is true that some courts have found that the theory of pyrolysis to be too speculative to be allowed into evidence through the testimony of an expert witness, (See e.g., Truck Insurance Exchange v. Magnetek, 360 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2004), other courts both before and after Daubert, have either allowed testimony on pyrolysis, or have recognized the theory in a written opinion, often without comment. See, e.g. Oxford Presbyterian Church v. Weil-McLain Co., Inc., 815 A.2d 1094, 1100 (Pa.Super., 2003) (district court allowed expert testimony on issue of pyrolysis as well as expert testimony opposing the theory); Dieker v. Case Corp., 73 P.3d 133 (Kan., 2003) (allowing expert to testify that pyrolysis of "field trash" would lower the ignition temperature of that material); Industrial Risk Insurers v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 1991 WL 99169 (Wis.App. April 3, 1991) (noting that the parties had conceded that fire had stared as a result of pyrolysis); Howard v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 437 F.Supp. 883 (D. Miss. 1977) (expert opined that pyrolysis of foam insulation resulted in emission of combustible gasses and combustion of the material). Accordingly, I find that the theory of pyrolysis is neither inherently reliable nor unreliable.

However, even a low amperage can allow an electric arc sufficient to burn or start a fire. See Howard v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 437 F.Supp. 883, 894 (S.D.Miss. 1977) (15-amp fuse on household current permitted a 1500-watt electric arc causing a fire to flash). Electric line overload will also cause a fire.

Because this statute changed the common law, it must be strictly construed and has not been held to authorize claims like that of appellants. See Howard v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 437 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.Miss. 1977); Smith v. Garrett, 287 So.2d 258 (Miss. 1973); Hasson Grocery Co. v. Cook, 196 Miss. 462, 17 So.2d 791 (1944).

The Court regrets that it may be giving these parties a "ticket for one ride only", Brown, supra, at 456, but such is the inherent danger in our federal system. This Court has previously taken one small step in the present direction in Howard v. Sears, 437 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.Miss. 1977) (bystander allowed to sue under strict liability theory, verdict for defendant on plaintiff's failure of proof). The court in West, supra, notes that 31 states have adopted § 402A in one form or another, with two federal court "predictions" in Utah and Vermont.

Ford Motor Company v. Cockrell, 211 So.2d 833, 836 (Miss. 1968); Lovelace v. Astra Trading Corporation, 439 F. Supp. 753, 759, 906 (S.D.Miss. 1977) (citing Mississippi law); Howard v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 437 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.Miss. 1977) (citing Mississippi law). See also, Elmore v. American Motors Corporation, 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal.Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84, 88-89 (1969); and Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581, 587-88 (Del. 1976).

It also serves to distinguish the situation at hand from that presented in Matter of Westchester Rockland Newspapers v Marbach ( 66 A.D.2d 335), relied upon by defendants, where members of the press attempted to gain access to a deposition, assertedly because the public had the right to know what was transpiring. While not squarely addressing the question, at least two Federal cases indicate acceptance of experts attending depositions (see, Matter of San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., US Dist Ct, Puerto Rico, Dec. 2, 1989, Acosta, J. [1989 WL 168401] [pretrial order]; Howard v Sears, Roebuck Co. 437 F. Supp. 883, 897, affd 584 F.2d 388). When it appears that expert assistance will be useful to a party in obtaining relevant information, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate some objective reason why the expert should be barred from attending the deposition (see, Farca v Semah, 181 A.D.2d 757, 758).