Hourigan v. Norwich

4 Citing cases

  1. Collins v. Olin Corp.

    418 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Conn. 2006)   Cited 12 times
    In Collins v. Olin Corp., 418 F.Supp.2d 34 (D.Conn. 2006), several homeowners brought a putative class action against a town and private corporation, seeking damages and injunctive relief for the diminution in the value of their properties due to alleged contamination of their soil and groundwater.

    Unlike the present case, in each of those cases, the allegedly tortious conduct of the municipalities was inextricably linked to the operation of the water utility for corporate gain.Elliott, at 413, citing Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358 (1904); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582 (1921); and Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143 (1974). There must be a direct link, then, between the municipal authority and the pecuniary benefit.

  2. Bagg v. Town of Thompson

    114 Conn. App. 30 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 21 times
    In Bagg, a pedestrian who fell from a stairway on the side of a highway brought an action against the town under ยง 13a-149.

    Id., 850. In the course of distinguishing between governmental and proprietary acts, the court stated: "This court explained in Hourigan v. Norwich [ 77 Conn. 358, 364, 59 A. 487 (1904)], that when the state performs its governmental function through an agent, `the agent cannot be sued for injuries resulting from a strict performance of the agency. In such case the act is regarded as the act of the [s]tate and not that of the agent, who is the mere instrument of the [s]tate and nothing more. . . .' Similarly, a municipality is the agent of the state `in the exercise of certain governmental powers . . . [and when] the [s]tate imposes upon an incorporated city the absolute duty of performing some act which the [s]tate may lawfully perform and pertaining to the administration of government, the city in the performance of that duty may be clothed with the immunities belonging to the mere agent of the [s]tate. . . . '" Considine v. Water-bury, supra, 279 Conn. 841.

  3. Williams v. Macky Two, LLC

    MMXCV136009247 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    When a municipality derives substantial revenue from its commercial use of municipal property, it has been considered nonetheless to be engaged in a proprietary function even if it reinvests that revenue back into the property's maintenance expenses or to pay down debt related to the property. See Carta v. Norwalk, supra, 108 Conn. at 702, 145 A. 158 (if municipality is deriving revenue or profit from renting its property, fact that it is " applied to the maintenance of the property and the reduction of the debt incurred in its construction or acquirement, or otherwise ultimately to the benefit of the public, is not sufficient to create the immunity"); Hourigan v. Norwich, supra, 77 Conn. at 365, 59 A. 487 (municipality " uses works constructed for the public benefit for its corporate profit, when the profits are to be applied to the maintenance of the works and the reduction of the debt incurred by the corporation in their construction"); but cf. Coleman v. Kootsillas, 456 Mich. 615, 621, 575 N.W.2d 527 (1998) (if revenue generated from activity " is used only to pay current and long-range expenses involved in operating the activity, this could indicate that the primary purpose of the activity was not to produce a pecuniary profit"). Accordingly, it has been stated that a municipality is engaged in a proprietary function when it acts " very much like private enterprise . . ."

  4. Cotto v. Board of Education

    2006 Conn. Super. Ct. 12081 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006)

    At common law in our state ". . . like obligations and duties are imposed upon a city performing proprietary functions as are imposed upon a company when governed by comparable statutory or charter language; Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150 (1974); also it has been held that "a town owning property for purposes of gain is liable for the negligence of its servants in dealing with that property." Horrigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 365 (1904). As noted, the plaintiff alleges in his complaint and supports by his affidavit that at the time of the accident he worked for an organization that leased space from a school which the defendant Board admits it controlled and managed.