Hot Springs Plumbing Heating Co. v. Wallace

19 Citing cases

  1. Spaeth v. Becktell

    150 Or. 111 (Or. 1935)   Cited 1 times
    Concluding that the timing, as well as other aspects of the evidence, indicated that not all of the line items were "contemplated by the parties to be considered as a part of one entire continuous contract"

    The theory of the plaintiff is that the work was performed and the materials furnished under and pursuant to a "continuing" contract entered into with the owner of the hotel building in May, 1927. In other words, plaintiff asserts that all the items set forth in his notice of lien are parts of one continuous connected transaction: Van Wart v. Rees, 112 Me. 404 ( 92 A. 328); Darlington Lumber Co. v. Smith Building Co., 134 Mo. App. 316 ( 114 S.W. 77); Hot Springs Plumbing Heating Co. v. Wallace, 38 N.M. 3 ( 27 P.2d 984). If this be true, it is not necessary, as stated in 40 C.J. 200, "that all the work or materials should be ordered at one time, that the amount of work or quantity of materials should be determined at the time of the first order, or that the prices should then be agreed upon, or the time of payment fixed; * * *." The rule is thus stated in Phillips on Mechanics' Liens (3d Ed.), § 229:

  2. Garrett Bldg. Centers, Inc. v. Hale

    95 N.M. 450 (N.M. 1981)   Cited 9 times
    In Garrett Bldg. Centers, Inc. v. Hale, 95 N.M. 450, 453, 623 P.2d 570, 573 (1981), a case involving an unacknowledged, but recorded mechanic's lien, the New Mexico Supreme Court noted in dicta that, while "[t]he filing of the lien served to place the owner of the property to be charged on notice of the lienor's claim[,] [s]ubsequent purchasers and other parties in interest were not affected because the lien was not considered of record, even though filed."

    The verification requirement is a part of that law and is to be afforded the same liberal treatment. In Hot Springs Plumbing Heating Co. v. Wallace, 38 N.M. 3, 27 P.2d 984 (1933), the dissent of Justice Freeman in Minor v. Marshall, 6 N.M. 194, 27 P. 481 (1891), was adopted as the proper standard for the liberal construction to be afforded verifications. The Hot Springs court quotes the dissent with approval as follows:

  3. Furr's Supermarkets v. Richardson Richardson

    315 B.R. 776 (D.N.M. 2004)   Cited 3 times

    In New Mexico, the Mechanic's and Materialmen's Liens statute, Section 48-2-1 NMSA 1978, et seq. was intended to be remedial in nature and equitable in enforcement and therefore, should be liberally construed. Lyons v. Howard, 16 N.M. 327, 117 P. 842 (1911); Hot Springs Plumbing Heating Co. v. Wallace, 38 N.M. 3, 27 P.2d 984 (1933); Ford v. Springer Land Ass'n, 8 N.M. 37, 41 P. 541 (1895), aff'd, 168 U.S. 513, 18 S.Ct. 170, 42 L.Ed. 562 (1897) ("The Courts of New Mexico are committed to the doctrine that `the mechanic's lien law is remedial in its nature and equitable in its enforcement and is to be construed liberally'"). The object of the Mechanic's Lien Law in New Mexico is to protect those who, by their labor, services, skill or materials furnished, have enhanced the value of the property sought to be charged.

  4. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Richardson Richardson

    No. CIV 03-1277 MCA/LCS (D.N.M. Aug. 23, 2004)

    In New Mexico, the Mechanic's and Materialmen's Liens statute, Section 48-2-1 NMSA 1978, et seq. was intended to be remedial in nature and equitable in enforcement and therefore, should be liberally construed. Lyons v. Howard, 16 N.M. 327 (1911); Hot Springs Plumbing Heating Co. v. Wallace, 38 N.M. 3 (1933); Ford v. Springer Land Ass'n, 8 N.M. 37 (1885), aff'd, 168 U.S. 51, 513 (1897) ("The Courts of New Mexico are committed to the doctrine that `the mechanic's lien law is remedial in its nature and equitable in its enforcement and is to be construed liberally'"). The object of the Mechanic's Lien Law in New Mexico is to protect those who, by their labor, services, skill or materials furnished, have enhanced the value of the property sought to be changed.

