In matters of this kind the trial court can and should exert reasonable control over the time and manner in which offers of evidence are made, to the end that once a definite ruling has been deliberately made, all further efforts to get the same objectionable matter before the jury, whether by questions, answers, or offers of proof shall be so made as not to influence the jury. In holding that in this case there was no reversible error asserted in plaintiff's first assignment, we do not intend to express any disagreement with the opinions of this court in Guedon v. Rooney, 160 Or. 621, 644, 87 P.2d 209, and Howland v. Fenner Mfg. Co., 104 Or. 373, 206 P. 730, 207 P. 1096. Our ruling on the second assignment must be similar to that on the first. If the defendant violated the law which requires that drivers of motor vehicles should act in obedience to traffic signs, the fact that others thereafter also violate it would be immaterial, and evidence to that effect inadmissible. If customary violation of traffic regulations is inadmissible ( Frame v. Arrow Towing Service, 155 Or. 523, 64 P.2d 1312) then, a fortiorari, evidence of violation not even supported by custom would also be inadmissible.

In another class of cases the giving of an abstract instruction has been disapproved because it submitted to the jury for determination, issues which were not within the pleadings. Woodward v. The O.R. N. Co., 18 Or. 289, 22 P. 1076; Buchtel v. Evans, 21 Or. 309, 28 P. 67; Coos Bay Railroad Co. v. Siglin, 26 Or. 387, 38 P. 192; Dooley v. Bank of Baker City, 29 Or. 277, 45 P. 780; Hughes v. McCullough, 39 Or. 372, 65 P. 85; First National Bank v. McDonald, 42 Or. 257, 70 P. 901; Latourette v. Meldrum, 49 Or. 397, 90 P. 503; Miami Quarry Co. v. Seaborg Packing Co., 103 Or. 362, 204 P. 492; Howland v. Fenner Mfg. Co., 104 Or. 373, 206 P. 730, 207 P. 1096; Mannix v. The Portland Telegram, 136 Or. 474, 284 P. 837, 297 P. 350, 300 P. 350; Burk v. Portland Traction Co., 177 Or. 645, 164 P.2d 720. A careful examination of the Oregon authorities indicates that substantially all of the cases in which instructions have been held erroneous because abstract, fall within one or the other of the two classes last mentioned. They have either broadened the issues beyond the scope of the pleadings or beyond the scope of the evidence and have thus directly or impliedly submitted to the determination of the jury questions which were not properly before them.

A general statement of the controlling effect of such an utterance as this by the appellate court is found in 5 C.J.S. 1499, Sec. 1964. Commercial Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 115 So. 400; Dickerson v. Western Union Tel. Tel. Co., 114 Miss. 115, 74 So. 779; 4 C.J. 1213; Carlson v. Northern Pac. R.R. Co., 281 P. 913; Davis, Agent, v. M.A. Pharr Cotton Co. (Ga.), 122 S.E. 623; L. N.R. Co. v. Cornett's Admr. (Ky.), 35 S.W.2d 10; Hutcherson v. Towne, 241 P. 917; Howland v. Fenner, 252 P. 962. It is reversible error for the trial court to ignore this law of the case.

The plea of res judicata, therefore, is not in the case. The decision of this court on the former appeal is the law in this case: Howland v. Fenner Mfg. Co., ante, p. ___ ( 252 P. 962); Wicks v. Sanborn, 81 Or. 366 ( 159 P. 71); Williams v. Pacific Surety Co., 70 Or. 203 ( 139 P. 914). In the former decision of this court in this case it was held that the judgment-roll in the case of Montgomery Estate Co. v. Elerath Steel Iron Co. was admissible as evidence.