Opinion
No. CV 03 0407894
November 22, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE (#113) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
On November 24, 2003, the plaintiff, Lucille Hrostek filed a four-count complaint against the defendant, Daniel Massey. Hrostek alleges that on or about January 1992, she and Massey began a romantic relationship. One year later the couple began cohabitation along with Hrostek's children from a previous marriage. The living arrangement continued until September 2003, when Hrostek and Massey decided to terminate their relationship.
Hrostek alleges that prior to and during their period of cohabitation, Massey agreed that assets acquired during the relationship would be divided on an equal one-half basis. It is, however, alleged that after the relationship ended Massey breached that agreement by not paying Hrostek her one-half share of the assets and property accrued during the relationship, which at that time had a value of approximately eighteen million dollars. This action arises out of losses allegedly sustained as a result of Massey's breach of the agreement.
Hrostek alleges in count one of the complaint that Massey breached the agreement by not paying her fifty percent of the assets at the termination of the relationship. She alleges in count two that Massey was unjustly enriched by keeping one hundred percent of the assets. In count three, Hrostek alleges that Massey made fraudulent misrepresentations that he would pay her the agreed fifty-percent share. Hrostek alleges in count four that Massey also made negligent misrepresentations that she would receive fifty percent of the assets from Massey.
Massey moves to strike the third and fourth counts of Hrostek's revised complaint on the ground that they fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted because the counts are barred by General Statutes § 52-572b, (Heart Balm Act).
"A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . . [The court] take[s] the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and . . . construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency . . . [I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Thus, [the court] assume[s] the truth of both the specific factual allegations and any facts fairly provable thereunder. In doing so, moreover, [the court] read[s] the allegations broadly, rather than narrowly." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 173, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).
Massey moves to strike counts three and four of the revised complaint on the grounds that the counts are barred by General Statutes § 52-572b, the Heart Balm Act. The Act states that, "[n]o action may be brought upon any cause arising from alienation of affections or from breach of a promise to marry."
There is no claim in this action involving alienation of affections.
Massey argues that the allegations in counts three and four are barred by the Heart Balm Act because the allegations concerning negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations were intertwined with the promise of marriage. For example, Hrostek alleges in count three that she inquired as to why the couple's assets were not put into joint names. It is alleged that Massey's response assured her that there was no reason for the parties to marry because they already acted like a married couple. She, therefore, did not take any steps to arrange joint title or to enter into marriage. In count four, Hrostek alleges that while the couple's assets were accumulating, Massey's misrepresentations prevented her from taking any steps to jointly title the assets or enter into marriage.
Hrostek counters that the allegations made in counts three and four are not barred by the Heart Balm Act because they do not involve the promise to marry. Hrostek maintains that the Heart Balm Act does not bar the allegations in counts three and four because they involve damages from fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation not damages for humiliation, mental anguish or social humiliation.
In an action seeking, inter alia, an equal share of the assets acquired during a long period of cohabitation, our Supreme Court has held that, "public policy does not prevent the enforcement of agreements regarding property rights between unmarried cohabitants . . ." Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 333, 342, 521 A.2d 142 (1987). "The enforcement of agreements between unmarried cohabiting couples continues to be recognized." Dore v. Devine, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 00 0176933 (October 6, 2000, D Andrea, J.) ( 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 313). "The language of General Statutes § 52-572b, the Heart Balm Act, does not [however] provide clear guidance about what forms of actions are brought within its prohibition of suits from: . . . breach of a promise to marry." Bouchard v. Sundberg, 80 Conn.App. 180 192, 834 A.2d 744 (2003). "In determining whether an action is barred by § 57-572b, therefore, we consider the underlying conduct alleged in the plaintiff's complaint." Id., 198. "The predominant view is that Heart Balm statutes should be applied no further than to bar actions for damages suffered from loss of marriage, humiliation, and other direct consequences of the breach, and should not affect the rights and duties determinable by common law principles." Piccininni v. Harris, 180 Conn. 369, 372, 429 A.2d 886 (1980). "An action for false and fraudulent representations will . . . be permitted." Greene v. Fox, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford (December 19, 1995, Lewis, J.)
The court finds that Hrostek's allegations that she was fraudulently induced to refrain from taking steps to enforce their financial agreement are not barred by the Heart Balm Act. Massey claims that counts three and four are barred because Hrostek based the counts on her missed opportunity to insist on marriage. There are, however, no allegations of a pending promise of marriage in this case. In fact, the complaint alleges that Massey stated the opposite, i.e., that there was no reason for the parties to marry. In Dore v. Devine, supra, 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 313, the court denied a motion to strike a four-count complaint on the basis that the Heart Balm Act did not bar actions to enforce agreements and promises made during cohabitation. "The plaintiff alleges that one of the promises of the [defendant] is that he would treat her as a wife with respect to the disposition of his property at death. Read in favor of the plaintiff under motion to strike law, that is still not an allegation of a promise to marry and the breach thereof." Dore v. Devine, supra, 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 313. The allegations made in this complaint are similar. The Heart Balm Act does not bar Hrostek's common law claims of fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. Reading the allegations of the third and fourth counts in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency, they are not barred by the Heart Balm Act.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike is denied.
By The Court,
Joseph W. Doherty, Judge