Opinion
NO. 2011-CA-001769-MR
02-22-2013
RONALD LEE HOUSE, JR. APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Ronald L. House, pro se LaGrange, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky Joshua D. Farley Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE IRV MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-CR-000281
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: CAPERTON, COMBS, AND DIXON, JUDGES. COMBS, JUDGE: Ronald House, pro se, appeals the orders of the Jefferson Circuit Court that denied his motions to vacate his judgment of conviction. After our review, we affirm.
On February 10, 2010, House pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse in the first degree. On May 17, 2011, House filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Kentucky Rule[s] of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. He urged the court to vacate the judgment. The court entered an order denying the motion on May 25, 2011. On June 1, 2011, House filed a motion to amend that order. That motion was denied by the court on June 2, 2011. This appeal follows.
House claims that but for the ineffective assistance of counsel that he received, he would not have entered a guilty plea. He also contends that the court erred in denying his RCr 11.42 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Our standard of review of an RCr 11.42 motion is governed by rules set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States. It has prescribed a two-pronged test determining the defendant's burden of proof:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), adopted in Kentucky by Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 39-40 (Ky. 1985). In order to satisfy the Strickland test, a defendant must demonstrate both criteria of deficiency of counsel's performance and the resulting prejudice to the defendant.
The Supreme Court refined the Strickland test specifically in the context of guilty pleas in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), where it held that "in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. at 59.
Upon appeal, we must review a trial court's denial of a motion for an evidentiary hearing based upon whether the allegations are refuted by the face of the record, considering that if indeed they were true, they would nullify the conviction. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967). However, no evidentiary hearing is required if, on its face, the record contradicts the allegations. Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. App. 1986).
House first argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because the evidence did not support his conviction. However, at the time that he entered his guilty plea, House affirmatively admitted to the court that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty of the specific act of which he had been accused. The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant's statements in court in the course of entering a guilty plea are "a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629 (1977).
Furthermore, counsel is not deemed to be ineffective for advising a client to plead guilty. Rigdon v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004); Beecham v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 236-37 (Ky. 1983); Glass v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Ky. 1971). House has also failed to provide any basis for his allegation that the evidence against him was insufficient to support a felony conviction. RCr 11.42(2) mandates that grounds be stated with specificity and that they be supported factually. See also Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 444 (Ky. 2001) (overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009)). Therefore, we cannot conclude that the court erred in denying House's motion on these grounds.
House also argues that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate witnesses and mitigating witnesses. Again, House has not offered any information to identify those witnesses, nor has he suggested what proof they would have offered. He merely makes conclusory statements that wholly fail to meet the specificity requirement of RCr 11.42(2). His allegations neither indicate nor substantiate that counsel was deficient or that the trial court committed error.
House contends that his counsel erred by not informing him that the intoxication defense was available. Kentucky Revised Statute[s] (KRS) 501.080(1) provides that voluntary intoxication "is a defense to a criminal charge only if . . . [it] negatives the existence of an element of the offense[.]" The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that in order for the intoxication defense to be available for a defendant, "there must be something in the evidence reasonably sufficient to support a doubt based on the defense[.]" Brown v. Commonwealth, 555 S.W.2d 252, 257 (Ky. 1977). House suggests that he might have been too drunk to form an intent to commit the offense. However, nothing in the record supports this contention. The record does state that House was intoxicated at the time of his arrest, which occurred contemporaneously with the sexual abuse for which he was charged. However, the record also reveals that House had tried to bribe his victim with money in exchange for her silence, a fact indicative of his awareness of his legal plight. House has not offered any other proof to the contrary. Furthermore, we reiterate that House admitted under oath and without coercion that he had committed the act with which he was charged. Therefore, we are not persuaded that House's counsel was ineffective with respect to the intoxication defense.
House also urges us to hold that the trial court erred in denying his motion for amendment of its findings pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.02 and 52.03. He claims that the trial court's findings were insufficient because the trial court recited his plea colloquy verbatim. We are unable to comprehend any merit underlying this argument. In his colloquy with the court, House stated - under oath and without equivocation - that he understood the rights that he was waiving, that no one coerced him to plead guilty, that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation, and that he was actually guilty. The court did not err in finding these statements to be a sufficient basis for denying his RCr 11.42 motion. House presents no evidence to the contrary upon appeal.
Finally, because all of House's claims are refuted by the record, his arguments concerning both an evidentiary hearing and cumulative error are moot.
Accordingly, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Ronald L. House, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Joshua D. Farley
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky