This certainly meets the 10-year requirement of adverse possession.See Howard v. Kunto, 3 Wn. App. 393, 397-99, 477 P.2d 210 (1970), overruled on other grounds in Chaplin, 100 Wn.2d at 853, 861 n. 2, 676 P.2d 431 (1984).

[6-8] Lozier contends that the trial court erred in finding that the neighbors' use of the Lot 10 portions of the dock during the prescriptive period was continuous and uninterrupted. Lozier argues that because the neighbors uses of the dock were sporadic and seasonal, taking place mostly during the summer months and on the weekends, the uses were not continuous or uninterrupted. Lozier correctly contends that each of the neighbors bore the burden of establishing by clear proof that they or their predecessors in interest used the Lot 10 portions of the dock continuously and in an uninterrupted fashion for at least 10 years. See Howard v. Kunto, 3 Wn. App. 393, 398, 477 P.2d 210 (1970) (overruled on other grounds by Chaplin, 100 Wn.2d at 862). "Continuous and uninterrupted use" does not, however, require the neighbors to prove constant use of the dock.

In Howard v. Kunto, for example, the privity required for a deemed conveyance of title acquired by adverse possession was found where a deed completely misdescribed the property formerly occupied by a seller and thereafter occupied by its buyer. 3 Wn.App. 393, 400, 477 P.2d 210 (1970), overruled in part on other grounds by Chaplin, 100 Wn.2d 853. The court explained that "the requirement of 'privity' is no more than judicial recognition of the need for some reasonable connection between successive occupants of real property so as to raise their claim of right above the status of the wrongdoer or the trespasser."

Instead, "the claimant need only demonstrate use of the same character that a true owner might make of the property considering its nature and location." Lee v. Lozier, 88 Wash App 176, 185, 945 P2d 214, 219 (1997) (prescriptive easement for boat dock may be gained by seasonal use if such use would be normal for that dock), quoting Double L. Properties, Inc. v. Crandall, 51 Wash App 149, 158, 751 P2d 1208 (1988) (citation omitted); see also Howard v. Kunto, 3 Wash App 393, 398, 477 P2d 210, 214 (1970) (continuous possession is established where the claimant uses the property in the way that an owner of property of like nature and condition would hold, manage, and care for the property). The record contains no concrete information to establish that Sirrah or any of its predecessors used the road continuously and uninterrupted for the requisite 10 years.

Instead, "the claimant need only demonstrate use of the same character that a true owner might make of the property considering its nature and location." Lee v. Lozier, 88 Wash App 176, 185, 945 P2d 214, 219 (1997) (prescriptive easement for boat dock may be gained by seasonal use if such use would be normal for that dock), quoting Double L. Properties, Inc. v. Crandall, 51 Wash App 149, 158, 751 P2d 1208 (1988) (citation omitted); see also Howard v. Kunto, 3 Wash App 393, 398, 477 P2d 210, 214 (1970) (continuous possession is established where the claimant uses the property in the way that an owner of property of like nature and condition would hold, manage, and care for the property). The record contains no concrete information to establish that Sirrah or any of its predecessors used the road continuously and uninterrupted for the requisite 10 years.

See 3 Am. Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 69. "For example, the regular use of property as a summer home and for recreation purposes during summers can be continuous for a claim of adverse possession." Id. (citing Kay v. Biggs , 13 Ariz.App. 172, 475 P.2d 1 (1970) ; Mahoney v. Heebner , 343 Mass. 770, 178 N.E.2d 26 (1961) ; Nechtow v. Brown , 369 Mich. 460, 120 N.W.2d 251 (1963) ; Lee v. Raymond , 456 A.2d 1179 (R.I. 1983) ; Burkhardt v. Smith , 17 Wis.2d 132, 115 N.W.2d 540 (1962) ); see alsoBooten v. Peterson , 47 Wash.2d 565, 288 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1955) (disputed property’s use as a "beach place and summer home" sufficient for adverse possession), overruled on other grounds byChaplin v. Sanders , 100 Wash.2d 853, 676 P.2d 431, 436 n.2 (1984) ; Howard v. Kunto , 3 Wash.App. 393, 477 P.2d 210, 213-14 (1970) (rejecting "the conclusion that summer occupancy only of a summer beach home destroys the continuity of possession" because "the requisite possession requires such possession and dominion ‘as ordinarily marks the conduct of owners in general in holding, managing, and caring for property of like nature and condition’ "), overruled on other grounds byChaplin , 676 P.2d at 436 n.2.[¶33] "Continuous use or possession therefore may be established notwithstanding seasonal breaks from the use of the property."

