Houts v. Jameson

12 Citing cases

  1. In re Will of Uchtorff

    693 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 2005)   Cited 14 times
    Stating remainder interest in trust fund is a future interest

    Iowa Code § 633.33 (2003); see, e.g., In re Estate of Rogers, 473 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa 1991); Houts v. Jameson, 201 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1972). Our review is de novo.

  2. In re Arney

    35 B.R. 668 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983)   Cited 6 times
    Finding that spendthrift provision in will excluded debtor's interest from the bankruptcy estate

    Under Iowa law, a remainder is generally held to be vested where the beneficiary or recipient of such interest is a presently identifiable person. Houts v. Jameson, 201 N.W.2d 466, 470 (Iowa 1972); Katz Investment Co. v. Lynch, 242 Iowa 640, 47 N.W.2d 800, 806 (1951). A contingent remainder, on the other hand, is one which is limited to take effect "to a dubious or uncertain person or upon a dubious or uncertain event."

  3. In re Lopez

    64 Haw. 44 (Haw. 1981)   Cited 8 times
    Noting that, if a settlor of a trust wanted income and corpus distribution to be treated the same, he "naturally would have used similar language"

    The third factor strengthens the preference for a per capita distribution, especially where the first two elements are present. Words such as "in equal shares," "divided equally," and "share and share alike" usually import equal treatment, or a division per capita. See Lidgate v. Danford, 23 Haw. 317 (1916); see generally Houts v. Jameson, 201 N.W.2d 466 (Iowa 1972); Will of Dow, 390 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1977); G. Bogert, Trusts, Trustees, § 182, 340 n. 17 (1979). Consequently, there is little doubt that Antonio J. Lopez intended a per capita distribution of the corpus among the children of the Named Eight.

  4. Matter of Estate of Kalouse

    282 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1979)   Cited 17 times

    80 Am.Jur.2d Wills § 1410. See also Elkader Production Credit Ass'n v. Eulberg, supra; Matter of Estate of Kruse, 250 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1977); Houts v. Jameson, 201 N.W.2d 466 (Iowa 1972). We should also consider a somewhat narrower but none-the-less general principle akin to and often thought to be a part of the parol evidence rule.

  5. Oxley v. Oxley

    262 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 1978)   Cited 6 times
    In Oxley at 149, the court considered in finding an ambiguity the fact the failure to do so would nullify the residuary clause.

    Section 633.33, The Code; Larson v. Anderson, 167 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Iowa 1969); Houts v. Jameson, 201 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1972). "While weight will be given to findings of trial court this court will not abdicate its function as triers de novo on appeal. * * * [citing authority]."

  6. Matter of Estate of Kruse

    250 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1977)   Cited 15 times

    I. Our review is de novo. See Houts v. Jameson, 201 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1972); Section 633.33, The Code 1973; Iowa R. Civ. P. 334, 344(f)(7).

  7. In re Estate of Spencer

    232 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1975)   Cited 15 times
    Stating courts are "bound to carry out" the intent of a settlor or testator

    However, they analyze that instrument differently, and each, not surprisingly, extracts from her language a reasonable and plausible version favorable to himself and those he represents. The rule upon which our decision depends is stated this way in Houts v. Jameson, 201 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1972): "The basic rules governing our consideration of this will are: (1) the testator's intent is the polestar and must prevail; (2) the intent must be gathered from a consideration of all the language of the will, the scheme of distribution, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the will; and (3) technical rules of construction should be resorted to only if the language of the will is clearly ambiguous or conflicting or testator's intent is for any reason uncertain.

  8. In re Estate of Lemke

    216 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1974)   Cited 17 times
    Stating “due process requirements depend upon the facts and circumstances in each case” and concluding notice was not reasonable

    In either instance, the purchase money to be paid by Clarence, in event the option be exercised, was to be divided equally between Wayne and Clarence. It is inceptionally appropriate to note this guiding statement in Houts v. Jameson, 201 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1972): "The basic rules governing our consideration of this will are: (1) the testator's intent is the polestar and must prevail; (2) the intent must be gathered from a consideration of all the language of the will, the scheme of distribution, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the will; and (3) technical rules of construction should be resorted to only if the language of the will is clearly ambiguous or conflicting or testator's intent is for any reason uncertain.

  9. Mead v. Lane

    203 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1972)   Cited 11 times

    Assuming, without deciding, it is reciprocal and mutual as to testators' rights to take under it, the important issue here is whether it purports as a matter of law to permit the survivor to make a new individual will. We recently restated the rules governing our interpretation of wills in Houts v. Jameson, Iowa, 201 N.W.2d 466 (filed October 18, 1972). With these rules in mind, considering only the joint will, we believe testators clearly, expressly and unambiguously therein granted each other the right upon survivorship to use the entire inheritance "as the survivor may see fit" and to revoke the joint will.

  10. Matter of Estate of Wagner

    507 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 6 times

    Our standard of review is de novo. Iowa Code § 633.33 (1993); In re Roehlke's Estate, 231 N.W.2d 26, 27 (Iowa 1975); Houts v. Jameson, 201 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1972) (citation omitted). The Iowa probate laws are codified in chapter 633 of the code.