Opinion
June 3, 1996
Appeal from the Court of Claims (Silverman, J.).
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof which denied the branch of the appellant's motion which was to dismiss so much of the claim as is based on Labor Law § 240 and by substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The claimant seeks to impose liability on the appellant pursuant to Labor Law § 200 (1), § 240, and § 241 (6). The Court of Claims granted the appellant's motion to dismiss the claim to the extent of dismissing so much of the claim as is based on Labor Law § 241 (6).
We agree with the appellant that so much of the claim as is based on Labor Law § 240 should also have been dismissed inasmuch as the present case is governed by the principles of Federal maritime law ( see, Tompkins v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 217 A.D.2d 269; Torres v. City of New York, 177 A.D.2d 97, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 759, cert denied 507 U.S. 986; Suto v. Coastal Dry Dock Repair Corp., 153 A.D.2d 937; see also, Shea v. Rev-Lyn Contr. Co., 868 F.2d 515). Moreover, we find no basis for distinguishing between bridge repair work and pier repair work ( see, Tompkins v. Port of N Y Auth., supra; Irvin v. Amerada Hess Corp., 191 A.D.2d 478) for the purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient nexus to maritime activities.
However, in light of the absence of any pretrial discovery and the claimant's affidavit, which tends to show that the appellant's agents actively supervised the project in question, we affirm so much of the order as denied the branch of the appellant's motion which was to dismiss so much of the claim as is based on Labor Law § 200 (1) ( see, Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 505-506). Rosenblatt, J.P., Copertino, Altman and Friedmann, JJ., concur.