Hourigan v. Norwich

28 Citing cases

  1. Considine v. Waterbury

    279 Conn. 830 (Conn. 2006)   Cited 196 times
    Finding statute was an attempt to codify municipal common-law tort liability

    At common law, a municipality was, under certain circumstances, immune from liability for the torts it committed. See, e.g., Abbot v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150 and n. 2, 355 A.2d 68 (1974); Carta v. Norwalk, supra, 108 Conn. 701-702; Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 364-65, 59 A. 487 (1904). The source of this municipal immunity was the state's sovereign immunity.

  2. Blonski v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n

    309 Conn. 282 (Conn. 2013)   Cited 11 times
    In Blonski v. Metropolitan District Commission, 309 Conn. 282, 284, 71 A.3d 465 (2013), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had negligently maintained the gate in an unsafe and dangerous condition and that the defendant's conduct was connected to the defendant's proprietary function of operating a water supply company.

    In addition, we observe that the defendant appears to have adopted the plaintiff's dual characterization of its functions—those in relation to its supply of water being proprietary and those in relation to its provision of recreational space being governmental—although it disagrees as to which function the plaintiff's allegations of negligence relate. The defendant therefore has neither challenged this court's prior decisions that the supply of water is proprietary whenever revenues are generated thereby; see Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, supra, 275 Conn. at 53, 881 A.2d 194;Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150, 355 A.2d 68 (1974); Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 364–66, 59 A. 487 (1904); nor asserted that the allegations in the present case relate to its statutory duty to construct and maintain public roads under the special act that chartered the defendant. See 20 Spec. Acts 1204, No. 511, § 2 (1929).

  3. Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission

    275 Conn. 38 (Conn. 2005)   Cited 262 times
    Deciding as matter of law that defendant's decision whether to supervise, inspect, maintain, close or barricade trails was discretionary rather than ministerial

    The municipal operation of a water utility for corporate profit is a proprietary function. See Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150, 355 A.2d 68 (1974); Richmond v. Norwich, supra, 588; Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 364-66, 59 A. 487 (1904). A municipal entity is subject to liability pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (1) (B), however, only if its allegedly tortious conduct was inextricably linked to a proprietary function.

  4. Elliott v. Waterbury

    245 Conn. 385 (Conn. 1998)   Cited 360 times
    Holding that legal concepts of wanton, reckless, willful, intentional and malicious conduct are indistinguishable

    The plaintiff's claim, rather, is that the alleged conduct did not constitute governmental acts because it concerned a proprietary, as opposed to a public activity, namely, the operation of a water utility. In support of her claim, the plaintiff relies upon three cases involving negligence actions arising out of a municipality's operation of a water utility: Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 59 A. 487 (1904); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 115 A. 11 (1921); and Abbot v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 355 A.2d 68 (1974). In each of those cases, this court concluded that the municipal defendants could not avail themselves of immunity because the municipalities engaged in the allegedly tortious actions for the sake of corporate gain rather than for the administration of government.

  5. Manning v. City of Pasadena

    58 Cal.App. 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922)   Cited 16 times
    In Manning v. City of Pasadena, 58 Cal.App. 666 [ 209 P. 253], it was held that the sale of garbage by the city after its collection did not convert the governmental activity into a proprietary function so as to render the city liable for the negligent acts of its employees while engaged in gathering the garbage together.

    Excepting as the above facts may be evidence thereof, there is no evidence in the record that the city of Pasadena was conducting a garbage business for the purpose of making a profit. [1] However, the respondent takes the position that the foregoing facts show that the defendant city was at the time and under the circumstances delineated conducting the garbage business for a profit and that the defendant city is liable for the negligence of its servants in the performance of the duties cast upon them in gathering together the garbage, and in this behalf respondent cites McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, sections 2625, 2673; Chicago v. Selz-Schwab Co., 104 Ill. App. 376, 381; Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 365 [ 59 A. 487]; Judson v. Borough, 80 Conn. 384 [15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 91, 68 A. 999]. As we understand the appellant, its position is that without regard to what may be the rule in other states, the facts of this case do not show that at the time of the accident the city of Pasadena was engaged in the garbage business for profit, and therefore the respondent did not bring himself within any exception to the above rule that cities, as subordinate agencies of the state, are intrusted with the exercise of limited governmental powers for the benefit of the local public in the performance of which, in this state, there being no statutory provision to the contrary, they are not liable for the negligence of their officers, agents, and servants through whom they act.

