No. 05-10-00828-CR
Opinion issued December 14, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court of Appeals No. 2 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. MB08-11290-M.
Before Justices MORRIS, FRANCIS, and LANG-MIERS.
Opinion by Justice MORRIS.
At trial, Elton Karl Howard waived his right to a jury trial and was convicted by the trial court of evading arrest or detention. He now complains on appeal that the evidence against him is legally insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Factual Background
At approximately 8:40 p.m. one summer night, Addison police officer Rick McCafferty was patrolling in the parking lot of an apartment complex. The area had a moderately high crime rate, and thefts and burglaries of vehicles, as well as drug offenses, were known to occur there. McCafferty observed a grey sedan parked in the lot. The car had no back license plate or temporary tag. The two back windows of the car were rolled down, but the front windows were up and there was a reflective sun shade in the car's windshield. McCafferty recalled that it was very hot outside. The car appeared to be occupied by two people in the front seats. McCafferty parked his car two to three cars behind the vehicle and began to walk toward it. He was concerned that the occupants of the car were trying to steal it or something inside it or that the car had already been stolen. As McCafferty neared the car from the rear passenger side, he could see appellant in the driver's seat and a white male in the passenger seat. Appellant was reaching behind the passenger seat on the floorboard area of the car. McCafferty stood near the car observing appellant. When appellant saw him, McCafferty greeted him and said "Police." At that point, appellant "began to panic." Saying "Oh, God. Oh, God," he kept reaching between the area behind the passenger seat and somewhere in the front seat for ten to fifteen seconds. McCafferty thought appellant was trying to hide something. The vehicle was cluttered inside. Because it was summer, McCafferty had no difficulty seeing inside it. McCafferty made eye contact with the passenger and again announced that he was with the police. He asked to see the men's identification. He wanted to be sure that the vehicle actually belonged to appellant or his passenger. The passenger immediately gave McCafferty his driver's license. Appellant, however, continued to reach under the front seat "like he was panicking." Then he started the car. McCafferty asked appellant to turn the car off, and appellant complied. As McCafferty started to walk from the passenger side to the driver's side of the car, appellant got out and started running. As he ran, he kept reaching into the waistband of his shorts. Eventually, McCafferty was able to stop appellant by pushing him, but appellant struggled so much that McCafferty was not able to handcuff him until he used pepper spray and was assisted by four other officers. Following the arrest, McCafferty found a small baggie of what appeared to be marijuana under the driver's seat of the car where McCafferty had seen appellant reaching. Appellant testified in his own defense. He claimed there was a temporary license plate in the back window of the car. Appellant further claimed that he heard McCafferty tap on his car but did not hear McCafferty announce that he was a police officer. According to appellant, all he heard was a demand to get out of the car. Appellant asserted that he could see only that McCafferty had his hand on his gun but not that McCafferty was in a police uniform. Appellant also claimed that while he was running from McCafferty, he stated, "I didn't know you were a cop." According to appellant's version of events, there was computer equipment in the car, which is why the back windows were down. Appellant recalled that, just before his encounter with McCafferty, he was moving a laptop computer from the back seat to the front to "see if a driver would fit in it." Appellant admitted that he was not in the car very long after the officer approached before he took off running. He stated that he did not recall the officer asking his companion for identification. Discussion
Appellant contends in his sole issue that the evidence against him is legally insufficient to support his conviction. In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. See Rollerson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Here, appellant complains the trial court could not have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the arresting officer never had reasonable suspicion to detain him or probable cause to arrest him. The State concedes that McCafferty did not initially have probable cause to arrest appellant but argues that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain him. Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless detention of a person must be justified by reasonable suspicion. A police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 150 (2011). This standard is an objective one that disregards the actual subjective intent of the arresting officer and looks, instead, to whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention under the totality of the circumstances. Even if the circumstances seem innocent enough in isolation, if they combine to reasonably suggest the imminence of criminal conduct, an investigative detention is justified. We must determine not whether particular conduct is innocent or criminal, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to the particular non-criminal acts. See id. To support a reasonable suspicion, the facts must show that some activity out of the ordinary has occurred, some suggestion that connects the detainee to the unusual activity, and some indication that the unusual activity is related to a crime. See id. at 916. Particularly with respect to information suggesting that a crime is about to occur, the requirement that there be some indication that the unusual activity is related to crime does not necessarily mean that the information must conclusively lead to the conclusion that a particular, identifiable penal code violation is imminent. To satisfy the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, it is enough that the information is sufficiently detailed and reliable to suggest that something of an apparently criminal nature is brewing. Id. at 917 (emphasis in original). In appellant's case, McCafferty was patrolling at night in an area known for burglary and theft of vehicles and drug activity. He noticed a car without a back license tag occupied by two people despite the fact that a sun shade was blocking the car's windshield. It was a hot night, and yet only the back windows of the car were down. As McCafferty approached the car without announcing his presence, he could see appellant moving his hands from the back to the front of the car and vice versa. Once appellant spotted McCafferty and McCafferty announced that he was a police officer, appellant visibly and audibly panicked and began making furtive gestures in the car. When asked for his identification, appellant instead started the car. He complied with McCafferty's request that he turn off the car, but then he fled as McCafferty approached him. McCafferty had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant when he fled from the car. Viewing the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction. We resolve his sole issue against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment.