Opinion
Civ. No. 98-3763 (DRD).
September 15, 1999
Randall Bass, Esq., FREEMAN BASS, P.A., Newark, New Jersey, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Anthony J. Labruna, Esq., Assistant United States Attorney, Newark, New Jersey, Attorney for Defendant.
OPINION
Plaintiff Eunice Howerton appeals from a final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying her Application for Social Security Disability benefits under the Social Security Act. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's determination is affirmed.
Plaintiff applied for and was awarded Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") payments on July 7, 1998. In her memorandum of law in support of this appeal, plaintiff also contests the onset date applied by the Commissioner in determining her SSI benefits. See , plaintiff's memorandum of law at pages 1-2. Plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies with regards to that decision, nor was an appeal of that determination raised in plaintiff's complaint dated August 7, 1998. For those reasons, the issue cannot be entertained at this time.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to Local Rule 9.1, the parties have submitted a Joint Document of Stipulated Facts and Medical Abstracts. On March 7, 1994, plaintiff filed an Application for Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging disability based upon "orthopedic, neurological, neuropsychiatric, psychiatric, psychological, pulmonary, internal, and conditions related thereto," and specifically "back pain." (Tr. 78-84, 99-108). Plaintiff's original application alleged a disability onset date of March 1991. Id. Plaintiff later filed an amendment to her application, changing the alleged onset date to April 30, 1992. (Tr. 84).
Plaintiff's application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (Tr. 86-88, 92-94). Following the appointment of a legal representative (Tr. 39-40), plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), which was conducted on August 17, 1995. (Tr. 41-77). Plaintiff was represented by counsel at this hearing.Id.
On February 29, 1996, plaintiff's application for benefits was denied in a written decision by ALJ Gerald J. Ryan. (Tr. 21-26). ALJ Ryan determined, inter alia, that the plaintiff's impairments do not prevent her from performing her past relevant work and that plaintiff therefore was not under a "disability" as defined in the Social Security Act. (Tr. 26).
Plaintiff, through her attorneys, filed a request for review of the hearing decision, along with written objections to the ALJ'S decision, with the Appeals Council. (Tr. 13-17). Plaintiff's counsel later submitted additional evidence to the Appeals Council, indicating that plaintiff suffers from AIDS. (Tr. 12). The ALJ's decision became final when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on July 17, 1998. (Tr. 5-6). Plaintiff filed her complaint seeking review of this determination on or about August 7, 1998.
Administrative Findings
In his written decision dated February 29, 1996, ALJ Ryan made the following findings:
1. The claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on April 30, 1992, the date the claimant stated she became unable to work, and continues to meet them through the date of this decision.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 30, 1992.
3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has severe low back strain and asymptomatic HIV infection, but that she does not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
4. Her complaints of pain and other symptomatology, to the extent that they preclude all work activity, are not credible.
5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform work-related activities except for work involving lifting and carrying more than 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 and 416.945).
6. The claimant's past relevant work as an office/data entry clerk did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the above limitation(s)(20) C.F.R. § 404.1565 and 416.965).
7. The claimant's impairments do not prevent the claimant from performing her past relevant work.
8. The claimant was not under a "disability" as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of the decision ( 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e)).
(Tr. 25-26).
Evidence Before The ALJ
The administrative record before the ALJ consisted of 26 exhibits, primarily plaintiff's medical records. These records indicate that plaintiff suffered injuries when a ceiling collapsed on her on April 17, 1990. (Tr. 137-40). Each of these reports indicates that plaintiff experiences severe back pain resulting in significant limitation of motion, making it difficult for plaintiff to perform many activities. (Tr. 137-46).
At the administrative hearing on August 17, 1995, ALJ Ryan also received testimony from the plaintiff. Plaintiff testified that she completed some college and had received vocational training in word processing and computer processing. (Tr. 45-46). She stated that she is HIV positive and suffers from headaches, joint and back pain. (Tr. 47). Her last job as a supermarket cashier ended in March of 1992; she was terminated because she was unable to perform lifting required as part of her job. (Tr. 47-48). She performs light housework and is able to take care of her personal needs, including grocery shopping. (Tr. 51, 53-54).
Plaintiff testified to various physical ailments, including back pain, the symptoms of which her doctors have treated with nonprescription pain relievers. (Tr. 56-61). She testified to alcohol abuse, but did not report any incidents of hospitalization, treatment, or problems with the law resulting from her use of alcohol. (Tr. 62-63).
Plaintiff testified that she completed a course of study at SCS Business and Technical Institute, attending classes approximately twenty hours each week from March 1993 until August 1993. (Tr. 72).
Plaintiff was diagnosed as HIV positive in October of 1994. (Tr. 75). At the completion of the administrative hearing, ALJ Ryan stated that he would reserve decision until medical records regarding plaintiff's HIV diagnosis, including blood tests, could be obtained and made part of the administrative record. (Tr. 76). These additional records were submitted and reviewed by the ALJ; they indicate that plaintiff is HIV positive and suffers from arthritis and other physical ailments. (Tr. 171-77).
