Opinion
24A-JT-1269
12-04-2024
In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: D.P. (Minor Child) v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner H.P. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Jennifer A. Joas Madison, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Natalie F. Weiss Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Jennings Circuit Court The Honorable Murielle S. Bright, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 40C01-2312-JT-19
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Jennifer A. Joas Madison, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Natalie F. Weiss Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
WEISSMANN, JUDGE
[¶1] H.P. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights as to her six-year-old child, D.P. (Son), arguing only that termination was not in Son's best interest. But Mother failed to complete the ordered reunification services and was actively using methamphetamine at the time of the termination hearing. Because Mother has not shown that the trial court's decision to terminate her parental rights was clearly erroneous, we affirm.
Facts
[¶2] Son is primarily non-verbal, has an intellectual disability causing developmental delays, and requires constant supervision due to his tendency to injure himself and wander off. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) became involved with Son after receiving a report of his physical abuse and neglect. During its investigation, DCS became concerned that Son lacked a sober caregiver, but Mother refused to submit to drug screens or grant DCS access to the family's home. When the court ordered Mother to comply, she tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.
[¶3] While the initial investigation was pending, DCS received a second report of Son's neglect. Son, who was four years old at the time, had been found by police wandering the neighborhood at 1:30 a.m., half a mile from his home. This was not the first time Son had escaped while in Mother's care. Based on the new escape incident, as well as Mother's positive drug test and ongoing lack of cooperation with the investigation, DCS took emergency custody of Son and filed a petition alleging Son was a child in need of services (CHINS).
[¶4] After the requisite hearings, the trial court adjudicated Son a CHINS and ordered Mother to participate in reunification services. These included a parenting assessment, substance abuse treatment, and random drug screens. The court also ordered Mother to maintain stable employment and to abstain from using illicit substances. But over the following year, Mother failed to comply. She did not engage in any services except for visitation with Son, did not submit to any required drug screens, and failed to obtain any employment.
[¶5] Mother then made a short-lived attempt to comply. She completed a substance abuse intake but never enrolled in the recommended services. She also completed a parenting assessment but stopped engaging after a few months, leading to her discharge from the program for non-compliance. The handful of random drug screens Mother provided all came back positive for both methamphetamine and amphetamine. And though she did get a job, she lost it after only four or six weeks and did not get another.
[¶6] As a result of Mother's extended non-compliance with the reunification plan, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights. Mother then inquired about an inpatient drug treatment program that would allow Son to live with her. The DCS Family Case Manager (FCM) advised Mother that while enrolling in the program would benefit her case, she must first show some sustained sobriety before Son would be able to join her. Mother never enrolled.
[¶7] At the termination hearings, DCS presented evidence of Mother's noncompliance with reunification services since Son's removal, and both the FCM and the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) testified that termination was in Son's best interest. At this point, Son was living in a pre-adoptive placement where he was supervised constantly and enrolled in speech and occupational therapy to address his developmental delays. The FCM testified that Son was doing well and opined that further delaying permanency would be "detrimental." Tr. Vol. II, p. 232.
[¶8] It also became apparent at these hearings that Mother was still actively using drugs. At the first hearing, the trial court ordered an immediate drug screen after finding that Mother appeared to be under the influence and nodding off after returning from a lunch break. The test results showed "dangerously high" levels of methamphetamine and amphetamine. Tr. Vol. III, p. 34. At the second hearing, Mother stated that she would refuse another screen if ordered and confirmed she was not enrolled in any drug treatment program.
[¶9] Following the hearings, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights, which Mother appeals.
The parental rights of Son's father were terminated as well, but he does not participate in this appeal.
Discussion and Decision
[¶10] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence that supports the judgment. Id. Because Mother does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, we accept those findings as true. See S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 610 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019).
[¶11] To terminate Mother's parental rights as to Child, DCS had to prove certain elements by a preponderance of the evidence. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2019). On appeal, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove only one-that termination was in Child's best interest. But the record provides ample support for the conclusion that DCS met its burden on this element. See Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (explaining that courts look to "totality of evidence" to determine child's best interest).
Shortly before the termination was ordered, the Indiana General Assembly significantly amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 to alter the allegations that DCS must include in a petition to terminate parental rights. See Ind. Public Law 70-2024, SEC. 4 (eff. Mar. 11, 2024). The amendment does not change the requirement that DCS show termination is in the child's best interest. Additionally, the amendment took effect after the termination petition was filed, and Mother does not allege that it applies here.
[¶12] Mother failed to complete the ordered reunification services despite being given twenty months to do so and being unemployed for nearly all of that time. She continued to use methamphetamine and, as of the fact-finding hearing, still had not engaged in any substance abuse treatment. See In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 82 (Ind.Ct.App. 2012) ("A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.") (internal quotations omitted).
[¶13] Additionally, both the FCM and the GAL testified that termination was in Son's best interest. This testimony, coupled with the trial court's undisputed finding that the conditions resulting in Son's removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to demonstrate that termination is in Son's best interest. See A.D.S. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013) (finding evidence sufficient to show termination in child's best interest where FCM and GAL recommended termination and conditions resulting in removal were unremedied).
[¶14] Ignoring this evidence, Mother shifts focus to Son's behavioral issues, which continued at his foster placement, essentially arguing that Son was no better off in this placement than in her care. This argument amounts to an improper request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642.
[¶15] Mother also argues that there would be "no additional harm" in giving her more time to complete treatment and avoid termination. Appellant's Br., p. 18. But "[c]hildren cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification." In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. The trial court must "subordinate the parents' interests to those of the children." Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. And "[c]entral among these interests is children's need for permanency." Id.
[¶16] By the time of the fact-finding hearing, Son had been removed from Mother's care for nearly two years and had been living with his foster parents for approximately nine months. Mother had more than enough time to seek the substance abuse treatment she now requests, and the trial court was well within its discretion to weigh her "prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination." In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. And again, Mother never actually enrolled in any treatment program.
[¶17] Given Mother's persistent drug use and failure to engage in services, the recommendations of both the FCM and GAL, and Son's unique needs, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in concluding termination was in Son's best interests. We therefore affirm.
Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.