Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-6889
March 13, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Presently before this Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants Ralph Domenic ("Domenic") and William Landis ("Landis"), both of whom are Philadelphia police officers. For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be granted.
I. FACTS
According to the Plaintiff, Terrell Howard ("Howard"), on August 30, 2000 he was a passenger in a vehicle that was pulled over by the Defendants Domenic and Landis for disregarding a stop sign. The Defendants told Howard and the driver to exit the vehicle while they performed a search of the passenger compartment. Under the passenger seat, where Howard was sitting, Domenic found bags of marijuana. The Defendants then arrested Howard and allowed the driver to leave after issuing him a traffic citation.
Howard's trial was held on February 16, 2001. At the trial, Domenic testified that Howard was the driver of the vehicle and that there was no one else in the vehicle. Domenic further testified that Howard had twelve bags of marijuana in his pocket in addition to two bags sitting on his seat. The judge dismissed the case because of mistakes in the paperwork. In the instant Complaint, Howard claims that he was falsely charged with drug possession, falsely arrested and that Domenic falsely testified at trial in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
II. STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Essentially, the inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-252 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. A factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id. at 248.
To defeat summary judgment, the non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings, but rather that party must go beyond the pleadings and present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Similarly, the non-moving party cannot rely on unsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions in attempting to survive a summary judgment motion. Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325 (1986)). Further, the non-moving party has the burden of producing evidence to establish prima facie each element of its claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. If the court, in viewing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact, then summary judgment is proper. Id. at 322; Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987).
III. DISCUSSION
"In order to prevail in a section 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived him of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States while acting under color of state law." Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989). Howard alleges that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated because he was falsely charged and arrested. The "Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from arresting a citizen except upon probable cause." Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995). Similarly,
the standard of probable cause applies to all arrests, without the need to balance the interests and circumstances involved in particular situations. If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested."Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483.
In this case, based upon the facts presented by Howard, the Defendants pulled over the vehicle in which Howard was riding because the driver disregarded a stop sign. The Defendants then searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle incident to the arrest for the traffic violation. The Defendants found marijuana under Howard's seat. Therefore, the marijuana was within close proximity to Howard. These facts clearly establish that the Defendants had sufficient knowledge to reasonably believe that Howard had committed a crime and was in possession of the drugs. See e.g. Jackson v. Byrd, 105 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 1997). Moreover, the fact that the Defendants did not arrest the driver of the vehicle does not affect this finding. Consequently, the Defendants had probable cause to arrest Howard for possession of the marijuana, Howard's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated, and his claim for false arrest must fail. Howard also argues that Domenic falsely testified at Howard's criminal trial, and as a result, Domenic violated Section 1983. The Supreme Court of the United States held in Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), that a police officer who gives false testimony at trial cannot be held liable for a Section 1983 violation. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 343; Gatter v. Zappile, 54 F. Supp. d 454, 456 (E.D.Pa. 1999). Therefore, this argument must also fail.
It is well established that police officers may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle contemporaneously to the lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of the vehicle. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
Although Howard does not allege malicious prosecution under Section 1983, we note that such a claim is also dependant upon finding that probable cause is lacking. Therefore, had such a claim been raised, it would have failed. See Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003) (setting forth the requirements for malicious prosecution under Section 1983).
Regardless, as a matter of law, the Defendants also possess qualified immunity and, thus, they are immune from suit. Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity "provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law" and "gives ample room for mistaken judgments." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 343 (1986). "The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2513 (2002). Furthermore, in order for there to be liability, the constitutional right must be clearly established, meaning that, "a court must consider `whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.'"Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).
The facts presented by Howard do not establish a constitutional violation. Accordingly, no further inquiry is necessary. Id. The search of the passenger compartment after the traffic stop was constitutional, and the marijuana was found in close proximity to Howard. Therefore, the Defendants had probable cause to arrest Howard and his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated. This remains true even if the Defendants were ultimately mistaken concerning who owned the marijuana. Malley, 475 U.S. at 343. Furthermore, there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the objective reasonableness and legality of the Defendants' actions. Id. at 278.
Because the Defendants did not violate Howard's constitutional rights or Section 1983, and because they possess qualified immunity, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted and Howard's case must be dismissed.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of March, 2003, upon consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants (Doc. No. 7), and the Response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED and the case is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to mark this case as CLOSED.