The municipal operation of a water utility for corporate profit is a proprietary function. See Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150, 355 A.2d 68 (1974); Richmond v. Norwich, supra, 588; Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 364-66, 59 A. 487 (1904). A municipal entity is subject to liability pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (1) (B), however, only if its allegedly tortious conduct was inextricably linked to a proprietary function.

The plaintiff's claim, rather, is that the alleged conduct did not constitute governmental acts because it concerned a proprietary, as opposed to a public activity, namely, the operation of a water utility. In support of her claim, the plaintiff relies upon three cases involving negligence actions arising out of a municipality's operation of a water utility: Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 59 A. 487 (1904); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 115 A. 11 (1921); and Abbot v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 355 A.2d 68 (1974). In each of those cases, this court concluded that the municipal defendants could not avail themselves of immunity because the municipalities engaged in the allegedly tortious actions for the sake of corporate gain rather than for the administration of government.

Our Supreme Court has held that "the supply of water is proprietary whenever revenues are generated thereby ..." (Citations omitted.) Blonski v. Metropolitan District Commission, 309 Conn. 282, 290 n.6, 71 A.3d 465 (2013); see Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, 275 Conn. 38, 53, 881 A.2d 194 (2005); Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150, 355 A.2d 68 (1974); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 588, 115 A. 11 (1921); Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 365-66, 59 A. 487 (1904). The defendant seeks to distinguish itself from the tenets of these cases by submitting the affidavit of Vincent Caterino, the Superintendent of the Water and Sewer Department, who attests that the defendant does not own its own water supply, but rather provides its residents with water it purchases from the City of Waterbury.

Unlike the present case, in each of those cases, the allegedly tortious conduct of the municipalities was inextricably linked to the operation of the water utility for corporate gain.Elliott, at 413, citing Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358 (1904); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582 (1921); and Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143 (1974). There must be a direct link, then, between the municipal authority and the pecuniary benefit.

" When a municipality derives substantial revenue from its commercial use of municipal property, it has been considered nonetheless to be engaged in a proprietary function even if it reinvests that revenue back into the property's maintenance expenses or to pay down debt related to the property. See Carta v. Norwalk, [108 Conn. 697, 702, 145 A. 158 (1929)] (if municipality is deriving revenue or profit from renting its property, fact that it is 'applied to the maintenance of the property and the reduction of the debt incurred in its construction or acquirement, or otherwise ultimately to the benefit of the public, is not sufficient to create the immunity'); Hourigan v. Norwich, [77 Conn. 358, 365, 59 A. 487 (1904)] (municipality 'uses works constructed for the public benefit for its corporate profit, when the profits are to be applied to the maintenance of the works and the reduction of the debt incurred by the corporation in their construction')." Considine v. Waterbury, supra, 848.

When a municipality derives substantial revenue from its commercial use of municipal property, it has been considered nonetheless to be engaged in a proprietary function even if it reinvests that revenue back into the property's maintenance expenses or to pay down debt related to the property. See Carta v. Norwalk, supra, 108 Conn. at 702, 145 A. 158 (if municipality is deriving revenue or profit from renting its property, fact that it is " applied to the maintenance of the property and the reduction of the debt incurred in its construction or acquirement, or otherwise ultimately to the benefit of the public, is not sufficient to create the immunity"); Hourigan v. Norwich, supra, 77 Conn. at 365, 59 A. 487 (municipality " uses works constructed for the public benefit for its corporate profit, when the profits are to be applied to the maintenance of the works and the reduction of the debt incurred by the corporation in their construction"); but cf. Coleman v. Kootsillas, 456 Mich. 615, 621, 575 N.W.2d 527 (1998) (if revenue generated from activity " is used only to pay current and long-range expenses involved in operating the activity, this could indicate that the primary purpose of the activity was not to produce a pecuniary profit"). Accordingly, it has been stated that a municipality is engaged in a proprietary function when it acts " very much like private enterprise . . ."

At common law in our state ". . . like obligations and duties are imposed upon a city performing proprietary functions as are imposed upon a company when governed by comparable statutory or charter language; Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150 (1974); also it has been held that "a town owning property for purposes of gain is liable for the negligence of its servants in dealing with that property." Horrigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 365 (1904). As noted, the plaintiff alleges in his complaint and supports by his affidavit that at the time of the accident he worked for an organization that leased space from a school which the defendant Board admits it controlled and managed.

Provision of utilities for profit, such as the operation of a water works, has been ruled proprietary. Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143 (1974); Richmond v. City of Norwalk, 96 Conn. 582 (1921); Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358 (1904). A proprietary function is an act "done in the management of [a city's] property or rights for its own corporate benefit or profit and that of its inhabitants."