" (citations omitted)); accord 11 C.J.S. BOUNDARIES § 86 (Aug. 2002) ("Recognition and acquiescence of one owner may be tacked to that of a succeeding one, and privity of estate between successive owners is not necessary to permit of a technical tacking of their periods of holding to make out the statutory period." (footnotes omitted)); cf. Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210, 215 (Wash.App. 1970) (characterizing the requirement of privity as merely "a judicial recognition of the need for some reasonable connection between successive occupants so as to raise their claim of right above status of the wrongdoer or the trespasser"), overruled on other grounds, Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 431 (Wash. 1984).

As the case illustrates, privity may be established by intent of the parties or by a conveyance of the interest in a written instrument. See also Heriot v. Lewis, 35 Wn. App. 496, 668 P.2d 589 (1983); Howard v. Kunto, 3 Wn. App. 393, 477 P.2d 210 (1970). On the other hand, the court found that defendants had no interest in the property at all, having lost it by adverse possession.

148 (1928); Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 122 Wn. 514, 210 P. 770 (1922); Threlkeld v. Conway, 121 Wn. 624, 209 P. 1088 (1922); Cameron v. Bustard, 119 Wn. 266, 205 P. 385 (1922); O'Donnell v. McCool, 89 Wn. 537, 154 P. 1090 (1916); Skansi v. Novak, 84 Wn. 39, 146 P. 160 (1915); Snell v. Stelling, 83 Wn. 248, 145 P. 466 (1915); Milbank v. Rowland, 63 Wn. 519, 115 P. 1053 (1911); Yesler Estate, Inc. v. Holmes, 39 Wn. 34, 80 P. 851 (1905); Suksdorf v. Humphrey, 36 Wn. 1, 77 P. 1071 (1904); Phinney v. Campbell, 16 Wn. 203, 47 P. 502 (1896); Wickert v. Thompson, 28 Wn. App. 516, 624 P.2d 747 (1981); Roy v. Goerz, 26 Wn. App. 807, 614 P.2d 1308 (1980); Danner v. Bartel, 21 Wn. App. 213, 584 P.2d 463 (1978); Fies v. Storey, 21 Wn. App. 413, 585 P.2d 190 (1978); Jackson v. Pennington, 11 Wn. App. 638, 525 P.2d 822 (1974); Hunt v. Matthews, 8 Wn. App. 233, 505 P.2d 819 (1973); Diel v. Beekman, 7 Wn. App. 139, 499 P.2d 37 (1972); Schmidt v. Hanson, 5 Wn. App. 97, 485 P.2d 1007 (1971); Howard v. Kunto, 3 Wn. App. 393, 477 P.2d 210 (1970); Spear v. Basagno, 3 Wn. App. 689, 477 P.2d 197 (1970); Rognrust v. Seto, 2 Wn. App. 215, 467 P.2d 204 (1970); Turner v. Rowland, 2 Wn. App. 566, 468 P.2d 702 (1970). C

Regular and adverse use of property during the summer season is a sufficient basis for a claim of adverse possession. See Kay v. Biggs, 13 Ariz. App. 172, 175-76, 475 P.2d 1 (1970); Nechtow v. Brown, 369 Mich. 460, 462, 120 N.W.2d 251 (1963); Booten v. Peterson, 47 Wash.2d 565, 568-69, 288 P.2d 1084 (1955); Howard v. Kunto, 3 Wash. App. 393, 397-98, 477 P.2d 210 (1970); Burkhardt v. Smith, 17 Wis.2d 132, 139, 115 N.W.2d 540 (1962); annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 632 4; 3 Am.Jur.2d, Adverse Possession 57. The plaintiffs also claim that the defendant's use of the beach property was not "exclusive" because the plaintiffs themselves used the beach during the time it was allegedly adversely possessed.