Because this issue causes us to determine whether the manifest weight of the evidence supports the petitioner's allegations of extreme and repeated mental cruelty, a summary of the relevant facts as presented to the trial court will be necessary. • 5 In Quilty v. Quilty (1972), 5 Ill. App.3d 801, 803, 284 N.E.2d 690, 691, we stated the accepted definition of extreme and repeated mental cruelty as: "`[I]t is generally recognized that the elements consist of a course of abusive and humiliating treatment, calculated or obviously of a nature to torture, discommode, or render miserable the life of the opposite spouse; and which actually affects the physical or mental health of such spouse'" (quoting from Howison v. Howison (1970), 128 Ill. App.2d 377, 382, 262 N.E.2d 1, 3). (Accord, Graf v. Graf (1979), 71 Ill. App.3d 496, 389 N.E.2d 1206.) The facts of the particular case must be considered in light of the parties' pattern of conduct, their respective emotional makeup, and the circumstances under which the complained-of conduct occurred.
"It is a basic interest of the State to preserve the integrity and continuity of marriages and divorces will not be granted unless there is sufficient evidence of cause therefore as specified by statute. * * * According to Howison v. Howison, 128 Ill. App.2d 377, 262 N.E.2d 1, `The conduct of a defendant may vary from case to case but the ultimate test is the effect such conduct has upon the plaintiff and the marriage. * * * [I]t is generally recognized that the elements consist of a course of abusive and humiliating treatment, calculated or obviously of a nature to torture, discommode, or render miserable the life of the opposite spouse; and which actually affects the physical or mental health of such spouse.
We disagree. • 1, 2 Mental cruelty is conduct causing embarrassment, humiliation, and anguish so as to render life miserable and unendurable, or to cause a spouse's life, person, or health to become endangered. ( McGowan v. McGowan (1st Dist. 1973), 15 Ill. App.3d 913, 914, 305 N.E.2d 261; Quilty v. Quilty (3d Dist. 1972), 5 Ill. App.3d 801, 803, 284 N.E.2d 690; Woodshank v. Woodshank (3d Dist. 1971), 2 Ill. App.3d 596, 599, 274 N.E.2d 694; Howison v. Howison (2d Dist. 1970), 128 Ill. App.2d 377, 382, 262 N.E.2d 1.) To be entitled to a divorce on the ground of mental cruelty, a spouse must also show that the offensive conduct was unprovoked.
( Gregory v. Gregory (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 436, 321 N.E.2d 122.) Generally, the elements of extreme and repeated mental cruelty such as the plaintiff alleged here, have been recognized as a course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated or obviously of a nature to torture, discommode or render miserable the life of the opposite spouse, which conduct actually affects the physical or mental health of the spouse. Gregory v. Gregory (1974), 24 Ill. App.3d 436, 321 N.E.2d 122; Stanard v. Stanard (1969), 108 Ill. App.2d 240, 247 N.E.2d 438; Howison v. Howison (1970), 128 Ill. App.2d 377, 262 N.E.2d 1; Marks v. Marks (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 212, 289 N.E.2d 671; Quilty v. Quilty (1972), 5 Ill. App.3d 801; 284 N.E.2d 690. Finally nowhere in its decree did the court find that the plaintiff was not guilty of provocation.
• 4 Mental cruelty, as a ground for divorce, consists of a course of abusive and humiliating treatment, calculated or obviously of a nature to torture, discommode, or render miserable the life of the opposite spouse; and which actually affects the physical or mental health of such spouse. ( Howison v. Howison, 128 Ill. App.2d 377, 262 N.E.2d 1.) To prove a case entitling a spouse to divorce on the ground of mental cruelty, the evidence must show that the conduct of the offending spouse is unprovoked and constitutes a course of abusive and humiliating treatment that makes the life of the complaining spouse miserable, or endangers his or her life, person or health.
]" ( 59 Ill. App.2d 222, 226, 207 N.E.2d 130, 132.) The foregoing was quoted and followed in Howison v. Howison, 128 Ill. App.2d 377, 262 N.E.2d 1. Similarly, in Collinet v. Collinet, 31 Ill. App.2d 72, 175 N.E.2d 659, the court rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's suit for divorce, which was based upon "extreme and repeated cruelty," was barred by "plaintiff's actions of continuing to live at home and care for the family * * *."
Whether certain acts constitute mental cruelty depends upon the total factual background of each case, the emotional and personal make-up of the parties and the circumstances under which the incidents occurred. ( Woodshank v. Woodshank, 2 Ill. App.3d 596, 599 (1971); Loveless v. Loveless, 128 Ill. App.2d 297, 300 (1970); Howison v. Howison, 128 Ill. App.2d 377, 381 (1970); Akin v. Akin, 125 Ill. App.2d 159, 165-66 (1970).) The ultimate test is the effect the complained-of-conduct had upon the complaining party and the marriage.
Whether the acts in question constitute mental cruelty depends upon the total factual background and is determined primarily by the effect of the alleged misconduct upon the complaining party. Sharpe v. Sharpe (1973), 9 Ill. App.3d 667, 669-70; Howison v. Howison (1970), 128 Ill. App.2d 377, 381-382; Stanard v. Stanard (1969), 108 Ill. App.2d 240, 249. In the cases cited the trial court had the duty to weigh the evidence and to make its determination applying the mental cruelty standards, and the reviewing court was required to test the judge's finding to determine whether it was against the manifest weight of the evidence as disclosed by the entire record.
The counterdefendant admitted in her brief that no such rule has been articulated by an Illinois court but maintains that our courts have established and followed a policy of not allowing a divorce where the testimony of the complaining party was not corroborated by additional evidence on the issue of mental cruelty. In support of this position the counterdefendant cited Stanard v. Stanard, 108 Ill. App.2d 240, 247 N.E.2d 438 (1969), and Howison v. Howison, 128 Ill. App.2d 377, 262 N.E.2d 1 (1970). While it is true that in both cases the divorce was not permitted and that the only evidence as to mental cruelty was supplied by the complaining witness, the decisions are based on grounds other than that the testimony of the complaining witness was not corroborated. The law is directly contrary to the assertion of the counterdefendant and corroboration is not necessary in a contested divorce proceeding.
Mental cruelty has been defined by our courts as conduct which causes embarrassment, humiliation and anguish so as to render life miserable and unendurable or to cause a spouse's life, person or health to become endangered. Stanard v. Stanard, 108 Ill. App.2d 240, 247 N.E.2d 438; Howison v. Howison, 128 Ill. App.2d 377, 262 N.E.2d 1. In support of his allegation, plaintiff testified at trial that defendant's attitude toward him had been "cold" since approximately 1960. Defendant would not speak to plaintiff for periods of time (the longest of which was 3 to 4 days), and indicated to plaintiff that he was "less than a man" by constantly criticizing his actions and casting aspersions upon his intelligence.