The municipal operation of a water utility for corporate profit is a proprietary function. See Abbott v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150, 355 A.2d 68 (1974); Richmond v. Norwich, supra, 588; Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 364-66, 59 A. 487 (1904). A municipal entity is subject to liability pursuant to § 52-557n (a) (1) (B), however, only if its allegedly tortious conduct was inextricably linked to a proprietary function.

The plaintiff's claim, rather, is that the alleged conduct did not constitute governmental acts because it concerned a proprietary, as opposed to a public activity, namely, the operation of a water utility. In support of her claim, the plaintiff relies upon three cases involving negligence actions arising out of a municipality's operation of a water utility: Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 59 A. 487 (1904); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn. 582, 115 A. 11 (1921); and Abbot v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 355 A.2d 68 (1974). In each of those cases, this court concluded that the municipal defendants could not avail themselves of immunity because the municipalities engaged in the allegedly tortious actions for the sake of corporate gain rather than for the administration of government.

Id., 850. In the course of distinguishing between governmental and proprietary acts, the court stated: "This court explained in Hourigan v. Norwich [ 77 Conn. 358, 364, 59 A. 487 (1904)], that when the state performs its governmental function through an agent, `the agent cannot be sued for injuries resulting from a strict performance of the agency. In such case the act is regarded as the act of the [s]tate and not that of the agent, who is the mere instrument of the [s]tate and nothing more. . . .' Similarly, a municipality is the agent of the state `in the exercise of certain governmental powers . . . [and when] the [s]tate imposes upon an incorporated city the absolute duty of performing some act which the [s]tate may lawfully perform and pertaining to the administration of government, the city in the performance of that duty may be clothed with the immunities belonging to the mere agent of the [s]tate. . . . '" Considine v. Water-bury, supra, 279 Conn. 841.

" When a municipality derives substantial revenue from its commercial use of municipal property, it has been considered nonetheless to be engaged in a proprietary function even if it reinvests that revenue back into the property's maintenance expenses or to pay down debt related to the property. See Carta v. Norwalk, [108 Conn. 697, 702, 145 A. 158 (1929)] (if municipality is deriving revenue or profit from renting its property, fact that it is 'applied to the maintenance of the property and the reduction of the debt incurred in its construction or acquirement, or otherwise ultimately to the benefit of the public, is not sufficient to create the immunity'); Hourigan v. Norwich, [77 Conn. 358, 365, 59 A. 487 (1904)] (municipality 'uses works constructed for the public benefit for its corporate profit, when the profits are to be applied to the maintenance of the works and the reduction of the debt incurred by the corporation in their construction')." Considine v. Waterbury, supra, 848.

When a municipality derives substantial revenue from its commercial use of municipal property, it has been considered nonetheless to be engaged in a proprietary function even if it reinvests that revenue back into the property's maintenance expenses or to pay down debt related to the property. See Carta v. Norwalk, supra, 108 Conn. at 702, 145 A. 158 (if municipality is deriving revenue or profit from renting its property, fact that it is " applied to the maintenance of the property and the reduction of the debt incurred in its construction or acquirement, or otherwise ultimately to the benefit of the public, is not sufficient to create the immunity"); Hourigan v. Norwich, supra, 77 Conn. at 365, 59 A. 487 (municipality " uses works constructed for the public benefit for its corporate profit, when the profits are to be applied to the maintenance of the works and the reduction of the debt incurred by the corporation in their construction"); but cf. Coleman v. Kootsillas, 456 Mich. 615, 621, 575 N.W.2d 527 (1998) (if revenue generated from activity " is used only to pay current and long-range expenses involved in operating the activity, this could indicate that the primary purpose of the activity was not to produce a pecuniary profit"). Accordingly, it has been stated that a municipality is engaged in a proprietary function when it acts " very much like private enterprise . . ."

Another possible theory of negligent liability under § 52-557n would lie under subsection (a)(1)(B) which provides for liability for "(B) negligence in the performance of functions from which the political subdivision derives a special corporate profit or pecuniary benefit." This codifies a common-law exception to municipal immunity recognized over the years by our case law, see Horrigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 365 (1904); Richmond v. Norwich, 96 Conn.App. 582, 588 (1921); Abbot v. Bristol, 167 Conn. 143, 150 (1974); Elliot v. Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 413 (1998) and Martel v. Metropolitan District Comm., 275 Conn. 38, 53 (2005) rely on the codification of this common law set forth in subsection (a)(1)(B). The advantage to a plaintiff in being able to rely on negligence in the performance of a proprietary function is that it may prevent the municipality and possiblly its employees from relying on the discretionary activity exception to immunity also set forth in § 52-557n.