At common law, a municipality was, under certain circumstances, immune from liability for the torts it committed. See, e.g., Abbot v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150 and n. 2, 355 A.2d 68 (1974); Carta v. Norwalk, supra, 108 Conn. 701-702; Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 364-65, 59 A. 487 (1904). The source of this municipal immunity was the state's sovereign immunity.

In addition, we observe that the defendant appears to have adopted the plaintiff's dual characterization of its functions—those in relation to its supply of water being proprietary and those in relation to its provision of recreational space being governmental—although it disagrees as to which function the plaintiff's allegations of negligence relate. The defendant therefore has neither challenged this court's prior decisions that the supply of water is proprietary whenever revenues are generated thereby; see Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, supra, 275 Conn. at 53, 881 A.2d 194;Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150, 355 A.2d 68 (1974); Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 364–66, 59 A. 487 (1904); nor asserted that the allegations in the present case relate to its statutory duty to construct and maintain public roads under the special act that chartered the defendant. See 20 Spec. Acts 1204, No. 511, § 2 (1929).

The municipal operation of a water utility for corporate profit is a proprietary function. See Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150, 355 A.2d 68 (1974); Richmond v. Norwich, supra, 588; Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 364-66, 59 A. 487 (1904). A municipal entity is subject to liability pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (1) (B), however, only if its allegedly tortious conduct was inextricably linked to a proprietary function.

The plaintiff's claim, rather, is that the alleged conduct did not constitute governmental acts because it concerned a proprietary, as opposed to a public activity, namely, the operation of a water utility. In support of her claim, the plaintiff relies upon three cases involving negligence actions arising out of a municipality's operation of a water utility: Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 59 A. 487 (1904); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 115 A. 11 (1921); and Abbot v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 355 A.2d 68 (1974). In each of those cases, this court concluded that the municipal defendants could not avail themselves of immunity because the municipalities engaged in the allegedly tortious actions for the sake of corporate gain rather than for the administration of government.

Excepting as the above facts may be evidence thereof, there is no evidence in the record that the city of Pasadena was conducting a garbage business for the purpose of making a profit. [1] However, the respondent takes the position that the foregoing facts show that the defendant city was at the time and under the circumstances delineated conducting the garbage business for a profit and that the defendant city is liable for the negligence of its servants in the performance of the duties cast upon them in gathering together the garbage, and in this behalf respondent cites McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, sections 2625, 2673; Chicago v. Selz-Schwab Co., 104 Ill. App. 376, 381; Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 365 [ 59 A. 487]; Judson v. Borough, 80 Conn. 384 [15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 91, 68 A. 999]. As we understand the appellant, its position is that without regard to what may be the rule in other states, the facts of this case do not show that at the time of the accident the city of Pasadena was engaged in the garbage business for profit, and therefore the respondent did not bring himself within any exception to the above rule that cities, as subordinate agencies of the state, are intrusted with the exercise of limited governmental powers for the benefit of the local public in the performance of which, in this state, there being no statutory provision to the contrary, they are not liable for the negligence of their officers, agents, and servants through whom they act.

Our Supreme Court has held that "the supply of water is proprietary whenever revenues are generated thereby ..." (Citations omitted.) Blonski v. Metropolitan District Commission, 309 Conn. 282, 290 n.6, 71 A.3d 465 (2013); see Martel v. Metropolitan District Commission, 275 Conn. 38, 53, 881 A.2d 194 (2005); Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150, 355 A.2d 68 (1974); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 588, 115 A. 11 (1921); Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 365-66, 59 A. 487 (1904). The defendant seeks to distinguish itself from the tenets of these cases by submitting the affidavit of Vincent Caterino, the Superintendent of the Water and Sewer Department, who attests that the defendant does not own its own water supply, but rather provides its residents with water it purchases from the City of Waterbury.

Unlike the present case, in each of those cases, the allegedly tortious conduct of the municipalities was inextricably linked to the operation of the water utility for corporate gain.Elliott, at 413, citing Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358 (1904); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582 (1921); and Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143 (1974). There must be a direct link, then, between the municipal authority and the pecuniary benefit.

Other courts have found the relationship between quasi-independent boards and the municipality sufficient to support the municipality's liability for a board's torts. Hourigan vs. Norwich, 59 A. 487 (Conn. 1904); Fine vs. Mayor Council of Wilmington, 94 A.2d 393 (Del. 1953); St. Germain vs. Fall River, 59 N.E. 447 (Mass. 1901); Reed vs Syracuse, 120 N.W. 180 (Neb. 1909); Seeley vs. Amsterdam, 66 N.Y.S. 221 (N Y App. Div. 1900).

"However, if property is not held and used by the city for municipal purposes exclusively, but in considerable part as a source of revenue, the city is responsible, as a private owner would be, for injury sustained through its negligence. Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 365, 59 A. 487; Oliver v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 489, 502, 3 Am.Rep. 485; Chafor v. Long Beach, 174 Cal. 478, 163 P. 670, L.R.A. 1917E, 685, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 106; 6 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, p. 5512 . . . . In the present-case the amount of annual rental accruing to the city ($2,500) is such as to remove it, at least prima facie, from the category of such incidental income, and to import such a `special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit' as to exclude the application of the rule of governmental immunity. It may be that a further development of facts may alter the situation, but the plaintiff's evidence and the required inferences therefrom were sufficient to protect him from a nonsuit on this ground.

Whether the town actually made or lost money under its contract with the State is not of legal significance. It built the road as a contractor with the State, which furnished the money, and the jury could reasonably have found that it entered into the contract for its special corporate benefit and pecuniary profit, thereby depriving it of the right to claim the benefit of governmental immunity. Carta v. Norwalk, 108 Conn. 697, 145 A. 158; Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 59 A. 487. The defendant D. Maselli Son, Inc., appeals from the denial of its motion to set aside the verdict upon the ground that there was neither allegation nor proof that it was responsible for the negligence of Correia.