houser & Allison, APC, New York City (Eric D. Houser admitted pro hac vice), for respondent.
Gregory Sage, Kerhonkson, appellant pro se.
Houser & Allison, APC, New York City (Eric D. Houser admitted pro hac vice), for respondent.
Before: EGAN JR., J.P., LYNCH, DEVINE, CLARK and MULVEY, JJ.
CLARK, J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Melkonian, J.), entered May 1, 2015 in Ulster County, which denied defendant's motion to vacate a judgment of foreclosure.
In 2009, after defendant Gregory Sage (hereinafter defendant) defaulted on a note secured by a mortgage on his real property, plaintiff commenced this action and, following joinder of issue, moved for summary judgment striking defendant's answer and for the appointment of a referee. Defendant cross-moved for, among other things, leave to amend his answer to allege that plaintiff lacked standing to commence the action. Supreme Court granted plaintiff's motion and denied defendant's cross motion, and this Court affirmed (112 A.D.3d 1126, 977 N.Y.S.2d 446 [2013], lvs. dismissed 22 N.Y.3d 1172, 985 N.Y.S.2d 472, 8 N.E.3d 849 [2014], 23 N.Y.3d 1015, 992 N.Y.S.2d 774, 16 N.E.3d 1253 [2014] ). Thereafter, in 2014, defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate the judgment of foreclosure. Supreme Court denied the motion, and we now affirm. A trial court may relieve a party from a judgment or order on the basis of “newly-discovered evidence which ... would probably have produced a different result and which could not have been discovered in time [for a motion pursuant to CPLR] 4404 ” or on the basis of “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party” (CPLR 5015[a][2], [3] ). “A motion to vacate a prior judgment or order is addressed to the court's ‘sound discretion, subject to reversal only where there has been a clear abuse of that discretion’ ” (Pritchard v. Curtis, 101 A.D.3d 1502, 1503, 957 N.Y.S.2d 440 [2012], quoting Maddux v. Schur, 53 A.D.3d 738, 739, 861 N.Y.S.2d 814 [2008] ; see Alliance Prop. Mgt. & Dev. v. Andrews Ave. Equities, 70 N.Y.2d 831, 832, 523 N.Y.S.2d 441, 517 N.E.2d 1327 [1987] ).
Defendant sought to vacate the judgment of foreclosure on the basis of “newly-discovered evidence,” including an affidavit from a handwriting analyst, allegedly demonstrating that the affidavit submitted by plaintiff to establish that it had standing to bring this foreclosure action was falsified. However, as this Court previously determined (112 A.D.3d at 1127, 977 N.Y.S.2d 446 ), defendant waived his standing argument by failing to raise it in a pre-answer motion to dismiss or in his answer (see CNB Realty v. Stone Cast, Inc., 127 A.D.3d 1438, 1439, 8 N.Y.S.3d 679 [2015] ; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Ashley, 104 A.D.3d 975, 975–976, 961 N.Y.S.2d 337 [2013], lv. dismissed 21 N.Y.3d 956, 969 N.Y.S.2d 439, 991 N.E.2d 213 [2013] ). Moreover, defendant failed to demonstrate why this evidence was not available or could not, with due diligence, have been discovered at the time that he opposed plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (see Pritchard v. Curtis, 101 A.D.3d at 1503, 957 N.Y.S.2d 440 ; Maddux v. Schur, 53 A.D.3d 738, 739, 861 N.Y.S.2d 814 [2008] ). In view of the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court's denial of defendant's motion to vacate the judgment of foreclosure (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Ashley, 104 A.D.3d at 975–976, 961 N.Y.S.2d 337 ; Pritchard v. Curtis, 101 A.D.3d at 1503, 957 N.Y.S.2d 440 ).
Defendant's remaining arguments, to the extent not explicitly addressed herein, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.
EGAN JR., J.P., LYNCH, DEVINE and MULVEY, JJ., concur.