Opinion
No. 01-09-00343-CV
Opinion issued March 18, 2010.
On Appeal from the 172nd District Court, Jefferson County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. E174,330.
Panel consists of Justices JENNINGS, HANKS, and BLAND.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Bruce Wayne Houser, who is incarcerated and represents himself pro se, contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his lawsuit against appellee, Bonnie Young, and the other defendants below on the ground that he failed to comply with the requirements of Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.001-.014. (Vernon 2002). We have liberally construed Houser's brief to raise this general issue. We recognize that, in his brief, Houser actually lists seven issues. However, many of these issues are incomprehensible, and Houser's argument does not address the issues. Within his issues, Houser complains that certain documents are not in the clerk's record, there porter's record was not filed with this Court, and the trial court or the defendants below have withheld pleadings from this Court. In regard to Houser's record complaints, our review indicates that the clerk's record contains all necessary pleadings filed in the trial court. Moreover, the court reporter has indicated that there is no reporter's record, and the trial court's dismissal order does not indicate that there was a hearing held for which there should be a reporter's record. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(c) (providing that court "may" hold a hearing "before or after service of process"). There is also nothing in the record to support Houser's complaint that the trial court or the defendants below have intentionally withheld pleadings from this Court.
We will address, in the body of the opinion, Houser's contention within his issues that the trial court could not have dismissed his lawsuit against all defendants based upon a motion to dismiss filed by one defendant.
This appeal, originally filed in the Ninth Court of Appeals, Beaumont, Texas, was transferred to the First Court of Appeals, Houston, Texas. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 2005) (giving Texas Supreme Court authority to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another for good cause).
Background
In his petition, Houser names Anita Breaux, Dennis Hall, Thomas Cordle, Rodney Graves, Wesley Freeman, Bonnie Young, Kelli Ward, and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") as defendants. Houser alleges that in 2004, after he "reposted" a motion to reinstate in another unrelated lawsuit that he had filed, TDCJ officials threatened his "life, safety, and property." After these threats, he was subsequently strip searched, forcefully removed from his cell, and then placed in a "strip cell," where he was denied his eyeglasses, basic hygiene equipment, and medications. Houser's personal items were confiscated, and he sustained personal injuries. Houser complains that he continued to suffer wrongful retaliation from the defendants who were involved in an "illegal criminal conspiracy." Within his petition, Houser included an "affidavit relating to previous filings," in which he listed three other lawsuits that he had previously filed.
Young is the only named defendant who appeared below and who has filed briefing in this Court. The record does not contain evidence that any of the other named defendants were ever served in the trial court. We note that Chapter 14 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code expressly provides that the trial court may dismiss a cause of action prior to service. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a) (Vernon 2002).
See id. § 14.004.
In her motion to dismiss Houser's lawsuit, Young argued that the trial court should dismiss Houser's lawsuit because he had failed to file an affidavit related to previous filings, file certified copies of his inmate trust account, and show that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. Young also argued that the trial court should dismiss Houser's lawsuit because it was frivolous or malicious.
See id. § 14.004.
See id. §§ 14.004, 14.006.
See id. § 14.005.
See id. §§ 14.003.
After reviewing the pleadings and Young's motion to dismiss, the trial court signed an order granting Young's motion on the ground that Houser's lawsuit is frivolous.
Standard of Review
We generally review a trial court's dismissal of an inmate's suit under Chapter 14 for abuse of discretion. See Wilson v. TDCJ-ID, 268 S.W.3d 756, 758 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no pet.); Thompson v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice-Inst. Div., 33 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tex. App.-Houston 2000, pet. denied). When a lawsuit is dismissed as frivolous for having no basis in law or in fact, and no fact hearing was held, our review focuses on whether the inmate's lawsuit has an arguable basis in law, which we review de novo. Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex. App.-Houston 2006, no pet.).
Dismissal
In his sole issue, Houser contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his lawsuit under Chapter 14.
Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs inmate litigation. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.001-.014. (Vernon 2002). Under Chapter 14, a trial court may dismiss an inmate suit brought in forma pauperis, either before or after service of process, by finding that it is frivolous or malicious. Id. § 14.003(a)(2). In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, the trial court may consider whether: (1) the claim's realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact; (3) it is clear that the party cannot prove facts in support of the claim; or (4) the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate because the claim arises from the same operative facts. Id. § 14.003(b)(1)-(4). In finding that a claim is frivolous or malicious, the court "may" hold a hearing "before or after service of process" and "it may be held on motion of the court, a party, or the clerk of the court." Id. § 14.003(c).
An inmate seeking to proceed, other than a suit under the Family Code, in forma pauperis must file a separate affidavit or declaration describing each suit the inmate has previously filed pro se,. Id. § 14.004. The affidavit or declaration must (a) describe the operative facts for which relief was sought; (b) list the case name, cause number, and the court in which the suit was brought; (c) identify each party named in the suit; and (d) state the result of the suit, including whether the suit was dismissed as frivolous or malicious. Id. § 14.004(a)(2). These requirements were enacted to allow the trial court to determine whether an inmate's present claim is similar to a previously-filed claim. See Clark v. Unit, 23 S.W.3d 420, 422 (Tex. App.-Houston 2000, pet. denied.) (stating that "[t]he purpose of section 14.004 is to curb the constant, often duplicative, inmate litigation, by requiring the inmate to notify the trial court of previous litigation and the outcome").
In his affidavit related to previous filings, Houser identified three prior lawsuits. Although he identified the court in which the lawsuits were filed and the cause numbers of the lawsuits and claimed each of these lawsuits was "current," he did not adequately describe the operative facts for which relief was sought in each of these lawsuits. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.004(a)(2)(A). For example, with regard to the first lawsuit identified, he simply stated that he had brought that lawsuit for "recovery of damages for violations upon my person and property." In regard to the second and third lawsuits, he stated that he had brought them for a "five day stay in a strip cell and injuries to my person and property" and for an illegal library restriction. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that such descriptions did not sufficiently state the "operative facts" of these lawsuits to evaluate whether the facts here are substantially similar. See id. Houser also failed to identify, with respect to any of these three lawsuits, the case name or the identity of any of the defendants named in the lawsuits. See id. § 14.004(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C). Because Houser failed to comply with the affidavit requirements of section 14.004, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Houser's lawsuit. See Clark, 23 S.W.3d at 422 (holding that because appellant did not state operative facts for which relief was sought in prior suits, trial court was unable to consider whether current claim was substantially similar to prior claims and, thus, trial court did not err in dismissing case).
In her motion to dismiss, Young identified at least fifteen prior lawsuits that Houser did not identify in his affidavit. We have also confirmed, through our own research, that Houser has filed numerous other lawsuits in Texas state and federal courts that he failed to identify in his affidavit. Houser's failure to even identify these law suits is obviously a failure to comply with the requirements under Chapter 14. TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.004(a).
Finally, we note that nothing in Chapter 14 precludes a trial court from dismissing an entire lawsuit based upon a motion to dismiss filed by one party. In fact, as noted above, Chapter 14 provides that a trial court may dismiss a claim, either "before or after service of process," if it finds that the claim is frivolous or malicious or that the inmate filed an affidavit or unsworn declaration required by Chapter 14 that the inmate knew was false. TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a). Moreover, Chapter 14 provides that a trial court may hold a hearing "before or after service of process" and "it may be held on motion of the court, a party, or the clerk of the court." TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(c). These provisions permit a trial court to dismiss a case under Chapter 14 at the request of one party.
We overrule Houser's sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court.