Opinion
May 7, 1974.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Page 112
H. Gordon Howard, pro se.
Cross, Christensen & Price, Warren H. Price, Loveland, for defendant-appellee.
ENOCH, Judge.
Plaintiff H. Gordon Howard appeals from a declaratory judgment determining the rights and liabilities of plaintiff and defendant Poudre Valley Rural Electric Association (REA) under a contract for service. We affirm.
Plaintiff operates a mobile home park near Ft. Collins, Colorado. In 1964 plaintiff and REA signed a letter agreement which provided that, upon execution by plaintiff of separate standard contracts for each meter installed and payment of a small deposit, REA would install certain electrical facilities for eight trailer lots. Minimum monthly charges of $3.06 per meter were specified. The agreement further provided that '(a)ny future lots at the same park will be served under the same terms and conditions upon the execution of additional contracts.' Plaintiff's signature on the letter appears over a clause stating: 'I have read the above and hereby agree to the terms as set forth herein as well as to the terms in the standard contracts executed June 15, 1964.'
Plaintiff signed eight standard contracts, each denominated 'Application for Electric Service,' which contained the following provisions:
'(T)he minimum charge per month shall be not less than $3.00 plus tax regardless of the kilowatt hours consumed. In no event shall the monthly minimum charge be less than 1% Of the construction costs or $3.00 for the first 5 KVA of transformer capacity plus $.75 for each additional KVA or fraction thereof which ever is higher.
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The Applicant will comply with and be bound by the provisions of the Certificate of Incorporatin and the By-Laws of the Association and any such rules and regulations as may from time to time be adopted by the Board of Directors of the Association and on file with the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado.'
From time to time after 1964, plaintiff requested extension of electrical service to additional trailer lots. When a new meter was installed, plaintiff and defendant executed a standard contract governing the conditions of service. Over the years, the wording of the standard contract was modified by the REA, and each change was duly recorded with the Public Utilities Commission.
In 1971 plaintiff requested electrical connections to two newly-developed lots which were located several hundred feet from the original group of lots. The defendant informed him that, due to a change in REA regulations, which had been filed with the PUC, concerning extension of service to mobile home parks, the requested facilities could be provided under one of two arrangements: (a) If plaintiff complied with county zoning requirements governing mobile home parks, the initial construction costs would be absorbed by REA and plaintiff's minimum monthly rate would be 1% Of total construction costs; or (b) if plaintiff did not comply with county zoning and platting requirements, he would have to pay the initial costs of construction, which would then be rebated in full over a period of ten years. Plaintiff insisted that under the 1964 letter agreement he was entitled to receive new service without complying with REA's new regulations. After several fruitless discussions, plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action seeking construction of the 1964 letter agreement.
The trial court held that the 1964 letter did not constitute the existing contract between the parties because it had been 'superseded and supplanted' by the course of conduct of the parties and by subsequent changes in the rules and regulations promulgated by defendant and approved by the Public Utilities Commission. The court further found:
'That the several individual standard contracts executed between the plaintiff and the defendant providing service to individual meters . . . define the terms and conditions upon which future additional electrical service shall be furnished by defendant to plaintiff on the property described in the Complaint.'
While we agree with the trial court that the parties are bound by the subsequent rules and regulations on file with the PUC, we do not agree that the 1964 letter was completely superseded by the new rules and regulations. Under well-established law, where different writings relating to the same subject are executed at the same time between the same parties, the writings are to be treated as one instrument. Harty v. Hoerner, 170 Colo. 506, 463 P.2d 313; Meredith v. Ramsdell, 152 Colo. 548, 384 P.2d 941. The 1964 letter incorporated by reference the terms of the standard contracts executed at that time by plaintiff and defendant. One of those terms required plaintiff to comply with and be bound by the rules and regulations adopted by REA. Reading the standard contracts and the letter agreement together, it is clear that REA's undertaking to serve future lots 'under the same terms and conditions' merely indicated its willingness to provide electrical service in conformance with regulations effective at the time service was requested. By 1971, the REA regulations on file with the PUC governing mobile home parks had changed significantly, and the REA was justified in requiring plaintiff to meet the new standards before extending service. See Zelinger v. Public Service Co., 164 Colo. 424, 435 P.2d 412; Denver & Salt Lake Ry. Co. v. St. Clair, 94 Colo. 67, 28 P.2d 340.
Judgment affirmed.
PIERCE and RULAND, JJ., concur.