Additional Evidence Submitted to the Appeals Council
On May 29, 1996, plaintiff's counsel submitted, as additional evidence, a Newark Department of Health and Human Services Form A-329 completed by Dr. Samya B. Shafi and dated April 17, 1996. (Tr. 12). Dr. Shafi's report indicates a diagnosis of AIDS and neuropathy and lists plaintiff's condition as "permanent disability AIDS, neuropathy." (Tr. 207). Plaintiff's submission was accompanied by a letter from her attorneys, alleging that plaintiff meets Section 14.08 of the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. (Tr. 12).
DETERMINATION OF DISABILITY AND BURDENS OF PROOF
Under the Social Security Act, the term "disability" is defined as "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The statute further states that:
an individual will be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work . . .42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Social Security regulations provide a five-step procedure for evaluating disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and 416.920. The Commissioner first determines whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). If the claimant is employed in substantial gainful activity, his application for disability benefits is automatically denied. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).
The second step determines whether the claimant has a "severe impairment," defined as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities . . ." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). A claimant who does not have a severe impairment is not disabled. Id.
If the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner next determines whether the impairment is listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If so, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled, without consideration of the claimant's age, education and work experience. See id.
Fourth, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant can return to his previous type of employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The claimant bears the burden of proving that he is unable to return to his former occupation. Rossi v. Califano, 602 F.2d 55, 57 (3d Cir. 1979). TheRossi court noted that a "[p]laintiff satisfies her initial burden of showing that she is unable to return to her previous employment when her doctor substantiates her subjective claims." Id.
For the fifth step, "[t]he burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to show that the claimant, given [his] age, education, and work experience, has the capacity to perform specific jobs that exist in the national economy." Id. at 55, 57. Entitlement to disability benefits is dependent on a finding that the claimant is incapable of performing some other type of work in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing an administrative determination, the duty of the district court is not to review the case de novo, but instead to discern whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings and determinations of the Commissioner. See Bradley v. Bowen, 667 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1987). A district court must accept the Commissioner's findings of fact as conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981). Substantial evidence has been defined as "[s]uch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 704. Whether evidence is substantial has been described by the Third Circuit as a qualitative, not quantitative, exercise, see Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983), requiring an elaboration of the ALJ's analysis "so that a reviewing court may know the basis for the decision . . . not only an expression of the evidence s/he considered which supports the result, but also some indication of the evidence which was rejected." Cotter v. Harris, supra at 705 (quoting Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir. 1974)). When faced with conflicting evidence, an administrative decision must adequately explain in the record its reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence. Ogden v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 273, 278 (M.D.Pa. 1987).
DISCUSSION
Reviewing the Commissioner's five-step procedure for evaluating disability claims, ALJ Ryan's initial findings are supported by substantial evidence. As to the first determination, plaintiff's testimony establishes that she has not worked since April 30, 1992. The medical reports in the administrative record, particularly the reports of Drs. Roberts (Tr. 139-40), Ahmad (Tr. 141-44), and Sehgal (Tr. 145-47), support the ALJ's finding that plaintiff's back pain results in a "severe impairment" and limitations.
These medical reports also support the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff's condition did not fall within the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. As discussed by the ALJ in his decision, plaintiff's back pain does not meet the requirements of § 1.05(C) of Appendix 1. Likewise, the ALJ was presented with no evidence to indicate that plaintiff's HIV infection was symptomatic, nor was there evidence of any physical or mental manifestations of plaintiff's alleged alcoholism.
While it appears that the plaintiff's impairments prevent her from performing work-related activities involving lifting and carrying, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff's past "relevant work as an office/data entry clerk did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by [her] limitation(s)." (Tr. 26). Plaintiff's disability report and resumé indicate that she has received training in and has worked as a word processor and data entry clerk. (Tr. 103, 107-08).
The Appeals Council, in its denial of plaintiff's request for review on July 17, 1998, adequately explained the basis for rejecting the additional evidence submitted by plaintiff regarding her AIDS diagnosis. Section 114.00(D)(3) of Appendix 1 requires documentation of HIV infection "by laboratory evidence or by other generally acceptable methods consistent with the prevailing state of medical knowledge and clinical practice." As noted by the Appeals Council, Dr. Shafi's report consists of a diagnosis only, and does not include any supporting objective findings.
Plaintiff apparently does not contest the Commissioner's determinations regarding her back pain, instead raising challenges based solely on plaintiff's alcoholism and her HIV-positive diagnosis. The essence of plaintiff's argument is that these conditions, when coupled with plaintiff's race, gender, educational level and social status, constitute "nonexertional impairments" as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a, and make it impossible for her to retain any type of job. As plaintiff's counsel describes it:
This inner city minority female Plaintiff with her storefront academy training who needs a shot of rum to get up in the morning and is HIV positive and has been mugged and has had the ceiling in her basement slum dwelling fall on her, does not have the ability to work in a stressful or competitive situation.
Plaintiff's memorandum of law at 13. As discussed above, there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner's findings to the contrary.
Moreover, as noted by defendant, plaintiff's argument, insofar as it is based on plaintiff's abuse of alcohol, is precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C), which states that "an individual shall not be considered to be disabled . . . if alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for this subparagraph) be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner's determination that the individual is disabled."
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the final determination of the Commissioner is affirmed. An appropriate order shall be entered.