Opinion
21A-CR-1804
02-21-2022
Adam Lee Howard, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff,
Attorney for Appellant R. Patrick Magrath Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Attorneys for Appellee Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Evan Matthew Comer Deputy Attorney General
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Decatur Superior Court, Trial Court Cause No. 16D01-2004-F6-376, The Honorable Matthew D. Bailey, Judge
Attorney for Appellant
R. Patrick Magrath
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP
Attorneys for Appellee
Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Evan Matthew Comer Deputy Attorney General
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Robb, Judge.
Case Summary and Issues
[¶1] Adam Lee Howard appeals the trial court's revocation of his probation. Howard raises multiple issues which we restate as: (1) whether sufficient evidence was presented that he violated his probation; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. Concluding the State presented sufficient evidence that Howard violated his probation, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Howard's probation, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On April 1, 2020, the State charged Howard with unlawful possession of a legend drug, a Level 6 felony. Howard pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 730 days with 180 days to be served on home detention followed by 550 days of probation. Howard's Order for Probation stipulated that he "must not commit any criminal act" during his period of probation. Appellant's Appendix, Volume 2 at 28.
[¶3] On October 1, 2020, Howard completed his period of home incarceration and began serving his probation. On November 20, 2020, Howard accused his wife, Brandy Woodruff, of infidelity and the two became involved in a verbal altercation. Woodruff went to work but throughout the day Howard sent her multiple text messages continuing their argument. During their text exchange, Woodruff told Howard to leave their apartment. However, when Woodruff returned home after work Howard was still there. Woodruff entered the apartment to get a different car key and switch vehicles so she could pick up her children from her mother's home. Howard briefly exited the apartment. After getting the key, Woodruff attempted to exit, but Howard was standing on the other side of the door holding it shut and preventing her from exiting. As Woodruff tried to pull the door open, Howard opened the door and "shoved" it into her arm. Transcript of Evidence, Volume 2 at 30. After making contact with Woodruff, Howard walked away from the door.
[¶4] Woodruff exited the residence and told Howard she wanted him to leave before she returned. Later that evening, police officers were dispatched to the apartment. When they arrived, both Woodruff and Howard were at the apartment. Woodruff showed the officers her left arm which had "fresh red marks, swelling and bruising" from where Howard had hit her with the door. Id. at 18; see Exhibits, Volume 1 at 14.
[¶5] Howard was charged with domestic battery, a Level 5 felony. The State then filed a petition to revoke Howard's probation in this case for violating the terms of his probation by "Receiving New Criminal Charges." Appellant's App., Vol. 2 at 39. The trial court held a fact-finding hearing and determined that "the State has met its burden and proven that Mr. Howard committed a criminal offense while he was on probation[.]" Tr., Vol. 2 at 50. The trial court ordered Howard to serve his 550-day suspended sentence in its entirety. Howard now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Howard's domestic battery charge is a Level 5 felony because he has a previous domestic battery conviction, which also involved Woodruff. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(c)(4).
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[¶6] Probation is a "matter of grace" left to the discretion of the trial court, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). "The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated." Id. The State need only prove the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence, and we will consider all the evidence most favorable to the judgment of the trial court without reweighing that evidence or judging the credibility of the witnesses. Monroe v. State, 899 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009). If the trial court finds that a person has violated a condition of probation at any time before termination of the probationary period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the trial court may impose one or more sanctions, including ordering execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h).
[¶7] A trial court's decision imposing sanctions for a probation violation is reviewed using the abuse of discretion standard. Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial court misinterprets the law. Madden v. State, 25 N.E.3d 791, 795 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015), trans. denied.
II. Revocation of Probation
[¶8] Probation revocation is a two-step process. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). "First, the court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred." Id. If a violation is proven, the trial court then must determine if the violation warrants revocation. Id.
A. Violation
[¶9] Howard argues there was insufficient evidence to prove that he violated his probation. When the State alleges that the defendant violated probation by committing a new criminal offense, the State is required to prove-by a preponderance of the evidence-that the defendant committed the offense. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 617 (Ind. 2013); Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f). To show Howard committed the crime of battery, the State had to prove that Howard "knowingly or intentionally" touched Woodruff in a "rude, insolent, or angry manner[.]" Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).
[¶10] Howard argues that State failed to demonstrate that he "knew or intended Woodruff to be struck by the door" during their altercation. Appellant's Brief at 11. Intent is a mental function, and "can be inferred from a defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points." Heuring v. State, 140 N.E.3d 270, 275 (Ind. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). A defendant need not personally touch another person because "battery may be committed by the unlawful touching by [the] defendant or by any other substance put in motion by [the] defendant." Henson v. State, 86 N.E.3d 432, 440 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (citation omitted).
Howard also contends that there is no evidence that he acted in a "rude, angry, or insolent manner." Appellant's Br. at 11. However, Woodruff testified that Howard was angry. See Tr., Vol. 2 at 31. Further, as stated in this section, the record shows that prior to the touching, the pair got into a verbal altercation, Howard sent Woodruff texts accusing her of cheating on him, and Howard refused to leave the home when Woodruff attempted to kick him out. Thus, the trial court could reasonably determine that Howard acted in a "rude, insolent, or angry manner." Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).
[¶11] Here, Howard and Woodruff got into a verbal altercation in the morning causing Woodruff to ask Howard to leave the apartment. Howard refused to leave and continued to question Woodruff regarding alleged infidelity via text messages while she was at work throughout the day. Woodruff testified that later in the day Howard attempted to keep her from leaving the apartment by holding the door closed from the outside and then pushed the door open and hit her in the left arm. See Tr., Vol. 2 at 30.
[¶12] Intent may be inferred from the nature and circumstances surrounding the crime and "duration, brutality, and relative strengths of the defendant and victim are factors that can be considered . . . as indications of the defendant's intent." Vanryn v. State, 155 N.E.3d 1254, 1267 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020). Therefore, the State presented sufficient evidence to infer that Howard intentionally touched Woodruff with the door. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence that Howard committed battery and violated his probation.
B. Sanction
[¶13] Howard also argues that the trial court's revocation of his suspended sentence was an abuse of discretion. Specifically, Howard contends that his underlying offense "was not particularly reprehensible[, ]" he did not have "any violations of his home incarceration[, ]" and "the nature of the alleged offense is minimal despite being charged as a level 5 felony." Appellant's Br. at 12-13.
[¶14] However, in determining the appropriate sanction upon finding a probation violation, trial courts are not required to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 59 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied. Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation. Beeler v. State, 959 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011), trans. denied. "[S]o long as the proper procedures have been followed in conducting a probation revocation hearing pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3, the trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence upon a finding of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence." Crump v. State, 740 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) (citation omitted), trans. denied.
[¶15] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing and determined that Howard committed battery by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court's sanction decision is not against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of this case. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Howard to serve his previously suspended sentence.
Conclusion
[¶16] We conclude the State presented sufficient evidence that Howard violated his probation, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Howard's probation. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶17] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Molter, J., concur.