Opinion
NO. CV-12-0103-WFN
2013-09-12
PAIGE ALLISON HOWARD, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Before the Court are cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 13 and 16). Attorney Jeffrey Schwab represents Plaintiff; Special Assistant United States Attorney Robert Van Saghi represents Defendant. The Court has reviewed the administrative record and briefs filed by the parties and is fully informed.
JURISDICTION
Plaintiff protectively applied for social security income [SSI] benefits on March 26, 2009, alleging disability beginning on July 3, 2005, due to fibermyalgia, back pain, bipolar depression, anxiety, irritability, and social withdrawal. The application(s) were denied initially and on reconsideration.
At a hearing before Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] Caroline Siderius on April 27, 2011, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, a medical expert, and a vocational expert testified. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this final decision is appealable to the district court. Plaintiff sought judicial review on February 16, 2013.
FACTS
The facts of the case are set forth in detail in the transcript of the proceedings and are briefly summarized here. Plaintiff was 43 years old at the time of her hearing. (Tr. 43) She lived alone in a trailer outside a major business. (Tr. 42) She testified that she tends to her own day to day needs (Tr. 50) but requires help grocery shopping. (Tr. 51). She occasionally babysits her grandchild. (Tr. 42) Though she used to abuse illegal drugs, she has been clean for seven or eight years. (Tr. 44). She complains of memory issues, anxiety and bouts of depression and anger. (Tr. 44 - 45).
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not disabled. First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial activity since March 26, 2009. Second, the ALJ indicated that the Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: degenerative changes, hip, right-sided spondylolysis at L5-S1, depression, bipolar disorder, and personality disorder, but that none of these impairments, nor any combination thereof, meet or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Based on review of the record, the ALJ decided that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform light work. Based on this assessment, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as a housekeeper. In the alternative, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff can perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. (Tr. 19)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001), the court set out the standard of review:
A district court's order upholding the Commissioner's denial of benefits is reviewed de novo. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the Commissioner may be reversed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin. 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999).
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ's determinations of law are reviewed de novo, although deference is owed to a reasonable construction of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).
It is the role of the trier of fact, not this court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). If substantial evidence exists to support the administrative findings, or if conflicting evidence exists that will support a finding of either disability or non-disability, the Commissioner's determination is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (9th Cir. 1987).
SEQUENTIAL PROCESS
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). In steps one through four, the burden ofproof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie case of entitlement to disability benefits. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99. This burden is met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents him from engaging in his previous occupation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If a claimant cannot do his past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that (1) the claimant can make an adjustment to other work; and (2) specific jobs exist in the national economy which claimant can perform. Batson v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 359 F,3d 1190, 1193-94 (2004). If a claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work in the national economy, a finding of "disabled" is made. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I-v), 416.920(a)(4)(I-v).
ISSUES
Plaintiff complains of two general issues. First, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff's mental health impairment. Specifically, Plaintiff complains that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions, especially that of Dr. Moore. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give a proper hypothetical to the vocational expert. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ "failed to ask even one hypothetical question which encompassed a single limitation arising from mental health impairment." (ECF No. 14, pg. 9).
DISCUSSION
Upon review of the record and the thorough opinion, it is apparent that the ALJ's decision was based on substantial evidence and the ALJ did not err. The ALJ carefully reviewed and properly assessed the medical opinions. Further, it is clear that Dr. Moore's opinions were soundly based on the medical record. The ALJ did not err in giving Dr. Moore's opinion significant weight. The ALJ also gave significant weight to treating physician Dr. Genthe's opinion. The ALJ did not discount treating physicians in favor of Dr. Moore, but rather used Dr. Moore's analysis to inform review of specific issues in the record such as GAF scores.
Dr. Moore noted that after taking medication, Plaintiff's mental health symptoms greatly improved. Plaintiff argues that improvement alone is insufficient to justify a finding of not disabled; however, the record supports the conclusion that mental health symptoms were in remission in August of 2010. (Tr. 15). Such significant improvement certainly supports the ALJ's findings.
Plaintiff also complains that Dr. Moore cast aspersions on Plaintiff based on Plaintiff's concerns, replete in the record, regarding how her actions would affect obtaining social security benefits. Treating physicians noted on more than one occasion that Plaintiff was reluctant to seek work, not due to her mental health issue, but rather her concern that she would jeopardize an award of social security benefits. Dr. Moore's opinions did not misstate the record.
The ALJ's reliance on Dr. Moore's assessment of the GAF scores was well supported. Dr. Moore did put more stock in the clinical notes than GAF scores, but doing so does not undermine Dr. Moore's opinion. It is evident from the opinion that the ALJ took into account all medical records and reports from Plaintiff. Failure to assign heavy weight to specific GAF scores did not undermine the ALJ's assessment of the record. Overall, the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff's mental health issues caused mild difficulties for social function and mild to moderate difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace is supported by substantial evidence.
Lastly, contrary to Plaintiff's assignment of error, the ALJ did ask questions pertaining to mental health limitations. The ALJ made findings of some limitations in the residual functional capacity and asked pertinent questions of the vocational expert related to the residual functional capacity. The Court finds no error.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the record and the ALJ's findings, the Court concludes the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on legal error. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed August 2, 2013, ECF No. 13, is DENIED.
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 3, 2013, ECF No. 16, is GRANTED.
The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order and provide copies to counsel. Judgment shall be entered for Defendant and the file shall be CLOSED.
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WM. FREMMING NIELSEN
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE