Defendant responds that neither the terms of the Acts nor the cases relied on by plaintiff require that the immunities offered by the Recreational Use Act be restricted in the way propounded by plaintiff because none of these cases considered the second sentence of section 25 of the Recreational Area Act. In support of its position, defendant relies on an opinion of the Appellate Court, Fourth District, Hoye v. Illinois Power Co., 269 Ill. App.3d 597 (1995). In Hoye, the plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic after he dove into a lake from an anchored boat and struck his head.
In the ensuing appeal, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The appellate court opinion extensively cited Hoye v. Illinois Power Co., 269 Ill. App.3d 597 (1995), and like Hoye, rejected the casual basis test, finding that "the [Campground Licensing and] Recreational Area Act does not restrict the applicability of the Recreational Use Act." 301 Ill. App.3d at 518.
This is not the type of charge that would remove the immunity under the Recreational Use Act. See Hoye v. Illinois Power Co., 269 Ill. App. 3d 597, 602 (1995) ("As used in the Recreational Use Act, `charge' means an admission fee to go upon the land. [Citation.] This does not include incidental charges for refreshments or other services while on the land. Under the allegations of the complaint, it is possible that a person who put his boat into the lake in the morning and took it out in the afternoon would not have to pay a fee"). If anything, this charge is more properly described as "cash made for the purpose of properly conserving the land," which is specifically excluded from the definition of "charge" under the Recreational Use Act. 745 ILCS 65/2(d) (West 2002).
The System maintains the circuit court properly dismissed with prejudice the remaining counts on the merits, because plaintiff was not entitled to relief under his theories because the retirement annuity was properly calculated. In reviewing dismissals for failure to state a cause of action under section 2-615, this court takes as true all well-pleaded facts and their reasonable inferences, while rejecting unsupported conclusions of fact or law, to determine de novo whether sufficient facts are alleged in the pleading that could, if proved, entitle plaintiff to relief. Hoye v. Illinois Power Co., 269 Ill. App.3d 597, 599, 646 N.E.2d 651, 652 (1995). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for the failure to state a cause of action, a trial court may only consider the allegations in the complaint and not other supporting material.