  6. Jamele v. Town of Watertown

    UWYCV166029417 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jun. 7, 2018)

    Our Supreme Court has held that "the supply of water is proprietary whenever revenues are generated thereby ..." (Citations omitted.) Blonski v. Metropolitan District Commission, 309 Conn. 282, 290 n.6, 71 A.3d 465 (2013); see Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, 275 Conn. 38, 53, 881 A.2d 194 (2005); Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150, 355 A.2d 68 (1974); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 588, 115 A. 11 (1921); Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 365-66, 59 A. 487 (1904). The defendant seeks to distinguish itself from the tenets of these cases by submitting the affidavit of Vincent Caterino, the Superintendent of the Water and Sewer Department, who attests that the defendant does not own its own water supply, but rather provides its residents with water it purchases from the City of Waterbury.

  7. Collins v. Olin Corp.

    418 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Conn. 2006)   Cited 12 times
    In Collins v. Olin Corp., 418 F.Supp.2d 34 (D.Conn. 2006), several homeowners brought a putative class action against a town and private corporation, seeking damages and injunctive relief for the diminution in the value of their properties due to alleged contamination of their soil and groundwater.

    Unlike the present case, in each of those cases, the allegedly tortious conduct of the municipalities was inextricably linked to the operation of the water utility for corporate gain.Elliott, at 413, citing Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358 (1904); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582 (1921); and Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143 (1974). There must be a direct link, then, between the municipal authority and the pecuniary benefit.

  8. Roberts v. Sewerage Water Board

    634 So. 2d 341 (La. 1994)   Cited 178 times
    In Roberts, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that "[i]n the absence of positive law to the contrary, a local government unit may be deemed to be a juridical person separate and distinct from other government entities, when the organic law grants it the legal capacity to function independently and not just as the agency or division of another governmental entity."

    Other courts have found the relationship between quasi-independent boards and the municipality sufficient to support the municipality's liability for a board's torts. Hourigan vs. Norwich, 59 A. 487 (Conn. 1904); Fine vs. Mayor Council of Wilmington, 94 A.2d 393 (Del. 1953); St. Germain vs. Fall River, 59 N.E. 447 (Mass. 1901); Reed vs Syracuse, 120 N.W. 180 (Neb. 1909); Seeley vs. Amsterdam, 66 N.Y.S. 221 (N Y App. Div. 1900).

  9. Glenn v. Raleigh

    246 N.C. 469 (N.C. 1957)   Cited 40 times
    Holding that defendant-city's generation of revenue from activity precluded governmental immunity

    "However, if property is not held and used by the city for municipal purposes exclusively, but in considerable part as a source of revenue, the city is responsible, as a private owner would be, for injury sustained through its negligence. Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 365, 59 A. 487; Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, 502, 3 Am.Rep. 485; Chafor v. Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478, 163 P. 670, L.R.A. 1917E, 685, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 106; 6 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, p. 5512 . . . . In the present-case the amount of annual rental accruing to the city ($2,500) is such as to remove it, at least prima facie, from the category of such incidental income, and to import such a `special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit' as to exclude the application of the rule of governmental immunity. It may be that a further development of facts may alter the situation, but the plaintiff's evidence and the required inferences therefrom were sufficient to protect him from a nonsuit on this ground.

  10. Tierney v. Correia

    120 Conn. 140 (Conn. 1935)   Cited 24 times

    Whether the town actually made or lost money under its contract with the State is not of legal significance. It built the road as a contractor with the State, which furnished the money, and the jury could reasonably have found that it entered into the contract for its special corporate benefit and pecuniary profit, thereby depriving it of the right to claim the benefit of governmental immunity. Carta v. Norwalk, 108 Conn. 697, 145 A. 158; Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 59 A. 487. The defendant D. Maselli Son, Inc., appeals from the denial of its motion to set aside the verdict upon the ground that there was neither allegation nor proof that it was responsible for the negligence of Correia.