Nos. 05-08-00979-CR, 05-08-00980-CR, 05-08-00981-CR
Opinion Filed March 30, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F05-71598-HKT, F06-67969-QKT, F08-54964-LT.
Before Justices RICHTER, LANG, and MURPHY.
Opinion By Justice RICHTER.
James Aurther Houghtaling appeals from the revocation of his community supervision in two cases and his conviction in one case. In seven points of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision in two cases and by sentencing him to imprisonment in each case. We affirm the trial court's judgments.
Background
In cause nos. 05-08-00979-CR and 05-08-00980-CR, appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at less than $1500, enhanced with two prior theft convictions, and robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 29.02(a), 31.03(a), (e)(4)(D) (Vernon 2003 Supp. 2008). The trial court assessed punishment at two years' confinement in a state jail facility, probated for five years, for the theft conviction, ten years' imprisonment, probated for five years, for the robbery conviction, and $750 fines in each case. The State later moved to revoke appellant's community supervision, alleging several violations, including committing a possession of cocaine offense. In a hearing on the motions, appellant pleaded true to the allegations. The trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and assessed punishment at two years' confinement in a state jail facility for the theft and five years' imprisonment for the robbery. In cause no. 05-08-00981-CR, appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine in an amount less than one gram. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a), (b) (Vernon 2003). The trial court assessed punishment at two years' confinement in a state jail facility. Applicable Law
Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). In determining questions concerning sufficiency of the evidence in probation revocation cases, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. An order revoking probation must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. Id. at 763-64. A finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd.). Thus, in order to prevail, appellant must successfully challenge all the findings that support the revocation order. See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Harris v. State, 160 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, no pet.). Discussion
In his first, second, third, and fourth points of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision in the theft and robbery cases by not specifying which allegation it found he violated. Appellant asserts the judgments failed to satisfy the minimum requirements of due process because they fail to specify the allegations the trial court found true. The State responds that appellant did not request that specific findings be included in the judgments, and the trial court is not required to make specific findings. Texas courts require a defendant to make a request for specific findings. See King v. State, 649 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983). In the absence of such a request, the trial court's failure to make specific findings in the order revoking community supervision is not reversible error. Id. Here, appellant did not request specific findings. Moreover, the motions to revoke are included in the record, and the judgments recite the trial court found the allegations had been proven. We overrule appellant's first, second, third, and fourth points of error. In his fifth, sixth, and seventh points of error, appellant contends the trial court erred and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing him to a prison term rather than continuing his community supervision because the sentences were not necessary to prevent the recurrence of the alleged offenses. Appellant asserts the evidence shows he suffers from the debilitating effects of AIDS and is a good candidate for continued probation. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaints for appellate review and, alternatively, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in assessing appellant's sentences. Appellant did not complain about the sentences either at the time they were imposed or in motions for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Moreover, the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory ranges for the offenses. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 12.34, 12.35 (Vernon 2003); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). We conclude the trial court did not err in assessing the sentences. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). We overrule appellant's fifth, sixth, and seventh points of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.