The fact that the accident was gravity related, however, does not end the inquiry, since a liability finding also requires a showing that the drill steel fell "because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute" (Narducci, 96 N.Y.2d 259 at 268). Defendants argue that the drill steel pieces were adequately secured and that there was no safety device of the kind enumerated in Labor Law § 240 (1) that could have been used to prevent the drill steel from "settling" or slipping into connection (see Fabrizzi, 22 N.Y.3d 658 at 663; HoustonvState of New York, 171 A.D.3d 1145, 1145-1146 [2d Dept 2019]; Portalatin v Tully Constr. Co.-E.E. Cruz & Co., 155 A.D.3d 799, 800 [2d Dept 2017]; Zamora v 42 Carmine St. Assoc., LLC, 131 A.D.3d 531, 532 [2d Dept 2015]; Buckley v Columbia Grammar &Preparatory, 44 A.D.3d 263, 269 [1st Dept 2007], Iv denied 10 N.Y.3d 710 [2008]). In support of this contention, defendants point to testimony in the record showing that the connection between the top piece of drill steel and the rig's drill head and the connection between the bottom piece supported by the whip or sling was sufficient to allow plaintiff and his coworkers to safely place the hex head into position to connect the drill steel pieces without incident.

The evidence submitted in support of their motion, which included the plaintiff's deposition testimony, failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact (seeAlvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572 ). Triable issues of fact exist, inter alia, as to whether the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries (seeHouston v. State of New York, 171 A.D.3d 1145, 98 N.Y.S.3d 620 ), and whether the pipe fell because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device (seeNarducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d at 267–268, 727 N.Y.S.2d 37, 750 N.E.2d 1085 ; Carlton v. City of New York, 161 A.D.3d 930, 932–933, 77 N.Y.S.3d 445 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) insofar as asserted against them, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (seeWinegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642 ).

Given the exceptional protection offered by Labor Law § 240(1), the statute does not cover accidents merely tangentially related to the effects of gravity. Rather, gravity must be a direct factor in the accident as when a worker falls from a height or is struck by a falling object (Ross, 81 N.Y.2d at 501; Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 514 [1991]). In falling object cases, "the claimant must demonstrate that, at the time the object fell, it either was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purpose of the undertaking" (Houston v State of New York, 171 A.D.3d 1145, 1146 [2d Dept 2019], citing Fabrizi v. 1095 Avenue of the A ms.,LLC, 22 N Y3d 65 8,662-663 [2014]) In addition, the statute "does not automatically apply simply because an object fell and injured a worker;' [a] plaintiff must show that the object fell... because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute"' (Fabrizi v 1095 Avenues of the Ams., LLC, 22 N.Y.3d at 663, quoting Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N2d 259, 268 [2001]).

Rather, gravity must be a direct factor in the accident as when a worker falls from a height or is struck by a falling object (Ross, 81 N.Y.2d at 501; Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 18 N.Y.2d 509, 513 [1991]). In falling object cases, "the claimant must demonstrate that, at the time the object fell, it either was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purpose of the undertaking" (HoustonvState of New York, 171 A.D.3d 1145, 1146 [2019], citing Fabrizi v1095 Avenue of the Ams., LLC, 22 N.Y.3d 658, 662-663 [2014]). In addition, the statute "does not automatically apply simply because an object fell and injured a worker; '[a] plaintiff must show that the object fell . . . because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute'" (Fabrizi v 1095 Avenues of the Ams., LLC, 22 N.Y.3d at 663, quoting Narducciv Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N2d 259, 268 [2001]).

Rather, gravity must be a direct factor in the accident as when a worker falls from a height or is struck by a falling object (Ross, 81 N.Y.2d at 501; Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 513 [1991]). In falling object cases, "the claimant must demonstrate that, at the time the object fell, it either was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purpose of the undertaking" (Houston v. State of New York, 171 A.D.3d 1145, 1146 [2019], citing Fabrizi v. 1095 Avenue of the Ams., LLC, 22 N.Y.3d 658, 662-663 [2014]). In addition, the statute "does not automatically apply simply because an object fell and injured a worker; '[a] plaintiff must show that the object fell ... because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute'" (Fabrizi v. 1095 Avenues of the Ams., LLC, 22 N.Y.3d at 663, quoting Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d 259,268 [2001]).

Rather, gravity must be a direct factor in the accident as when a worker falls from a height or is struck by a falling object (Ross, 81 N.Y.2d at 501; Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 513 [1991]). In falling object cases, "the claimant must demonstrate that, at the time the object fell, it either was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purpose of the undertaking" (Houston v State of New York, 171 A.D.3d 1145, 1146 [2019], citing FabrizivJ095 Avenue of the Ams., LLC, 22 N.Y.3d 658, 662-663 [2014]). In addition, the statute "does not automatically apply simply because an object fell and injured a worker; 5 [a] plaintiff must show that the object fell ... because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute'" (Fabrizi v 1095 Avenues of the Ams., LLC, 22 N.Y.3d at 663, quoting Narducci v Manhasset Bcty Assoc., 96 N2d 259, 268 [2001]).

All motions on which I have reserved decision and which are not addressed above are denied. At various conferences with the parties in this case, I have raised the notion that defendant may have the burden of proof on the issue of "sole proximate cause", in light of caselaw that characterizes this doctrine as an affirmative defense (seeThompson v Sithe/Independence, LLC , 107 AD3d 1385, 1387 [4th Dept 2013] ; Houston v State of New York , 171 AD3d 1145, 1145 [2d Dept 2019] ; Benjamin v El-Ad Props NY, LLC , 28 Misc 3d 1239[A], at *5 [Sup Ct, Kings Cty Sept 16, 2010] ; see alsoDynamic Med. Imaging, P.C. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 32 Misc 3d 600, 606 [Dist Ct, Nassau Co 2011] ["Defendant has the burden of proof on the affirmative defense"]). Alternatively, since it is claimant's burden to prove proximate causation — and a finding that plaintiff is the "sole proximate cause" is inherently inconsistent with such proof — the burden of proof on this issue could be seen as falling to claimant (seeNohejl v 40 West 53rd Partnership , 205 AD2d 462, 462 [1st Dept 1994] ["A plaintiff in a § 240(1) claim must ... establish that the violation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries"]; see alsoBlake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of NY City , 1 NY3d 280, 290 [2003] ["Under Labor Law § 240(1) it is conceptually impossible for a statutory violation (which serves as a proximate cause for a plaintiff's injury) to occupy the same ground as a [c

The evidence submitted by Plaintiff is insufficient to establish that his injuries resulted from the absence or inadequacy of an enumerated safety device. Houston v State, 171 AD3d 1145 (2d Dept 2019). Under the circumstances of this case, triable issues of fact exist as to whether the named Defendants are proper parties pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1) and whether or not there is a sufficient nexus between Plaintiff's injuries and the absence or inadequacy of an enumerated safety device.

Indeed, the crane operator Joseph Doherty makes no mention of any equipment failures (see Doherty aff.). As such, this Court finds that there are triable issues of fact concerning whether plaintiff's accident was caused by the "inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated" by Labor Law 240 (1) (Houston v State, 171 AD3d 1145, 1146 [2d Dept 2019]).