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Hoye v. Dist. Attorney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Mar 2, 2020
Civil Action No. 2: 19-cv-1309 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2020)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 2: 19-cv-1309

03-02-2020

NATHAN HOYE, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PENNSLYVANIA, and WARDEN, SCI-SOMERSET, Respondents.

cc: NATHAN HOYE NX8604 SCI SOMERSET 1600 WALTERS MILL ROAD SOMERSET, PA 15510 (via U.S. First Class Mail) Alicia H. Searfoss Office of the District Attorney of Allegheny County (via ECF electronic notification)


Senior United States District Judge Joy Flowers Conti

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner, Nathan Hoye, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, be dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies and that a certificate of appealability likewise be denied.

II. REPORT

On August 6, 2019, Petitioner Nathan Hoye ("Petitioner" or "Hoye") pled guilty to all charges pending against him and was sentenced at two criminal cases pending in Allegheny County: CP-02-CR-0009767-2017 and CP-02-CR-0004077-2018. The sentences are to be served concurrently.

Hoye, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal challenging the validity of his sentence at CP-02-CR-0004077-2018, which appeal remains pending before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. He did not file a direct appeal challenging the validity of his sentence at CP-02-CR-0009767-2017. Hoye pro se also filed Post-Conviction Relief Act Petitions in both CP-02- CR-0009767-2017 and CP-02-CR-0004077-2018, which are pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.

A petitioner must exhaust state remedies by presenting his federal constitutional claims to each level of the state courts empowered to hear those claims, either on direct appeal or in collateral post-conviction proceedings. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). In Pennsylvania, this requirement generally means that a petitioner in a non-capital case must have presented every federal constitutional claim raised in his habeas petition to the Common Pleas Court and then to the Superior Court either on direct or PCRA appeal. See, e.g., Lambert, 387 F.3d at 233-34. Once a petitioner's federal claims have been fairly presented to the state courts and those proceedings conclude, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.

The exhaustion requirement is "grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal rights." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Federal court intervention would be premature whenever a state procedure still affords a petitioner with an opportunity to obtain relief from the judgment of sentence that he seeks to attack in a federal habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1998) ("The exhaustion requirement does not foreclose federal relief, but merely postpones it."). The general rule is that a district court should dismiss a federal habeas petition if the petitioner is exhausting his available state remedies. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).

Respondents acknowledge that Hoye's federal petition is timely filed in this Court, but argue that it is premature and should be dismissed. This Court agrees with Respondents. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court impose the general rule and dismiss the instant federal habeas petition. Hoye has a direct appeal pending before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania regarding the sentence imposed at CP-02-CR-0004077-2018 and he has filed PCRA petitions in both CP-02-CR-0009767-2017 and CP-02-CR-0004077-2018, which remain pending before the Court of Common Pleas. Accordingly, the claims presented in this habeas petition are unexhausted, but not procedurally defaulted as they remain pending in state court. The dismissal should be without prejudice to Hoye commencing another federal habeas case in the event that he does not receive the relief he seeks upon the completion of any relevant litigation before the state courts.

Hoye also seeks credit for time served. At this time, this issue is best addressed and, if necessary, corrected in state court.

Certificate of Appealability

Section 102 of AEDPA, which is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2253, governs the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. It provides that "[a] certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." "When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Applying this standard here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable that the claims raised in the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus have not been exhausted. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be dismissed without prejudice to Hoye commencing another federal habeas case in the event that he does not receive the relief he seeks upon the completion of any relevant litigation before the state courts and that a certificate of appealability be denied.

Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Petitioner, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file objections to this Report and Recommendation by March 20, 2020, and Respondents, because they are electronically registered parties, must file objections, if any, by March 17, 2020. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe "will waive the right to appeal." Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).

s/ Cynthia Reed Eddy

Cynthia Reed Eddy

Chief United States Magistrate Judge Dated: March 2, 2020 cc: NATHAN HOYE

NX8604

SCI SOMERSET

1600 WALTERS MILL ROAD

SOMERSET, PA 15510

(via U.S. First Class Mail)

Alicia H. Searfoss

Office of the District Attorney of Allegheny County

(via ECF electronic notification)


Summaries of

Hoye v. Dist. Attorney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Mar 2, 2020
Civil Action No. 2: 19-cv-1309 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2020)
Case details for

Hoye v. Dist. Attorney

Case Details

Full title:NATHAN HOYE, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY…

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Mar 2, 2020

Citations

Civil Action No. 2: 19-cv-1309 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2020)