  5. White v. Diamond Intern. Corp.

    665 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1983)   Cited 2 times

    "`* * * where it appears that the miner or mechanic has used words which by plain intendment were designed to operate as a verification, and where it is evident that the miner or mechanic was endeavoring to secure the benefit of the statute provided for such cases, and where such statement is sworn to, it ought to be regarded as a verification, within the meaning of the statute.'" 372 P.2d at 380, quoting from Hot Springs Plumbing Heating Co. v. Wallace, 38 N.M. 3, 27 P.2d 984, 990 (1934). After citing the above rule, the court went on to hold in Home Plumbing and Contracting Company that one of the challenged lien statements was not in substantial compliance because the statement failed to contain "any words whatsoever which by intendment, plain, or otherwise, `were designed to operate as a verification.'"

  6. First Sec. Mortg. Co. v. Hansen

    631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981)   Cited 14 times
    In First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981), the court held that a mechanic's lien was invalid because, though it was properly acknowledged, it was not verified by an oath as to the truth of its contents.

    Instead, substantial compliance was sufficient in the absence of a particular statutorily-prescribed form. In Hot Springs Plumbing Heating Co. v. Wallace, 38 N.M. 3, 27 P.2d 984 (1934), the court also held a verification to be sufficient which specifically verified the name of the property owner and the description of the property, and then generally verified an "itemized statement hereto attached" containing other pertinent statements constituting the basis for the claim of lien. The acknowledgement in this case did not contain even a general verification of the subject matter of the notice of claim.

  7. Daughtrey v. Carpenter

    82 N.M. 173 (N.M. 1970)   Cited 11 times

    The fact that Mr. Bennett may have verified his previous verification and reused a form which had previously been recorded would not be material. Hot Springs Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Wallace, 38 N.M. 3, 27 P.2d 984 (1933). Certainly no prejudice is shown to the owners.

  8. Crego Block Co. v. D. H. Overmyer Co.

    80 N.M. 541 (N.M. 1969)   Cited 4 times

    In view of the above, we cannot say that the statement of "net 30 days" in the claim of lien was not true in that there was a fatal variance between it and the pleadings. Compare Chavez v. Sedillo, 59 N.M. 357, 284 P.2d 1026 (1955) with Hot Springs Plumbing Heating Co. v. Wallace, 38 N.M. 3, 27 P.2d 984 (1933), and Allsop Lumber Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 73 N.M. 64, 385 P.2d 625 (1963). In Weggs v. Kreugel, 28 N.M. 24, 205 P. 730 (1922), this court held, "The primary object of filing the claim is to give notice to subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers and inform the owner of the extent and nature of the lienor's claim."

  9. Allsop Lumber Co. v. Continental Casualty Co.

    73 N.M. 64 (N.M. 1963)   Cited 23 times

    Particularly is this true in the light of our rule that our law should be liberally construed and substantial compliance is all that is required to enjoy its benefits. Home Plumbing and Contracting Company v. Pruitt, 70 N.M. 182, 372 P.2d 378; Hot Springs Plumbing Heating Co. v. Wallace, 38 N.M. 3, 27 P.2d 984. Section 61-2-6, N.M.S.A. 1953, provides that "every person, save the original contractor, claiming the benefit of this article, must within ninety [90] days after the completion of any building, improvement or structure * * *" file his claim.

  10. Home Plumbing and Contracting Company v. Pruitt

    70 N.M. 182 (N.M. 1962)   Cited 15 times

    In Lyons v. Howard, 16 N.M. 327, 117 P. 842, this court applied the rule of liberal construction to a verification there under attack and concluded that it was a sufficient compliance with the statute. In Hot Springs Plumbing Heating Co. v. Wallace, 38 N.M. 3, 27 P.2d 984, the development of the law was again discussed and the rule of liberal construction adhered to, and in this case the following language of Justice Freeman in his dissent in Minor v. Marshall, supra, was quoted as the law: "I think the better rule may be stated as follows, to-wit: That where it appears that the miner or mechanic has used words which by plain intendment were designed to operate as a verification, and where it is evident that the miner or mechanic was endeavoring to secure the benefit of the statute provided for such cases, and where such statement is sworn to, it ought to be regarded as a verification, within the meaning of the statute."