A defendant cannot be considered to be "doing business" in Arizona unless engaged in a systematic end continuous course of business. Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 112 Ariz. 365, 367, 542 P.2d 24, 27 (1975). It is apparent that Martin-Baker does not do business under this standard.
In contrast, the presence in Arizona of the allegedly infringing items in this case was not established by Amba, and thus the cited cases do not support personal jurisdiction here. See Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 112 Ariz. 365, 542 P.2d 24 (1975). Moreover, we think it was essential for Amba to show that the imitations were sold in Arizona or to Arizona consumers by either Jobar or the California mail order houses to which it sold in order to establish an "event" within the meaning of Rule 4(e)(2).
Injury in Arizona resulting from an out-of-state event is insufficient to establish jurisdiction under Rule 4(e)(2). See Amba Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Jobar International, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1977); Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 112 Ariz. 365, 542 P.2d 24 (1975). The hospital is not doing business in Arizona.
Did these defendants cause an event to occur in this state out of which the plaintiffs' claim arose? In Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 112 Ariz. 365, 542 P.2d 24 (1975), our Supreme Court held that where the actual damage causing event did not occur in this state, and the only nexus with this state was the effects of the event, the requisite "minimum contact" with Arizona is not met. Here, the actual damage causing event, i.e. ingestion of the drug, occurred in Ohio during the mother's pregnancy.
At the outset it is to be noted that once jurisdiction has been challenged, the burden of proving its presence rests on the party asserting it. Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp. (1975), 112 Ariz. 365, 542 P.2d 24, 26; Williams v. Connolly (D.C. Minn. 1964), 227 F. Supp. 539. Tortious Act Theory
Arizona's longarm statute establishes personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the maximum extent permitted by due process. Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 112 Ariz. 365, 542 P.2d 24, 26 (1975). Due process requires the defendants to have certain minimum contacts with the forum so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Amba's bare allegation of harm or injury suffered in the forum state does not constitute an "event" occurring within the state and thus does not by itself confer personal jurisdiction under Arizona's long-arm rule. See Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 112 Ariz. 365, 542 P.2d 24 (1975). Rather, the actual damage-causing event must have occurred in Arizona, not merely the effect of the event.
Arizona's long arm statute establishes personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the maximum extent permitted by due process. Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066, 105 S.Ct. 2143, 85 L.Ed.2d 500 (1985); Roughton v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 112 Ariz. 365, 367, 542 P.2d 24, 26 (1975). Thus, the only real issue before this court is whether exercising personal jurisdiction over this nonresident defendant comports with due process.
Arizona's long arm statute establishes personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the maximum extent permitted by due process. Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1066, 105 S.Ct. 2143, 85 L.Ed.2d 500 (1985); Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 112 Ariz. 365, 367, 542 P.2d 24, 26 (1975). Due process requires that a defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Of course, with defendant Ex-Lax dismissed from the case by virtue of the instant order, plaintiff may wish to voluntarily dismiss this case and sue in Arizona where in personam jurisdiction over both defendants may well be available. See Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 112 Ariz. 365, 542 P.2d 24 (1975). In accordance with the foregoing, it is, by the Court, this 23rd day of December, 1976,