Opinion
3:22-cv-218-KAP
12-05-2023
THOMAS HOUGE, Plaintiff v. TROOPER JASON KIDD, et al., Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDATION
KEITH A. PESTO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Thomas Houge filed a complaint when he was in custody at the Bedford County Correctional Facility that is subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. After screening under the PLRA, I recommend that the complaint, ECF no. 12, be dismissed with a time-limited leave to amend.
Report
This is filed as a Report and Recommendation because in Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198 (3d Cir. 2022), the Court of Appeals held that in cases where judgment may be appropriate as to parties that have not consented before judgment to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1)(C), the Magistrate Judge should proceed by Report and Recommendation to the District Court, which has Article III authority to dismiss parties and enter final judgment in the matter in favor of parties who have not filed a consent. Ordering service of a complaint to determine whether parties in whose favor judgment would be entered would consent to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1)(C) would waste scarce resources. Accordingly, regardless of any consent or lack thereof by the plaintiff, this format is used because review indicates that this matter should be dismissed.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act's screening requirements for inmate litigants proceeding in forma pauperis are set out at 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2):
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that -
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal -
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.See also 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A. The complaint fails to state a claim.
This matter began in November 2022, when plaintiff Houge sent the Court a two-page letter complaining about his arrest at a gas station in Bedford for disorderly conduct and other offenses on May 28, 2022, and his subsequent detention at the Bedford County Correctional Facility. The arrest resulted in a prosecution at Commonwealth v. Houge, CP-05-CR-248-2022 (C.P.Bedford). Houge's correspondence was docketed as a complaint and I advised plaintiff Houge that he needed to pay the filing fee or submit a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Houge filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis with a new version of the complaint dated February 4, 2023, on a standard Administrative Office Form. That version of the complaint, at ECF no. 12, is the operative version. In February 2023, I told plaintiff Houge that he must provide copies of the complaint and directions for service on each defendant. After that, Houge began sending correspondence and papers styled as motions for summary judgment, ECF no. 16, for temporary restraining orders, ECF no. 17, ECF no. 19, ECF no. 20, ECF no. 25, and for a writ of habeas corpus, ECF no. 34. The captions on various papers suggested Houge believed there were additional defendants.
After February 2023, the Clerk's Office was mailing Houge forms for service and waiting to receive service copies of the complaint. Houge filed various pleadings advising of his dissatisfaction with ongoing events that I characterized as fantastic or delusional attempts to obtain temporary restraining orders or summary judgment. ECF no. 21. At some point Houge was transferred to Torrance State Hospital, apparently for a mental health evaluation. Houge notified the Clerk of this in June 2023. Meanwhile, Houge was also charged criminally for actions alleged to have occurred in August 2022 while he was a pretrial detainee. Commonwealth v. Houge, CP-05-CR-425-2022 (C.P.Bedford) and Commonwealth v. Houge, CP-05-CR-322-2023 (C.P.Bedford).
According to the public docket sheets, all three criminal cases resulted in pleas and sentences on August 4, 2023: Houge received two concurrent 1-12 month sentences and a consecutive 1 month sentence, and there were no appeals docketed. In July 2023 Houge had sent correspondence from Torrance and from the Bedford County Correctional Facility referring elliptically to events in custody at both places and advising that he intended to amend the complaint, see e.g., ECF no. 43 (he would be “adding 10 more defendants”), but he has not updated his address. The sentences imposed would have made Houge eligible for parole on the day of sentencing and a call to the Bedford County Correctional Facility confirmed that Houge was released on August 4, 2023.
As I previously noted, the Supreme Court held in Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) that “the in forma pauperis statute ... accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless,” such as “claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios....” It is not implausible that an inmate's civil rights can be violated by law enforcement personnel or corrections officials, but a court can only examine what is set forth in a complaint and not what might be alleged. The claims in the complaint at ECF no. 12 that defendants have caused Houge hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of damages by, inter alia, murdering him are clearly fantastic and delusional. Where the claims are not fantastic, the more prosaic defect in the complaint is that Houge's claims lack any supporting facts. In the section for setting forth the facts supporting a claim, Houge states in full:
I was wrongfully arrested, illegally and unconstitutionally detained, falsely charged, held without a lawyer/bail/trial, starved dehydrated, tortured, sleep deprived, murdered (slowly, with fast attempts), assaulted, knocked out, sexually harassed, drugged, poisoned, stolen from, identity thieved, blackmailed, medically blackmailed, stalked, harassed, and a lot more. They stole everyone and everything that I have.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) requires a complaint to be a short and plain statement containing sufficient factual matter that if accepted as true would state a legal claim that is plausible on its face. Conclusory listing of claims or elements of claims is not adequate. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In the Supreme Court's words, plaintiff must allege enough facts in the complaint to “nudge” a claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id., 556 U.S. at 683, quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Further, plaintiff must in a nonconclusory way allege facts that permit the inference that each named defendant is liable. See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir.2005); Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015).
Houge's complaint fails to inform any defendant what alleged actions make that defendant liable to Houge. As the summer went on and attempts were made to obtain copies of the complaint and service paperwork, my hope was that Houge would return from Torrance and submit a complaint in a format that could be served. Nothing has been heard from Houge, however, since he or someone on his behalf sent a money order for service copies of the complaint in August 2023 and given the choice between serving a complaint that fails to state a claim, waiting indefinitely for amendments, and recommending that the complaint be dismissed before service for failure to state a claim, I recommend dismissal.
The Court of Appeals, in Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir.2002) and similar cases, directs district courts to allow plaintiffs in civil rights cases leave to amend unless that amendment is “futile” or “inequitable.” The Court of Appeals also directs that with two exceptions “federal courts treat pro se litigants the same as any other litigant.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). Those exceptions are liberal construction of pleadings - which does not relieve pro se plaintiffs from alleging sufficient facts in their complaints - id., 704 F.3d at 245, and giving notice to pro se inmate litigants when a motion to dismiss will be treated as a summary judgment motion. Id. The liberal construction of pleadings does not mean the court should imagine that unpleaded facts might exist. It is further clear that since Houge has been convicted of the charge for which he was arrested at the outset of this matter, any claims that imply the invalidity of that arrest and prosecution are barred. Houge may be able to articulate a claim but in light of the history of this matter, including Houge's failure to supply the Clerk with a change of address, a time limit should be placed on any amendment of the complaint. If the complaint is not promptly amended, as it stands it should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1), the plaintiff is being given notice at his most recent possible address that he can within fourteen days file written objections to my recommendation. In the absence of timely and specific objections, any appeal would be severely hampered or entirely defaulted. See EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).