Opinion
No. 05-04-01694-CV
Opinion Filed September 27, 2005.
On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 03-03878-C.
Dismiss.
Before Justices WRIGHT, FITZGERALD, and LANG-MIERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Preston L. Howard, pro se, appeals the trial court's December 28, 2004 "Order on Jurisdiction." For the reasons stated below, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
The record filed in this appeal indicates appellant, and another individual not a party to this appeal, filed a petition in the 68th Judicial District Court of Dallas County challenging the actions of a probate court in Gregg County. In response, the appellees, Lossie Howard Hopkins and Sharon Fisher, filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a counterclaim for breach of a settlement agreement, which appellees pled constituted a breach of contract. The December 28, 2004 "Order on Jurisdiction" states that the probate causes of action are dismissed for want of jurisdiction, but also states that issues regarding breach of contract are pending.
In a letter dated January 12, 2005, this Court informed appellant that the December 28, 2004 order did not appear to be a final appealable judgment, because it states that claims for breach of contract remain pending, and also informed appellant that the December 28, 2004 order was not an appealable interlocutory order. The letter instructed appellant that, if a "final appealable judgment or appealable interlocutory order has been signed by the trial court," he should request that a supplemental clerk's record be filed with this Court containing the final appealable judgment or appealable interlocutory order. Additionally, appellant was instructed to file a jurisdictional letter brief explaining the Court's jurisdiction over this matter.
Subsequently, on January 27, 2005, a supplemental clerk's record was filed which contained the December 28, 2004 "Order on Jurisdiction," but the supplemental record did not include any other order or judgment. Also, appellant filed a jurisdictional brief, but he did not address the Court's concern about the lack of finality of the December 28, 2004 order or make an argument that the order was an appealable interlocutory order.
Under Texas procedure, appeals may be had from final orders or judgments or may be had from interlocutory orders if permitted by statute. Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992). A final judgment is one which disposes of all legal issues between all parties. Id. The December 28, 2004 order states that issues regarding breach of contract "arising form (sic) the Court ordered mediation are pending in this cause." Because claims remain pending, the December 28, 2004 order is not a final judgment.
Additionally, appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider appeals of interlocutory orders if a statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdiction. Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code enumerates interlocutory orders that may be appealed to this Court. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (Vernon 2004-05). The December 28, 2004 order does not fit the description of one of those appealable interlocutory orders. Because the order is neither final nor appealable by statute, we conclude this Court is without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex.R.App.P. 42.3.