Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-0021 Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-0270
03-15-2017
NATHAN ROWSHAWN HOYE, Plaintiff, v. MR. ELI A. ZLOKAS, Defendant. NATHAN HOYE, Plaintiff, v. MR. ELI ZLOKAS, Attorney at Law, and DWAYNE WOODRUFF, Honorable Judge Allegheny County, Defendants.
United States District Judge Nora Barry Fischer REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that, pursuant to the authority granted courts by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, the Complaints filed at Civil Action No. 2:17-0021 and Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-0270 be dismissed pre-service sua sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that leave to amend not be granted as any amendment would be futile.
II. REPORT
Civil Action No. 17-cv-0021 was commenced on December 23, 2016, when Plaintiff, Nathan Hoye ("Hoye") a Pennsylvania state prisoner, submitted a Complaint for filing. The Complaint was not accompanied by either a motion for leave to file in forma pauperis or the requisite filing fee. (ECF No. 1). After some intervening proceedings regarding the submission of a complete Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, the motion was granted (ECF No. 7) and the Complaint was filed on March 14, 2017. (ECF No. 8).
The Court has applied the "prisoner mailbox rule," and deemed the Complaint to be filed on the date the documents were signed by Plaintiff and presumably "delivered to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk." Bond v. VisionQuest, 410 F. App'x 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2011).
Civil Action No. 17-cv-0270 was initiated on February 21, 2017, when Plaintiff submitted a Motion for Leave to proceed in forma pauperis, with an attached Complaint. The motion was granted (ECF No. 2) and the Complaint filed on March 13, 2017. (ECF No. 3).
A. Applicable Legal Principles
This Court has a statutory responsibility to review complaints filed by prisoners and by those who have been granted in forma pauperis to determine if the complaint states a valid claim for relief. The Court is required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.
Moreover, not only is a court permitted to sua sponte dismiss a complaint which fails to state a claim, but it is required to do so by the mandatory language of "the court shall dismiss" utilized by Section 1915(e)(2). In performing a court's mandated function of sua sponte reviewing complaints under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A to determine if they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a federal district court applies the same standard as applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Powell v. Hoover, 956 F. Supp. 565, 568 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to claim dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
In reviewing complaints as mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A and, consequently, utilizing the standards for a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must be read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all well-pleaded, material allegations of fact in the complaint must be taken as true. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Because Plaintiff is pro se, the court will accord him an even more liberal reading of the complaint, employing less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
B. Discussion
Although lacking in specifics, Plaintiff seems to allege that in 2012 Attorney Eli Zlokas, who was appointed by Judge Dwayne Woodruff to be his "payee," "stole half of [his] settlement funds." As relief, Plaintiff seeks the Court to order Attorney Zlokas to pay him $10,000.00 and to order Judge Woodruff to pay him $15,000.00 for assigning "a person who would steal [financial] funds from [his] account."
There are a number of problems with Plaintiff's complaints, none of which can be cured by amending the complaints. First, Plaintiff's complaints do not state whether Plaintiff is bringing his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights or under Pennsylvania state law for alleged tortious conduct. However, under either theory, Hoye's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as tort claims brought under Pennsylvania state law, are subject to Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2). A claim accrues "when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based." Kach, 589 F.3d at 634 (internal quotation marks omitted).
"When screening a complaint under § 1915, a district court may sua sponte dismiss the complaint as untimely under the statute of limitations where the defense is obvious from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required." Whitenight v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania State Police, No. 16-3752, slip op. at 2-3, -- F. App'x --, 2017 WL 35725 at *1 (3d Cir. Jan. 4, 2017) (per curiam) (citing Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 656-57 (4th Cir. 2006); Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995)).
In Civil Action No. 17-cv-0021, Plaintiff specifically states that the date of the event occurred "2012 - 2013; 3/23/2012 - 5/2/13." Complaint at ¶ IV(A). In Civil Action No. 17-0270, Plaintiff specifically states that the event occurred on March 22, 2012. As stated supra, Plaintiff initiated these actions on December 23, 2016, and February 21, 2017, respectively, clearly more than two years after the date the occurrence allegedly occurred. Plaintiff alleges no facts supporting a conclusion that the statute of limitations was tolled for any reason.
Next, assuming the claims are timely, Judge Dwayne Woodruff is absolutely immune from liability for all claims Plaintiff brings against him for any acts taken in his judicial capacity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Azubukov. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006). Judicial immunity is not only immunity from damages, but also immunity from suit. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
And finally, assuming that these claims are timely and are based on state law, it does not appear that this Court has original jurisdiction because the amount in controversy is far below the $75,000 threshold and the parties are not citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
For all these reasons, even construing the allegations in the Complaints in Plaintiff's favor, he has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted because his claims were not timely filed.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, it is respectfully recommended that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, these two Complaints be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. It is further recommended that leave to amend not be granted as same would be futile.
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff is permitted to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. Plaintiff, being a non-electronically registered party, may file objections to this Report and Recommendation by April 3, 2017. Failure to timely file objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Dated: March 15, 2017
s/Cynthia Reed Eddy
Cynthia Reed Eddy
United States Magistrate Judge cc: NATHAN HOYE
LZ-6846
1100 Pike Street
Huntingdon, PA 16654
(via U.S. First Class Mail)